COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy An extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy Volume I COMMITTEE PRINT U.S. House of Representatives COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy An extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy Volume I 1 tr :o ! m j zr □ o o MARINE .. c. l. COMMITTEE PRINT U.S. House of Representatives U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 1977 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 (3-Part Set ; Sold in Sets Only) Stock Number 052-070-04350-4 COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana LESTER L. WOLFF, New York JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts LEO J. RYAN, California CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey DON BONKER, Washington GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts ANDY IRELAND, Florida DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California WYCHE FOWLER, Jr., Georgia E (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas GEORGE E. DANIELSON, California JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff George R. Berdes, Staff Consultant Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas Ivo J. Spalatin, Subcommittee Staff Director William H. Fite, Minority Staff Consultant Forrest R. Frank, Subcommittee Staff Associate La Verne Still, Staff Assistant (ID FOREWORD This publication of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy represents the culmination of 7 years of research and brings together, in a current perspective, results previously published in a series of 15 committee prints of this committee and its Subcommittee on Inter- national Security and Scientific Affairs. In the foreword to the first of the 15 committee prints — an anno- tated bibliography published in March 1970 (superseded by an exten- sive new bibliography in the present collection) — I noted that previ- ous work by the subcommittee had revealed many instances in which U.S. foreign policy had lagged behind technological innovations of worldwide importance. In asking the Congressional Research Service to undertake the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy re- search project, the subcommittee sought to move toward improving xVmerica's performance in this vital area. It seems appropriate here to recapture some of the thoughts ex- pressed in presenting other committee prints of the series. Collec- tively these brief excerpts suggest the broad sweep of the study, the depth and durability of the committee's concern, and why the subject is one of compelling urgency and significance for legislators, officials throughout the executive branch, industrial leaders, scholars, and the American people : With the detonation of the first atomic bomb at Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945 the United States and the world entered the nuclear age. The development of the bomb revolutionized world affairs and set off a strategic arms race. . . . (The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age.) Put to destructive ends by the wrong hands, that discovery [nuclear fission] represents the potential unleashing of a force capable of destroying civilization. However, given wise and prudent management, it also represents the release and increase of human energy capable of opening a new phase in human history. (Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Interaction of American Diplomacy with a New Technology.) As our consciousness of the world as a "global village" intensifies, we are be- coming increasingly aware of the dangers and opportunities involved when tradi- tional values of time and space are no longer relevant. (The Politics of Global Health.) Although our times are often characterized as the Space Age . . ., they might also be characterized as the Sea Age because for the first time human beings have begun to explore below the waters of the world. . . . the seabed has become the object of intense economic, legal, and political interest. This interest is almost (HI) IV directly the result of the increasing capability of nations to exploit the natural resources which lie beneath the sea. (Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed.) Today, in many parts- of the earth, there is a food/people imbalance which causes the lives of millions to he a desperate search for sustenance. . . . In the helief that the food/population equation can he and should he brought into balance, modern man is applying scientific knowledge and technical skills. The United States, through its foreign aid programs, has been in the forefront. . . . (Beyond Malthus: The Food /People Equation.) In the minds of many today the idea of science and technology as oppressive and uncontrollable forces in society is becoming increasingly more prevalent. They see in the power of science and technology the means of destruction in war- fare, the source of environmental violation, and the stimulant behind man's grow- ing alienation. . . . [Often overlooked], however, is the corresponding alterna- tive these influences present for man's good — for his advancement, for the enrich- ment of his life, and for world peace. (The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism.) Science and technology are compelling determinants of the human condition. In September 1975 the United Nations General Assembly voted to convene an international conference on science and technology. The intent of this move was to allow the technologically sophisticated and dynamic elements of the U.N. family to focus the efforts of the 1979 General Assembly on a concerted program of global advance. The agenda of this program would include economic, social, polit- ical, and commercial concerns, but its backbone would be technical and mana- gerial. . . . Leaders of our diplomatic, technological, and national security affairs are not devoid of imagination or insensitive to the oppressive weight of danger and insecurity ahead. However, if these leaders propose to meet future threats with the same strength of purpose and creative initiative that have largely marked the first two centuries of American independence, they must seek new forms and find new applications in a world of growing interdependence. The prob- lem of how to manage our relationships in such a world resolves in large part into the problem of managing technological dynamism and directing it to humane ends. (Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence.) Our purpose was not just to describe and analyze a specialized set of diplomatic problems and opportunities ; it was also, and primarily, to examine America's capability for dealing with these problems and opportunities and to suggest legislative options for improving that capability- This aim was the particular focus of the last two studies of the project : Science and Technology in the Department of State, by Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, the project director, and Science, Tech- nology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence, a summary and analysis of the whole series co-authored by Dr. Huddle and the associate project director, Mr. Warren R. Johnston. To repeat a further thought expressed in presenting the summary report: It is my hope and expectation that these analytical contribu- tions of the Congressional Research Service will prove in a practical way to have yielded three separate sets of products: (1) specific legis- lative options and administrative initiatives to strengthen the conduct of ongoing diplomacy, with its increasingly important and inseparable technical component; (2) encouragement of a consensus toward stronger and longer-range planning of technical initiatives in sup- port of U.S. diplomacy, involving closer cooperation among all ele- ments of the Federal Government; and (3) a more far-reaching par- ticipation in the foreign policy process throughout government at all levels and involving also the academic and technical communities, private industry, and the public at large. The findings contained herein are the responsibility of the individual authors and of the Congressional Research Service and do not neces- sarily reflect the views of the membership of the Committee on Inter- national Relations. Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, Committee on International Relations. January 1978. DOCUMENTS IN THE ORIGINAL STUDY SERIES (These documents are now out of print. They are incorporated, with some minor revisions, in the present volume. The documents are listed here in the order of their publication. An explanation of the different order followed in pre- senting them all together in this volume is given in Chapter Fifteen under the heading, Methodology of the Study.) A Selected, Annotated Bibliography of Articles, Books, Documents, Periodicals, and Reference Guides. (Superseded by Ms. Knezo's bibliography of January 1976/July 1977, reproduced at end of volume III.) Compiled by Genevieve Knezo. (69 pages.) Issued March 1970. Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age. An introduction to the entire study by Franklin P. Huddle. (28 pages.) Issued April 1970. The Evolution of International Technology. A review of the emergence of tech- nology as a factor of change in international relations by Franklin P. Huddle. (70 pages.) Issued December 1970. The Politics of Global Health. A study of worldwide efforts to prevent epidemic disease by Freeman H. Quimby. (79 pages.) Issued May 1971. Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed. A survey of technical, economic, legal, and political considerations involved in using the natural wealth of land below the seas by George A. Doumani. (86 pages, plus appendixes.) Issued July 1971. Beyond Malthus: The Food/ People Equation. A study of the interrelation of food and population and the resulting impact on international affairs by Allan S. Xanes. (96 pages.) Issued October 1971. The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism. A case study of the accomplishments and failures of the massive Indochina works project by Franklin P. Huddle. (86 pages. ) Issued May 1972. The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age. A study of an early, serious attempt to bring atomic energy and weapons under international control by Leneice N. Wu. (67 pages.) Issued August 1972. Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe,: The Interaction of American Diplomacy With a New Technology. Analysis of the interaction during last 30 years between American diplomacy and the technological development of nuclear power in Europe by Warren H. Donnelly. (163 pages.) Issued December 1972. U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy. An assessment of the linkages in U.S.-Soviet relations among diplomacy, economics, and technology transfer by John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday. (105 pages.) Issued June 1973. The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. An analysis of atti- tudes, behavior patterns, and procedures followed in the IGY as a step toward detente by Harold Bullis. (64 pages.) Issued November 1973. U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for Nongovern- mental Scientific Exchange. A study of major Federal programs which send nongovernment U.S. scientists and technical personnel abroad by Genevieve J. Knezo. (163 pages.) Issued April 1974. (VII) VIII Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility. Assessment of the costs and benefits of the migration of technically trained persons, especially from developing to developed countries, by Joseph G. Whelan. (272 pages. ) Issued September 1974. Science and Technology in the Department of State: Bringing Technical Content Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations. This concluding study of the series, by Franklin P. Huddle, analyzes the impact of science and technology on the Department of State, and describes departmental efforts and opportunities to relate science and technology to its mission. (180 pages.) Issued June 1975. Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence. A review of the entire series by Franklin P. Huddle and Warren R. Johnston, with analysis of implications for improved mechanisms and strengthened procedures in both executive and legislative branches. (360 pages, plus 132-page bibli- ography prepared by Genevieve J. Knezo. ) Issued June 1976. Contents — Volume I Page Foreword ni Documents in the Original Series vii Organization of the Study xi Letter of Submittal xin Acknowledgments xv Preface xvii Introduction to the Study as a Whole : Chapter 1 — Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age ■ 1 Chapter 2 — The Global Context of Science, Technology, and Diplomacy . • 37 Part 1 — Six Cases : Chapter 3 — The Baruch Plan : U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age 53 Chapter 4 — Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Interaction of American Diplomacy With a New Tech- nology 123 Chapter 5 — The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year 293 Chapter 6 — The Mekong Project : Opportunities and Prob- lems of Regionalism . 361 Chapter 7 — Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed . . . 435 Chapter 8 — United States-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy 525 (IX) ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY Volume I Introduction to the Study as a Whole Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age The Global Context of Science, Technology, and Diplomacy Part 1 — Six Cases The Baruch Plan Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year The Mekong Project Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed United States-Soviet Commercial Relations Volume II Part 2 — Six Issues The Evolution of International Technology The Politics of Global Health Beyond Malthus U.S. Scientists Abroad Brain Drain Science and Technology in the Department of State Volume III Introduction to the Analysis and Findings Recapitulation of Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the Study Part 3 — Analysis of the Cases and Issues Analysis of the Cases Analysis of the Issues Part 4 — Principal Policy Implications About the Essays to Follow Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-Technology Diplomacy Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions in International Technology Independence Versus Interdependence Long-Range and Short-Range Planning Concluding Observations Bibliography (XI) LETTER OF SUBMITTAL October 28, 1977. Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, Committee on International Relations, and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, B.C. Dear Mr. Chairman : In response to your request of April 6, 1977, I am pleased to submit in edited and updated form the entire set of reports produced for your subcommittee in the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy project and published by the committee be- tween March 1970 and June 1976. These reports, as originally planned, now form an integrated whole. Parts 1 and 2 present the 12 individual case and issue studies in full. Parts 3 and 4 examine the cases and issues from a mid-1977 perspective to shed light on the capabilities and deficiencies of the Federal Govern- ment in dealing with technology-based diplomatic issues. This is the final study phase of the research project that you initiated with your request to this service in September 1969. Since then the project has been under the continuous direction of Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, senior specialist in science and technology, with Mr. Warren R. Johnston as associate project director. Mr. Johnston, who served as assistant chief of the Foreign Affairs Division and then as an assistant director of CRS before his recent retirement, has been responsible, in consultation with Dr. Huddle, for preparing this edited and updated version of the study. The study includes an extensive supplement of July 1977 to the January 1976 annotated bibliography. Both were prepared by Ms. Genevieve J. Knezo, Analyst in Science and Technology. In pre- paring the supplement Ms. Knezo was aided by Mrs. Elaine Carlson, research assistant to Dr. Huddle. Let me convey once again the thanks of all concerned for the oppor- tunity of taking part in this unique research undertaking. Sincerely, Gilbert Gude, Director. (XIII) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It seems fitting on the completion of a research undertaking of the magnitude of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy for the project director and associate director to claim the privilege of giving recognition to the significant contributions to the project. To begin at the beginning : We are indebted to the Honorable Clem- ent J. Zablocki, chairman of the Subcommittee on International Se- curity and Scientific Affairs, for his foresight in initiating the series and his dedicated efforts in seeing it through its completion. In addi- tion, two successive staff consultants of the Subcommittee on Interna- tional Security and Scientific Affairs, Dr. John H. Sullivan and Mr. George R. Berdes, are to be thanked for their constructive guidance during the past 7 years and for the unfailingly sympathetic support of an enterprise that proved more demanding, and extended over a longer period of time, than was originally foreseen. Mr. Ivo J. Spalatin, who has now succeeded them in the important role of subcommittee staff director, and his associates, are also due our thanks for their encour- agement and support in the final stages of this enterprise. Apart from the codirectors, there were 10 authors of studies, as iden- tified at the beginning of this volume under the heading Documents in the Original Study Series. They deserve recognition and gratitude, not merely for superior accomplishment but for their tolerance of strenuous conditions of competing work assignments, their thousands of hours of volunteered overtime, and their assistance in the review and updating of material in the final study. Genevieve J. Knezo pre-- pared both the original annotated bibliography for the series and the current bibliography to be found at the end of this volume. Dr. Huddle's assistant, Mrs. Elaine Carlson, performed many essential editorial and research support tasks. Dozens of others in CRS, over the years, contributed their time and skills in bibliographic, research, and clerical assistance, and in the re- view of studies in draft. CRS Coordinator of Research James W. Robinson reviewed the studies in their entirety and made many helpful suggestions. In addition, many scholars and officials outside CRS were generous with their help in reviewing draft text and providing constructive criticism. Prof. Edgar S. Robinson of American University submitted extensive notes in review of Science and Technology in the Depart- ment of State which were of value in preparing the final study ; he also served as consultant in the preparation of the latter. To him and to the other scholars, too numerous to cite individually, appreciation and thanks are expressed for their assistance in collecting facts, offer- ing suggestions, and encouraging the ultimate completion of this undertaking. A final important acknowledgment : gratitude beyond measure is due our wives, Clare Scott Huddle and Eunice C. Johnston, for years of indispensable support and forbearance. Franklin P. Huddle. Warren R. Johnston. (XV) PREFACE The finding of this study is that U.S. diplomacy is neglecting two powerful instruments of policy formation and policy execution : tech- nological expertise and management skill. Most of the countries of the world look to the United States as the undoubted leader in both tech- nological achievement and in the skills of organization and administra- tion to apply technology effectively. But during the rise of the United States to technological preeminence, the Department of State has given slight attention to the implications of technology for foreign policy. Only meager resources have been spared to search for ways to turn technology to achievement of diplomatic goals. The emerging trend toward congressional participation in the diplo- matic process plays a significant role in this context. The opportunity is at hand for the Congress to examine the uses of technology made by the executive branch toward the purposes of foreign policy. More than that, the study suggests that the necessary teamwork of the legislative branch with the executive branch in the field of foreign policy requires that the Congress equip itself with its own resources of equal diplomatic expertise. The impressive array of technological implications for U.S. diplomacy further requires that these congres- sional resources of diplomatic expertise contain a strong technological element for both current oversight and long-range planning of future initiatives. Technology has made intolerable the consequences of failure to at- tain the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy. But technology also offers many opportunities for the attainment of these objectives. No element of national policy and no component of national program warrants more respect in the short-range or the long-range future of the United States. (xvn) 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AS A WHOLE e which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect World Peace or World Destruction." Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: The United Nations Charter now reflects serious inadequacies. One inade- quacy sprang from ignorance. When we were in San Francisco in the Spring of 1945, none of us knew of the atomic bomb which was to fall on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The Charter is thus a pre-Atomic Age Charter. In this sense it was obsolete before it actually came into force. As one who was at San Francisco, I can say with confidence that if the delegates there bad known that the mysteri- ous and immeasurable power of the atom would be available as a means of mass 11 U.S. President (John P. Kennedy). "Address at the Anniversary Convocation of the National Academy of Sciences." Speech given October 22, 196:5. in Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1963. (Washington, r.s. Government Printing Office, 1964), PP. 802 •". « Opening salutation by Bernard M. Baruch to United Nations Atomic Energy Com- mission, June 14, 1040, before Introducing his plan for the International control of atomic energy. 13 destruction, the provisions of the Charter dealing with disarmament and the regulation of armaments would have been far more emphatic and realistic. 18 Secretary of State Dean Rusk : Today the United States has operational weapons in its arsenal hundreds of times as destructive as that first atom bomb. The Polaris and Minuteman missiles are armed with warheads tens of times as powerful. The Soviets also have weap- ons of great destructive power. The hard fact is that a full-scale nuclear exchange could erase all that man has built over the centuries. War has devoured itself because it can devour the world. * * * No responsible man will deny we live in a world of vast and incalculable risks. Where decisions may be required in minutes, we must be constantly on guard against the accident or miscalculation that can lead where no one wants to go. A local conflict anywhere around the globe in which the interests of the great powers are engaged might suddenly pose the prospect of nuclear war. 14 Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson : * * * We have lost an important battle in technology. That has been demon- strated by the satellites that are whistling above our heads. 13 Unanimous statement by Senate Preparedness Subcommittee: We began with a simple — but revolutionary — fact. It was that for the first time in all history a manmade satellite was placed into orbit around the earth. There were many who realized that this was an inevitable development of the march of science. But the circumstances under which it happened were startling and brought into sharp focus facts which had been known previously but not fully appreciated. We had expected to be first with this achievement. In fact, we have yet to prove second. * * * From the beginning, however, it developed that there was much more at stake than the prestige of being "first". * * * [This achievement by the Soviet Union 1 has two important implications. First, it demonstrates beyond question that the Soviet Union has the propulsive force to hurl a missile from one continent to another. Second, the Soviet Union has gathered basic information about outer space. * * * It can now be said: * * * The Soviet Union has led the world into outer space. * * * We are engaged in a race for survival and we intend to win that race. But the truly worthwhile goal is a world of peace — the only world in which there will also be security. The immediate objective is to defend ourselves. But the equally important objective is to reach the hearts and minds of men everywhere so the day will come 13 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the American Bar Asso- ciation, August 26, 1953. However, according to Bernhard G. Bechhoefer ["Postwar Nego- tiations for Arms Control," Brookings Institution, 1961, p. 28] : "Dulles' statement that the delegates at San Francisco knew nothing of the bomb is not literally correct." Among those present who knew were Secretary of State Stettinius, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Artemus Gates, Assistant Secretary of State Clement Dunn, British Ambassador Lord Halifax, and perhaps others. 14 "Statement of Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State." In U.S. Congress. Senate. Com- mittee on Foreign Relations. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings before the * * * on Executive M. 88th Congress, 1st Session. The treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21. 22, 23, 26, and 27, 1963. 88th Congress, first session. (Washington, U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1963), p. 12. 15 Statement by Chairman Lyndon B. Johnson to Preparedness Investigating Subcom- mittee Nov. 25, 1957. (The Sputnik had been launched Oct. 4, 1957.) In U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs. Hear- ings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the * * * Part I. Novem- ber 25, 26, 27, December 13, 14, 16, and 17, 1957, January 10, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 23, 1958. 85th Congress, first and second sessions. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 3. 14 when the ballistic missile will be merely a dusty relic in the museums of mankind and men everywhere will work together in understanding. 16 House Concurrent Resolution 326 : Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress of the United States believes that the nations of the world should join in the establishment of plans for the peaceful exploration of outer space, should ban the use of outer space for military aggrandizement, and should endeavor to broaden man's knowledge of space with the purpose of advancing the good of all mankind rather than for the benefit of one nation or group of nations. * * * a Representative John W. McCormack : Mr. McCormack. Mr. Speaker * * * This resolution represents the unanimous views of the members of the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Explo- ration. * * * The resolution * * * expresses the sense of the Congress that the United States should strive, through the United Nations or such other means as may best be appropriate, for international agreements designed to accomplish these purposes. * * * But it is impossible to analyze man's forthcoming explora- tion of space solely in terms of such technological benefits ; its scope and mean- ing for man and his development far transcend such calculations. Not least among the possibilities of this great adventure is the potentiality of a reemphasis in men's hearts of the common links that bind the members of the human race together and the development of a strengthened sense of community of interest which quite transcends national boundaries. It is my belief that in such a develop- ment lies our strongest hope of world peace and the security necessary to live in happiness and prosperity. * * * But * * * attempts to project nationalistic rival- ries beyond the earth's boundaries cannot but lead to a perpetuation of exist- ing world tensions and the increased likelihood of war. * * * Our country must cast the weight of its great influence and leadership firmly on the side of peaceful international cooperation * * *. 18 Senator Lyndon B. Johnson : We should, certainly, make provisions for inviting together the scientists of other nations to work in concert on projects to extend the frontiers of man and to find solutions to the troubles of this earth. * * * It would be appropriate and fitting for our Nation to demonstrate its initiative before the United Nations by inviting all member nations to join in this adventure into outer space together. The dimensions of space dwarf our national differences on earth. 58 6. Further Contemporary Evaluations The role of science as a medium of international communication was recognized by Representative George P. Miller, chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, in a statement to a seminar of the Foreign Service Institute, early in 1965. Said Chairman Miller : Now, let me proceed to a facet of Congressional relationship with science and technology that holds great promise to ourselves and is, no doubt, of immediate interest to you — that is, in the field of international relations. I believe that one of 10 Unanimous statement by Preparedness Subcommittee ("Statement of the Senate preparedness Subcommittee Issued by Chairman Lyndon I?. Johnson and Ranking Minority Member Styles bridges at the Direction of the Subcommittee") January ".'(, 1958. in U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of tin- • * * Reports of Secretary of Defense on Accomplishments of Defense Department on Recom ■ Herniations of the Preparedness Subcommittee dated January 23, 1 !>;">s. Tart III. Feb- ruary 26, April .'{, and July 24, 1958. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958J, P- 2427. 17 House Concurrent Resolution 320, which passed the House June 2, 19T>N, was favor- ably reported by unanimous vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. June 1<). 1!»TiS, and was agreed to by the Senate on July 2'A, 1958. Ttl I'.S. Congress. Senate. Special Committee on space and Astronautics. Final Report of the * * * Pursuant to 8. Bee. 856 uj tin H.'ith Congress. Senate Report NO. 100, March 11, 1959. 86th Congress, first session. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office; 1959), p. 17. '"John W. McCormack. "Relative to the Establishment of Plans for the Peaceful Exploration of Outer space." statement of the lion. John \v. McCormack on the floor Of the House, in support of House Concurrent Resolution '.W>, June 2, 1958. Congressional Record (June 2, 1958), p. 9912. ' • Address by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson before a meeting of the Columbia Broad- casting System Affiliates, Shoreham Hotel. Washington, i>.c. January 14, 1958. At that time he was chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics. 15 the most important characteristics of science is that it can be, and usually is, outside the realm of politics. It has provided us areas of peaceful dialogue and co- operation between ourselves, our friends and our potential enemies that have hardly been possible in any other field of activity. The International Geophysical Year programs were great testimony to this fact. 20 Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who had been the first Presidential science adviser following the Sput- nik success of the Soviet Union, told the same Seminar that the inte- gration of science and technology into foreign policy was a practical imperative. There was a "diplomatic opportunity to grasp a powerful new lever to advance our national interest in the world arena." The United States [he continued] has exceptional technical resources that are understood all over the world, both by advanced peoples and by less-advanced peoples. This scientific and technological strength is among the most conspicuous, most admired, and most persuasive features on the American landscape * * *. In this technology and the education which supports it, lies a unique diplomatic opportunity, if we can but cultivate the complicated skills and understanding required to exploit it, and create the condition where this skill and understanding can be made really at home in agencies concerned with affairs abroad. The power of our science and technology to serve national goals at home and abroad also presents to the Department of State a compelling reason to pursue policies designed to maintain and augment this quality. 21 However, Dr. Killian also took note of the fact that fewer than 150 of the members of the Foreign Service have "majored in the sciences, engineering, or mathematics"; he called this number "disappointingly small." Scientists in the United States have become keenly aware of the expanding scope and reach of scientific inquiry. A report by the Com- mittee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, of the Ameri- can Association for the Advancement of Science, in 1965, warned that "The entire planet can now serve as a scientific laboratory." 22 Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis- sion, in a speech in 1966, called attention to the essential international- ism of science, which he said "may ultimately be mankind's greatest blessing." He offered two reasons for this belief. The first, and more obvious, is that international cooperation in science will accelerate those advances of mankind which, if applied wisely and equally around the world, will help to eliminate the causes of political and economic strife. The second idea is that internationality in science extends the rational processes of science to other human activities in all countries, and that the ascendancy of scientists within their respective countries will influence national leaders and their people to deal with problems in a more rational and hence more peaceful and productive way * * *. If we view science in its broadest terms, that is, as a highly organized and penetrating pursuit of knowledge and truth, some good is going to come by having the attitudes and approaches of science applied to other areas. As an example of necessary international cooperation, he called attention to the growth of "big science," whose researches "demand 20 Hon. George P. Miller. "Legislative Scientific Committees." Address by the Hon. George P. Miller, Chairman, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, January 12, 1965. Made at Foreign Service Institute Seminar. In U.S. Department of State. Science, Technology, and Foreign Affairs. Report on the Seminar held at the Foreign Service Institute, January 11 to February 2, 1965. Prepared by L. R. Audrieth, Visiting Pro- fessor of Science Affairs at the Foreign Service Institute, and H. I. Chinn, Science Officer, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 5. 21 Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., "Science in the State Department: A Practical Impera- tive." Address by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the Corporation, M.I.T., Janu- ary 11. 1965. Made at Foreign Service Institute Seminar. In Ibid., pp. 42—43. 22 "The Integrity of Science : A Report by the AAAS Committee on Science in the Pro- motion of Human Welfare." American Scientist (No. 53, 1965), p. 191. 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 16 large facilities and expensive equipment, beyond the financial means of many individual scientific organizations and even many nations." ** Speaking as Secretary of State to the Panel on Science and Tech- nology of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Jan- uary 24, 1967. Dean Rusk described the need to deal more explicity with the "uncharted region where the interests of science and foreign policy meet" : For any American involved in public affairs today [he said], scientific literacy is a must ; and that is particularly so in foreign affairs. We are firmly convinced that the Foreign Service officer should be familiar with the ways, the concepts, and the purposes of science. He should be able to grasp the social and economic implication of current scientific discoveries and engineering accomplish- ments. * * * But the burden is not all on one side. Scientists and engineers must, of course, recognize very real progress in many fields outside their own specialties, and they should be conscious of the difference between the values of society and the verifi- able truths of the natural sciences. For such men there is a role in the foreign policy process. Secretary Rusk also spoke of the need to look ahead, in appraising future prospects and opportunities in science and technology as these impact on the foreign policy process : "We cannot clearly foresee the advances, discoveries, and innovations which lie ahead, but the uses to which we put the new knowledge in our human relationships may well be critical." It was necessary to "* * * examine some aspects of the changing modern environment which are of direct concern to foreign affairs, many of which can only be dealt with internationally." As examples, he suggested the pollution of the atmosphere, population pressures, the spread of nuclear power reactors, the need for a "co- operative assault on the treasure chest of the seas," the "challenges of our space environment," and assistance to the developing countries in building a base for their technological competence. He also called for an "alliance of the natural sciences with the social sciences in meeting new facets of old problems in the world laboratory." ** Caryl P. Haskins, president of the Carnegie Institution of Wash- ington, has called for a "scientific revolution" among the developing countries as a means of spurring their advance. While there were material reasons for his proposal, it was in the "* * * qualities of science as a structure of communication, of philosophy, of faith that we find the deepest reasons." Without a living science, the new countries will have no access to the cultural world fraternity that the fabric of scientific understanding implies. They will not share in the lofty concepts that form the priceless heritage of the scientifically literate peoples. They will be denied access to one of the significant assurances that there is an inherent logic, an underlying stability, unifying the currents of scien- tific and technical change that so alarmingly threaten to engulf them. * * * Finally, an original science demands, as it also stimulates, the development of the critical and creative habits of mind that are essential to the leadership of the 23 Glenn T. Seaborj,'. "What's Ahead for International Science V Article based upon • i Bpeech delivered at the International Conference on Nuclear Physics held in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, September 13, 1966. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January 1067), \>. 26. -'Dean Kusk. "Science and Foreign Affairs." Keynote address made before Hie eighth annual Panel on Science and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Astro- nautics, by the Hon. Dean Kusk, Secretary of State, January 24, 1!»onsible leadership in international affairs. We must begin to do the hard thinking necessary to bring our technical abilities and our diplomatic skills into concert. 28 U.S. President (Richard Nixon). "Strengthening the Total Fabric of Pence." Address made before the "4th session of the U.N. General Assembly at the United Nations, NY., on Sept. 18, 1!m;9. Department of State Bulletin (October C, 1969), p. 301. ™New York Times (Sunday, Dec. 13, 1964), p. 8E. 19 Definitions of Terms 1. Science and Technology Every study that treats of the interactions of science or technology with culture encounters the same problem of characterizing the various descriptive terms relating to science and its exploitation. In an earlier study by the Legislative Reference Service, an effort was made to clarify the relationship of basic and applied research with technology. The concept expressed there was that basic research has as its goal the discovery of facts about nature. It was structured into such disciplines as physics, chemistry, biology, and astronomy; into such subdisci- plines as solid state physics, inorganic chemistry, and solar astronomy ; and into such integrating disciplines as physical chemistry, astro- physics, and ecology. Applied research was defined as the use of information about nature, derived from basic research, and employed to make feasible some social goal or to create new technological options for man. It was structured in two ways: (1) into loose categories of like fields or sub- ject disciplines, such as meteorology, metallurgy, electronics, agron- omy; these overlapped with (2) subject categories suggesting purpose or mission, such as transportation, communications, materials, and standards. All goals of applied research were observed to aim at a single overriding objective, which was to develop ways to improve man's compatibility with his environment. The products of applied research are thus options which man can exploit by means of technology. Broadly, these options appear to fall into four categories of technology, as follows: 1. Physical modification of man. — An improvement in the feasibility of man's capability to adapt himself to his environment by physical changes of his own structure. 2. Application of natural resources. — An improvement in the feasibility of man's exploitation of the resources of nature to change the physical environment to render it more compatible with man. 3. Environmental restoration. — An improvement in the feasi- bility of corrective actions to restore the physical environment by reversing impairments wrought by man or by natural forces. 4. The, social environment. — An improvement in the feasibility of actions by man to enhance his compatibility as an element of the changing social/human environment. 30 In this concept, the effects of basic science take the form of con- tributions to culture — an appreciation of the universe of man in all its natural laws and relationships. The effects of applied research are 30 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. Technical Information for Congress. Report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the * * * Prepared by the Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, April 25, 1969. House Document No. 91-137, 91st Congress, first ses- sion. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969). p. 11. For a more extended definition of the terms "basic research," "applied research," and "technology," see : U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Science Policy : A Working Glos- sary [Third Edition — 197-6], Prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology by the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Librarv of Congress, March 1976. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, Com- mittee print.) pp. 56, 57, 82. 20 opportunities. Only in technology does the system of science make tangible and material impacts upon human affairs. Technology is thus the cutting edge of science, the point at which economic and political decisions are required, as to whether an innovation is com- patible with the needs and limitations of society. Basic science can reveal information about the passage of pure water through a mem- brane; applied science can develop information as to which mem- branes work best to separate water from dissolved salts; technology provides a desalting plant. The relationship of technology to domestic and foreign affairs is limitless. It encompasses almost all forms of foreign aid, military hardware, arms control, the extraction of minerals, agricultural tech- nology, transportation and communications systems, exploitation of the seas and the ocean floor. It raises questions as to the reshaping of social institutions to accommodate new capabilities of man, whether to feed his expanding numbers by the "Green Revolution" or to achieve peace through "balance of terror." Industrial production and gross national product are only two of many measures of the application of technology; others are the satisfaction man can take from his control or his preservation of his own environment. Almost all forms of technology pass over international boundaries. The beneficial effects are eagerly sought in East and West. Moreover, the sometimes adverse second-order consequences of technology (such as pollution, noise, risk of accident, and the like) are felt in all countries where technology takes root. As with science, the interest in technology is international, and diplomatic concern is warranted for both its benefits and its costs. 2. Diplomacy The word diplomacy in this study stands for the broad function of making and carrying out foreign policy, and the word diplomat is used for a person engaged in this function. While scientists may sometimes be diplomats, in this study the term will be used to identify those whose primary training, interest, and work is in international political problems as apart from scientific or technological problems. It includes not only those who negotiate with other nations directly but also participants in the foreign policy making machinery within the United States. The background of diplomats, in this sense of the word, may be quite varied. The preparation for a traditional diplomatic career in the Foreign Service has been a liberal arts education, with much of the specific knowledge and skills acquired through experience in the State Department or at posts abroad, supplemented by brief courses at the Foreign Service Institute. However, many who are engaged in the political and economic aspects of foreign policy are not in the Foreign Service and have never served abroad. They may be generalists or specialists in some geographic area or functional field, and some — including the President, many ambassadors, heads of agencies, and .Members of Congress — may have achieved their influential positions in the making of foreign policy primarily because they were active in politics, lather than because of their academic background or expert- ness in any international activity. 21 The Context of the Study 1. The /Structure of U.S. Foreign Policy Formulation The classical method of the conduct of international relations by the United States as well as other nations was through diplomatic repre- sentatives stationed in national capitals. The President was in charge of the dealings with other countries, assisted primarily by the Secretary and Department of State. From the beginning, however, the making of foreign policy in the United States has not been a simple matter of information and decisions flowing up and down a chain of command within the Executive Branch. In establishing a democratic republic, the drafters of the Constitution built checks and balances into the system of making foreign policy as well as into other areas. Senatorial approval was made a requirement for all treaties and appointments of ambassadors. Congress as a whole was given several major powers directly related to foreign policy, such as the power to declare war, to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy, and to regulate foreign commerce, as well as the responsibility for making all laws and appropriating funds. The people of the United States could also make their voice heard through communications and elections and thus were an important factor. As profound technological and political changes occurred in the middle of the twentieth century and the United States increased its participation and leadership in world affairs, the conduct of Ameri- can diplomacy became far more complex. New agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency, were established to cope with specific problems or handle special programs in the foreign affairs field. Older agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, and the defense establishment found themselves increasingly involved in foreign affairs. The National Security Council and other groups were formed to help advise the President or to coordinate activities relating to foreign affairs spread throughout the Government. Official contacts with foreign governments were no longer made almost entirely through ambassadors and other members of the foreign service. Large numbers of Americans traveled abroad in a wide variety of capacities, and an increasing number of foreign visitors came to the United States. Membership in numerous international organizations, such as the United Nations, made multilateral diplo- macy increase vastly in importance. Rapid transportation facilitated meetings between chiefs of state and other high government officials, and instantaneous communication made it possible for messages of foreign policy importance to be carried directly between both the lead- ers and the people of different nations outside of traditional diplomatic channels. Diplomacy, once the narrow task of a few high officials and a select few in the Foreign Service, expanded into a broad effort involving a large part of the Government as a whole. 2. Goals of American Foreign Policy Before taking up the question as to the place of science and tech- nology in advancing the goals of American diplomacy, it may be 22 useful to explore some relevant goals of American foreign policy. There are overall goals, variously expressed, of American foreign policv toward which all foreign policy actions are more or less directed, but they may seem too vague or Utopian to be helpful. While there is no single document accepted by all Americans as the official declara- tion of foreign policy goals, there is a consensus on what the ultimate goals are. These might be summarized as a world of peace and freedom, or a peaceful world order in which justice and freedom prevail, or a world in which the United States may exist in peace and security. Within these broad goals there are more specific objectives. The promotion Qf mutual understanding and friendly relations, further progress toward a sound and expanding world economy, the wider application of international law, the reduction and control of arma- ments and the building of collective security systems, for example, are objectives through which the United States is seeking to attain a world of peace and freedom. These objectives in turn may be broken down into still more specific components such as, in the case of the reduction and control of armaments, regulation of the military use of the ocean bed or outer space. Defining foreign policy goals in each case will go hand in hand with the process of determining how science and foreign policy are interrelated. Among the questions which might be asked are: To what degree are the goals of science and foreign policy in specific cases the same or different ? Who formulates the goals in each case? Can foreign policy goals be as clear as scientific goals? How are priorities determined when there is conflict between a scien- tific goal and a foreign policy goal, or between different foreign policy objectives when science and technology can be applied to strengthen one or the other? 3. The Growing Importance of Science and Technology in U.S. Culture The importance of basic science for technological advance is well established: it provides essential new information and ideas, training in underlying principles and new concepts of hardware, laboratory skills, and an attitude of receptivity of innovation. In the long run, the disclosures of basic scientific research may be the most momentous factor in social change, and political decisions concerning the support of this research may be of the highest consequence. However, the effects on society of technology are more obvious and immediate than those of science. Agricultural technology in this century has brought farm families down from 50 percent to less than 5 percent of the population while cultivated land shrank and production rose. The application of tech- nology to personal transportation brought into being the dominant industry in the Nation, restructured the city and altered the social role and values of the family. Public health, medical drugs, and pesti- cides have enabled a worldwide increase in populations, raising life expectancy almost everywhere. Communication technology has spawned business enterprises extending into many political jurisdic- tions, a large television industry for home entertainment, and infor- mation flows that are national — and often international — in their reach. The coupling of computers with wire communications serves as an ever-increasing part of the population with bank records, billings, 23 and access to data bases, giving to the time-sharing computer network the character of a public utility. Abundant electrical energy is taken for granted in modern society. Government concern with the stimulation of science and the uses of technology has greatly intensified in the Twentieth Century. Basic scientific research, mainly in the universities, relies to a large extent on Government sponsorship. In fields of applied science and techno- logical development, virtually every agency of Government has found some role to play. For many well-established technologies, Govern- ment regulation has been found necessary, such as with rail and air transport, electric power, radio, and pharmaceutical preparations. An- other main interest of Government is in the stimulation of new tech- nologies; specific technological tasks have been widely assigned within the Government, such as weather modification, water desalting, coal utilization, helium conservation, weather satellites, highway construc- tion, high-speed trains, rapid excavation, communications satellites, and marine resources exploitation. On the other hand, defects or "second-order consequences'' of mod- ern technology are receiving increasing public attention and present a challenge to engineers to reduce the adverse effects of their innova- tions. Modern issues center on pollution of the air ; pollution of streams, oceans, and ground water; the spread of pesticides; eutrophication of lakes ; disposal of solid wastes ; the effects of noise ; toxic chemicals in general public use; the information explosion; invasion of personal privacy ; the hazards of radiation ; the upsetting of the ecological bal- ance ; automobile unsafety ; and, currently, the complex problems created by a growing energy shortage relative to a dynamically ex- panding pattern of energy utilization. Cogent description of the organization of scientists and engineers is beyond the scope of the study. The disciplines of science are prac- ticed in the universities and foundations, in some Government labora- tories, and to a degree in private, industry. Organizations of scientists, mainly to exchange and disseminate information, are largely by dis- ciplines, although interdisciplinary academies of sciences are active in many regions. A large and loose federation of scientists and scientific societies exists in the American Association for the Advancement of Science. A more formal interface between science and Government is provided by the National Academy of Sciences, which has access to all scientific and technical societies through the medium of the National Research Council. Contact of U.S. scientists with those abroad takes many routes: direct person-to-person communication, through the Scientific Unions, and through scientific groups under the aegis of the United Nations, among others. Organization of technologies is still further diversified. Technical societies, along roughly disciplinary lines, abound — such as the Ameri- can Society for Metals, the Society of Plastics Engineers, and the In- stitute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. Other technological societies have been formed along "mission" lines, such as the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, American Ordnance Asso- ciation, and the American National Standards Institute. Since tech- nology is a major activity in most private industrial corporations, its 24 concerns interlock with the economic interests of the business com- munity generally. The increasing use of technology to support Govern- ment programs has brought many agencies into direct working con- tact with the complex private networks of technologists. Since military programs absorb the bulk of governmental invest- ment in technology, the organizational consequences are profound; they include: — The evolution of a "military-industrial complex*' with specialized capabilities and needs ; — The development of "systems techniques'' to make possible the design and construction of advanced military weaponry of great cost, complexity, and sophistication ; — The evolution of numerous "think tanks'' using mathematical and other analytical techniques to forecast requirements, develop weapons concepts, examine alternative solutions to problems, and evaluate progress. The technologists also have their more formal point of contact with the Government through the offices of the National Academy of En- gineering, which shares with the Academy of Sciences the facilities and resources of the National Research Council. 4,. Policy Formulation in Science and Technology A study of "American science policy" by Wallace S. Say re, some years ago, concluded that it was fragmented and unsystematic and perhaps necessarily so. He wrote : Unity and comprehensiveness are * * * not likely to be the hallmarks of American science policy. Talk of a single, comprehensive "American science policy" has an essentially fictitious quality. There will be many science policies, rather than a master science policy. Diversity, inconsistency, compromise, experi- mentation, pulling and hauling, competition, and continuous revision in science policies are more predictable continuing characteristics than their antonyms. This has been the history of American science policies and this describes their present state of affairs as deplorable. But to live with diversity and accommoda- tions of policy, and yet to be impatient of them, may be the process by which a democratic society achieves progress in science as well as in other fields. In any event, the future seems to offer American scientists more dilemmas than un- equivocal answers in science policy. 31 More recently, a study by the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development, in its "Reviews of National Science Policy" series, concluded similarly, although its view of science in- corporated both research and development. Said the OECD report: The vast research and development enterprise, as it exists today [in the United States], does not, therefore spring from a deliberate, coordinated endeavor to make the most of the country's potential resources, but rather from scattered initiatives, taken in haste to meet an emergency and prolonged by limited pro- grammes. In many instances, the mobilisation of men and institutions and the establishment of the necessary framework of political structures, have been improvised ad hoc, as and when the needs dictated by the international situation have been recognised. The goal of the United States, asserted since the Second World War, has now become the maintenance and strengthening of its political, economic, scientific and technical leadership. * * * n Wallace 8. Bayre. "Scientists and American Science Policy." ( Reprinted from Science. Vol. 133, Nil 3456, March 24, 1961, pp. 859 864.) /" Bernard Barber and Walter Hlrscb; eds. The Sociology of Science. (New York. The Free Press of Qlencoe, 1002), p. 602. How- ever, by Title I, "National Science. Engineering, and Technological Policy and Priorities", of P.L. 94 2S2. approved May 11. 1!>7»>. the Congress undertook to reverse the position taken by Sayre toward a "master" science policy. 25 The Federal Government has thus come to look upon the scientific and tech- nical effort as a valuable instrument for achieving its political aims and it has been led to assume primary responsibility for the development and success of this undertaking. 8 " With respect to the organization of policy institutions within the Federal Government to effect this general aspiration, the OECD report noted that there was a "plurality of institutions" without an overall plan. It said : The Executive and the Legislature have each laboured in their own field to develop the scientific enterprise. They have done so in the light of their own concrete problems, of defense or national security, of the country's prestige or its internal affairs. Their concerns have not always been identical, and the priori- ties adopted by the one have not always commended themselves to the other. These different wills, though very often complementary, partly explain the institutional diversity of the Federal science policy mechanism. This Federal mechanism thus embodies two sets of bodies. The first forms part of the inner workings of the Presidency, and especially of the Executive Office, which takes a direct part in preparing the decisions of the President. The second originates in the structure of Congress itself, which has equipped itself with specialised bodies to carry out its mission of keeping a watch on the Administra- tion and enforcing its own priorities. The two groups are engaged in a continuous dialogue on the methods, means, and aims of the scientific enterprise. 33 Although national science policy is a diffused responsibility, the policy regarding technology is much more so. The exploitation of technology is the business of most private companies, and is involved in the programs of nearly every agency of Government. Accordingly, almost every committee of Congress encounters technological issues at some time. Technology is the physical means to many national ends. Political leaders in the Congress and in the executive branch tend to look to the. capabilities of technology — with its support in the more basic sciences — to wipe out disease, achieve military security, extend man's life, control the numbers of his progeny, eliminate the hazards of accident and environmental degradation, insure economic growth and stability, erase pockets of poverty, expand the utility of leisure time, explore and utilize the oceans and outer space, and perpetuate the resource base needed to feed, clothe, house, and equip man for safety, comfort, and happiness. 5. Scientific and Technological Elements in International Relations Science and technology are both a part of the substance of inter- national relations and an influence on the processes of international relations; they create objectives, influence the environment surround- ing and conditioning issues, and open up future prospects for signifi- cant further change that the process and conditions of diplomacy must accommodate. Substantively, science and technology create opportunities and problems in the achievement of diplomatic goals, and sometimes both together. In the exploitation of the seabed, for example, science and technology provide stimulus for global research and cooperative developmental ventures in a traditionally international environment, and problems concerning soverign jurisdiction of new "territory." The global spread of such polluting materials as DDT, radioactive wastes, and the lead additive in hydrocarbon fuels, result from expanded 32 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. "Reviews of National Science Policy: United States." (Paris, OECD Publications, March 1968), pp. 23, 25. 33 Ibid., p. 62. 26 opportunity in agricultural production, energy generation, and human mobility. However, their second-order effects as global pollutants have begun to motivate concerted action among nations to preserve and restore the world's natural environment. Science and technology are called upon to contribute to the solution of such human problems as the worsening food/population balance, the "information explosion." and the worldwide problem of water resource management. Science and technology have generated such diplomatic problems as the control of atomic weaponry and radiation, the rapid spread of diseases vec- tored by modern aircraft transportation, and the occurrence of crises resulting from the instant global communication made possible by modern electronics. Science and diplomacy are intertwined in many other ways. The multiplication of such global science programs as the International Geophysical Year, World Weather Watch, and the International Bio- logical Program, invariably have their diplomatic aspects. The IGY, for example, led a chain of events that included the Antarctic Treaty, progress in the use of satellites for space exploration, and the "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water." The travel of scientists to frequent international meetings, or personal consultation, or research abroad, increases the need for services by the Department of State to help and support American scientists in these activities. Scientists themselves participate in unofficial, exploratory investigations of possible future diplomatic opportunities, in such ventures as the "Pugwash Conferences.'' All these international contacts among scientists and engineers are difficult to evaluate as to their diplomatic consequences, but they are cerrainly significant. The methods of science and technology also offer support for the conduct of diplomacy in the analysis and solution of international problems. Investment in research is a continuing function of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, for example. The factfind- ing and hypothesis-testing methods of science have been advanced as offering possible methodologies for the study of strategy, decisionmak- ing, and information dissemination. Engineering techniques are com- ing into use in the establishment and achievement of goals in foreign aid and communications management. The use of cybernetics, systems analysis, and PERT (program evaluation and review technique) network analysis are suggested as having application to the manage- ment of the huge flow of diplomatic information. In view of the deep penetration of the substance, the problems, and the methods of science and technology into American diplomacy, a number of questions become salient. To what extent have the problems generated by science and technology been assessed by the institutions created to maintain U.S. diplomacy \ I low adequately stalled and sup- ported are these institutions to exploit the potent ia lit ies of science and technology in support of the objectives of U.S. diplomacy? What problems and opportunities for the future are discernible as a result of the great increase in the Government sponsorship of science and technology? In what ways are the results of this expanded science and technology beneficial for American diplomacy? In what ways are the results injurious, or potentially so ( And again, what can be done for the future \ 27 Formai, Aspects of the Study ./. Scop* and Lim itations As noted earlier, this study was undertaken at the request, in 1969, of the then Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House International Relations Committee) . Thus, the focus throughout is on the kinds of issues and outcomes that are of particular interest to the committee and involve institutional mechanisms or policy con- siderations particularly amenable to congressional review and per- haps action. The substantive issues chosen for study are of importance in terms of the recent past (since World War II), and involve ques- tions in which some consensus has already been reached. Some em- phasis has been placed on the roles, policies, and problems of U.S. Government agencies participating in international scientific and technological programs, and of international organizations (both gov- ernmental and nongovernmental) in which the United States partici- pates officially or nonofficially. Subjects have been avoided in which the essence of the situation in- volves extensive analysis of information denied to the general public, although some classified information was reviewed for purposes of background. Covert international activities, such as of the Central In- telligence Agency, and Department of Defense international scien- tific and technological policies and programs, also are not treated. 2. Methodology The methodology used in this project is the case study approach. By examining a selected set of cases and issues illustrating interac- tions of science and technology with diplomacy, it may be possible to derive insights for the Congress on how to devise policies and mechanisms to improve U.S. resources for the management of these interactions. Use of the case study method enables different researchers to use common and accepted concepts important in explaining decisionmak- ing, and it facilitates critical review of the findings of each case by stu- dents of policymaking. It also permits the surfacing of similar ob- stacles, problems, and inefficiencies at the intersections of the Depart- ment of State and other institutions, governmental or scientific, with an international program content. The case study method, in this project, is used to assess two kinds . of interaction of science and technology with diplomacy ; one episodic (called "cases"), the other continuing (called "issues"). The subjects to be studied were chosen to provide an appreciation of the ways in which modern science and technology have altered the environment, the goals, the substance, the methodology, the organization, and the personnel qualifications of American diplomats. The choice of items for study has been guided by the following considerations : (a) To point the way to a strengthening of support of the diplomatic process over a broad spectrum of problems salient and meaningful to the Congress ; and (b) To demonstrate the workings of the various administrative mechanisms that contribute to diplomacy, including factfinding, 28 information management, communication, problem-identification, problem-analysis, policy decisionmaking, negotiation and media- tion, and implementation feed-back. Cases are defined as discrete, coherent, and manageable episodes involving the interaction of science and technology with foreign policy, which are, or are capable of being, encompassed within a single program. Interactions of science and technology with diplomacy take many forms. Episodic subjects chosen to represent these various inter- actions are the international control of atomic energy; commercial uses of atomic energy in Europe ; the Mekong Regional Development Proposal; the United Nations and the sea bed; the International Geo- physical Year; and United States-Soviet relations and technology transfer. The continuing issues are recurrent international problems or condi- tions, with general, long-range goals and incremental or partial ease- ments. They are discussed by the late Charles O. Lerche in the follow- ing terms : Within American foreign policy today there are a number of "continuing issues." These are problems stemming from the general policy line the United States has been pursuing that are peculiar in that they do not seem to permit of any final resolution. Each has been met often within the context of a given set of circumstances, but each change in the situational milieu has required that new answers be given to the old questions. 34 Among the examples suggested by Lerche were strategic weaponry policy, arms control, foreign assistance, trade and tariff policy, and psychological factors. The continuing issues chosen for intensive analysis in this study are expressed in such terms as understanding the evolution and interna- tional political impacts of technology; influencing the level of world health; achieving improvements in the food/population balance on a global basis; understanding, evaluating, and redirecting the flow of scientific and technical personnel from one country to another; ex- amining the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. Government programs for sending U.S. scientists abroad; and improving the diplomatic skills of scientists and the scientific understanding of diplomats. Each of these cases and issues is dealt with in a separate chapter. Parts 3 and 4 of the study entail analysis of all the "issues" and "cases" to ascertain what generalizations might be drawn as to present measures and resources for constructively relating science or technol- ogy and American diplomacy. Plan of the Study In general, the issues selected for study are definable but open- ended, of a continuing nature. They Have wide ramifications, and require a careful selection of data to bring them into focus. Instead of an outcome, they may reveal a general tendency or direction. The cases, by contrast, are set in a shorter time frame. They tend to be more sharply defined and discrete as problems, more precise in scope, with some more measurable consequences. For the most part they are essentially resolved as to their outcome. ** Charles 0. Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People. Third Edition. (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1U07), p. 223, 29 1. Criteria for the Selection of Issues The specific criteria to be satisfied by each subject for study, as estab- lished at the outset, are four in number. First. The subject should be of substantial moment, and be regarded as such. Second. The subject should have a significant technical content, so that it involves a prob- lem of communication between the expert in the field and the gen- eralist concerned with the diplomatic implications. Third. The prob- lem should involve some aspect of "science in policy" or "policy in science" ; that is, it should deal with the application of science or tech- nology to advance some international policy of the United States, or it should deal with some way in which U.S. science or technology is sought to be strengthened by diplomatic action. Fourth. The subject should have had sufficient continuity and persistence as a problem be- fore the diplomatic community to enable observation of changes that have occurred as a result of national action. 2. Format for the Exposition of Issues An effort was made to achieve some degree of uniformity in the organization of the various chapters on issues. The format adhered to, as planned at the beginning of the project, is in general the following: (a) Definition of the issue to be studied ; (b) Significance of the issue in present and future contexts; (c) How the issue developed; (d) U.S. involvement in the issue; (e) Congressional concern with the issue; (/) Formulation of policy to influence the issue; (g) Options available to the policymakers and prospects for the future ; and (h) Further questions posed by the issue. Although consistency in treatment is advantageous, both for con- venience in reading and for ease in subsequent comparison and analy- sis of cases, nevertheless variation has been unavoidable. Respect for the subject matter as well as independent authorship has inevitably compelled some degree of departure from a superimposed outline. 3. Illustrative Questions Researched In developing the individual discussion of the issues to be re- ported on, attention was given to such questions as the following: (a) In what different ways has the issue been characterized? What conflicts arise out of different perceptions of it? Is there some kind of time frame in which these different perceptions predominate? (b) What is the place of the issue in the general matrix of foreign policy? What priority of attention has been assigned to it at different times? (c) What are the significant interactions of the issue in question with other policy elements? Does it benefit or threaten other national policies or programs ? (d) Has response to need been comprehensive or incremental? Is the effort mounted to influence the issue a powerful and motivated national effort, or is it being tackled bit by bit ? (e) Has a clear and positive U.S. policy been evolved respecting the issue? What is its place in the general structure of foreign policy? (/) Has a technically sophisticated mechanism been developed for choosing among alternative courses or options in achieving progress 30 in the problem ? Has the scientific-technological community been en- listed in the development of a program? What does the literature of this community say about the way the program has been developed, and about its outcome ? (g) What interactions have occurred between the United States and multinational bodies, or foreign countries, in respect to the issue? What is the documentation of international conversations? What sort of joint action has been found feasible? What degree of understanding as to methods and expected results ? If.. Enumeration of the Issues Six issues were chosen for study. They are as follows : (1) Evolution of international technology. — A review of the emer- gence of technology as a factor of change in international relations. Under this heading are considered such factors as : The growing aware- ness of the relevance of technology for diplomacy ; the practical separa- tion of technology from science ; the relations between the international exchange of technology and governmental and economic forms of social organization; problems of technological transfer (from whom, what, to whom, and how) ; U.S. organizations and programs to exploit technology for advancement of foreign policy goals; recruitment and training; successes; prospects. (2) World medicine. — Long-range consequences of worldwide appli- cation of medical sciences. Considered under this heading are such factors as: An overview of medical advances of the past and their impact on the world society, cultural and medical standards, perspec- tives on the present state of medical knowledge, the dilemmas of world medicine and national policy, national and international medical organizations and programs, problems and prospects for the future. (3) Food and population. — A study of the changing food/popula- tion balance in developing countries. Under this heading will be con- sidered such factors as : A review of historical evolution of formulation, coordination, and administration of U.S. foreign assistance policies to provide for adequate food resource development and management, public-health services, stabilization of the population growth rate, direct transfer of American technological expertise, U.S. policies in support of the development of indigenous E. & D. capabilities to ad- dress questions of the food/population balance, and obstacles (cultural, social, political, economic, technical) to successful design and imple- mentation of U.S. programs. (4) Programs for sending U.8. scientists and technical personnel abroad. — A study of the purposes, scope, accomplishments, problems, and needs of the various Federal programs that sponsor the movement of nongovernment scientists and technologists.overseas to teach and to study. (5) The "brain drain''' problem-. — Occurrence, consequences, and issues of one-way flows of scientific manpower (including in this con- text the entire array of basic and applied sciences and associated technologies). Under this heading are considered: The development of trained scientists at home and abroad, factors attracting scientists to new areas, consequences of outflows and inflows of scientists, prob- lems of retention and use of scientists, and administration of the forces that influence scientist migrations. 31 (6) Science and technology in, the Department of State. — Under this heading are considered such factors as: State Department organ- ization and procedures for marshaling science and technology in sup- port of both short-range and long-range U.S. foreign policy objectives, educational programs and briefings on science and technology- for the Foreign Service at home and abroad, organization of specialists in science and technology within the Department of State and their re- lations with generalists in the Department, opportunities and prob- lems, and prospects for the future. 5. Criteria for the Selection of Cases Being time-oriented and discrete, the cases are concerned with op- erational matters and action decisions, and with the consequences of these. They afford a somewhat different outlook from *he studies of issues in the ways in which foreign policy is determined and imple- mented in a variety of specific problems. Nevertheless, most of the criteria applicable to the selection of issues for study apply also to the cases. They need to be consequential, and regarded as such. They need to have a substantial technical content. And they need to involve de- cisions as to the uses of science or technology to further policy, or as to the use of diplomatic measures to further some basic capability or activity of science or technology. Some additional criteria are of particular relevance in the selection of the cases. Inasmuch as a number of fields involve sensitive and classified matters, for which documentation would be difficult in an unclassified study, these will be avoided. Then, the cases need to deal with subjects that yield explicit findings of actions taken and their results. They should illustrate both geographically-oriented and disci- pline-oriented problems. Care has been taken to select a range of cases to illustrate a range of institutional structures, kinds of tech- nical expertise, and administrative concepts. Finally, the cases selected all present the problem of time orientation in a dynamic subject-area; that is, the timing of the action-decision and the timing of its imple- mentation are relevant to the action and its results. 6. Form-at for the Presentation of Cases An effort parallel to that applied to the issues was made to achieve some degree of uniformity in the organization of the various chapters dealing with cases. The format adhered to is in general the following : (a) The environment of the case and its historical evolution; (b) Definition and development of the problem; (c) Organizational framework involved in dealing with the problem ; (d) Chronological account of the development of the problem; (e) How the problem came to the attention of the decision- making institution; (/) Methods and procedures employed in the decision process; (g) Description of the ultimate decision; (h) Subsequent developments that flowed from the decision (its implementation and the responses evoked) ; (i) Evaluation of the decision in terms of the ultimate outcome ; (j) Evaluation of the decisionmaking process, with particular attention to its technical aspects; (k) Further questions raised by the case. 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-4 32 Here again, some departure from the outline has been unavoid- able and probably desirable. The 6 cases have different authors and dif- ferent content, and the subject matter has tended to determine the organization and exposition of the findings. 7. Illustrative Questions To Be Researched In documenting and analyzing the respective cases, authors were guided by the following questions : (a) How was the problem identified and characterized? Was its im- portance perceived at the outset, or did it go through an evolutionary process? Was the problem correctly identified at first, or did it emerge from initial concern for some different issue ? (b) How timely was the identification of the problem? Was it per- ceived in time to take effective, constructive action or action after the fact? How did the identification of the problem relate to the con- temporary political climate and the climate of public opinion ? (c) What difficulties were encountered with communication in ap- proaching and analyzing the problem ? Did technical content obscure the political question or did political content obscure the technical problem ? (d) What difficulties were encountered in separating, and giving separate treatment to, the technical and political aspects? Were the decisionmakers able to coordinate the treatment of both together? (e) What was the nature of the decision, and how did it relate to the various possible alternatives available ? Were the various alternatives fairly evaluated? Were the decision criteria appropriate to the prob- lem ? Were all voices heard ? (/) How timely was the decision? Did the technical difficulties delay action unnecessarily ? Were opportunities lost ? (g) How stable has the decision proved to be? Were the intended purposes accomplished ? Have alternatives emerged subsequently that later opinion would have preferred ? (h) How effective was the decisionmaking process used? Did it deal comprehensively and accurately with the alternatives, their technical assessment, and their political evaluation ? 8. Enumeration of the Cases Researched The 6 cases chosen for study are as follows : (1) The international control of atomic energy. — The events follow- ing the initial use in warfare of atomic weaponry, and the evolution of the Acheson report and the Baruch plan. (2) Commercial uses of atomic energy in Europe. — Events sur- rounding the Eisenhower initiative for nuclear sharing, the evolution of the International Atomic Energv Agency, and the events that re- sulted from these actions. (3) The International Geophysical Year. — Interactions of the In- ternational Council of Scientific Unions, national scientific institu- tions, and national governments. Origins of the program. Conduct of the planning process. The roles of the Department of State, the Na- tional Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation. As- sessment of t lie scientific and political consequences. (4) The Mekong Regional Development Proposal,— Events that led to the proposal by President Johnson for a comprehensive, integrated multinational, aid program for Vietnam, as an initiative to end the 33 conflict there, expressed in his speech at Johns Hopkins University. Assessment of the Mekong project itself as example of the opportuni- ties and problems of the multinational regional approach to integrat- ing technological achievement and social policy. (5) The United Nations and the Seabed. — Interactions of national sovereignty with international technology in an international environ- ment. Attempted resolution of the issue of territorial limits. Problems created by the case seen as political and diplomatic rather than techno- logical, although it is technology that makes the case important. (6) U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations. — Exploratory assessment of the political and economic costs and benefits of the emerging trade re- lationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and of the transfer of technology from the former to the latter. 9. Organization of the Total Study A comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 12 individual studies (6 cases and 6 issues) and their findings is given in parts 3 and 4. The methodology of the analysis is described in chapter 14. 35 A word might be said here about the working philosophy which has governed the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy research project. Authors were encouraged to conduct and present the analysis of each case or issue with two perspectives continuously in mind : that of the case or issue as a worthy subject in itself, as well as that of its relationship to the broad theme of the overall study : i.e., the interac- tion of science, technology, and U.S. foreign policy. The returns are in for the first of those two complementary aims — to make available to the congressional (and in general the public affairs) community the analysis and findings of specific cases and is- sues, on their individual merits ; the results are gratifying. All 12 stu- dies have served significant congressional or other governmental pur- poses relating to their specific themes; all have received serious atten- tion in academic circles as well; most have had to be reprinted to satisfy a demand which persisted for some years after the date of publication. But it was the second and larger aim that prompted Chairman Zablocki to request this extended research undertaking to begin with, and to seek the critical reactions of knowledgeable persons in and out of government for the benefit of Congress. This was the aim of making an empirical examination, by the case study method, of representative instances of the interplay of science and technology with diplomacy for the light they might shed on how the U.S. Government could bet- ter equip itself to meet the compelling challenges posed by that inter- play. To see this problem whole, it was planned at the outset to bring all of the research results together in one collected study. The present document represents fulfillment of that plan. « Numerous references to material In the 12 basic studies occur throughout the overall study In both text and footnotes. These references cite pages of the overall study rather than the original page numbers. -.1 P ha Pter-study equivalents are as follows (for full citations of individual studies, see list Of documents in the original study series, p. VII. Chapter 1 — Huddle. Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age Chapter 3 — Wu. The Bamch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the'Nuclear Age. Chapter 4 — Donnelly. Commercial Nuclear Poner in Europe: The Interaction of American Diplomacy With a New Technology. (Continued) 34 The empirical approach followed in the project, and the broad matrix analysis of project findings in chapters 18 through 23, have resulted in a research product of somewhat formidable proportions. A certain amount of unavoidable repetition has also resulted. (On the other hand, many of the insights scattered through the 12 individ- ual studies could not be captured in the concluding analysis without distracting from the latter, with its main focus on the shortcomings of American institutions for coping with global issues; the individual studies therefore remain unique and useful resources in themselves.) The complete study consists of 24 chapters (the major subdivisions of which, identified by Roman numerals, are referred to as sections) organized into a general introduction and 4 parts. A short chapter introducing the main analytical portion of the study intervenes be- tween parts 2 and 3. Following two introductory chapters at the be- ginning, part 1 contains a separate chapter for each of the six case studies. Part 2 is made up of six chapters presenting the studies of continuing issues. Part 3 is devoted to a comprehensive analytical review of the preceding 12 studies, taken individually. Part 4 ex- amines the studies collectively under G cross-cutting headings reflect- ing broad policy concerns, with concluding observations as to policy options for the Congress and the executive branch. The study ends with an extensive annotated bibliography. As noted in Chapter 15 under Methodology, the order followed in presenting the cases and issues — both at large in the overall study and, in parallel, in the analysis of parts 3 and 4 — was established by the subject matter itself, independently of the date of publication of the particular study. The aim in any given case is to focus on enduring problems and underlying relationships, not to provide up-to-the- minute details. (As a practical matter, the basic studies — chapters 3 through 14 — have not been updated for inclusion in the full study collection; Chapters 1, 2, and 15, however, have been revised from a mid-1977 perspective, and to the extent deemed useful chapters 16 through 24 also have been brought up to date.) The appropriateness of this approach seems borne out by the fact that, in general, the in- dividual studies have not been outdated with the passage of time, and that virtually all of their findings remain valid and relevant. The foregoing introduction has been a restatement of the original project prospectus. 3 " The latter is here modified only to reflect the Continued) Chapter 5 — Rullis, The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. Chapter 6 — Huddle, The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism. Chapter 7- — Doumanl, Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed. Chapters — Hardt and Holllday, U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy. Chapter 9 — Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology. Chapter 10 — Quimby, The Politics of Global Health. Chapter 11 — Nanes, Beyond Malthas: The Food/People Equation. Chapter 12 — Knezo, U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange. Chapter 13 — Whelan, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility. Chapter 14 — Huddle, Science and Technology in tlic Department of Stat< : Bringing Technical Content Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations. Chapters 15 through -i (and Chapter 21 Huddle and Johnston, Science, Technology, ami Diplomacy in the Vge of Interdependence. "U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Toward a New Diplomacy in a scientific Age, in the series Selenee, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Franklin P. Hud- dle, Science Policy Research Division. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., c.s. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, 28 p. (Committee print.) 35 facts of work completed in place of the intentions of work in pros- pect. In the final reckoning, each user of the study can judge how the original goals of the project have been met, as expressed in the closing words of that prospectus. The project, said the latter, will — . . . involve an identification of the underlying principles of policy, organiza- tion, and methodology in the uses of science and technology as instruments of diplomacy, and the concurrent principles in the uses of diplomacy to strengthen U.S. goals in science and technology. It will be a search for opportunities for new initiatives, a search for areas of organization and administration needing more emphasis or support, and the identification of unresolved issues of policy. Beyond this, it is hoped that the intrinsic merit of each of the case studies will make it stand alone, as a study of policy on an important matter, and that restatement of the findings will serve as a useful compendium and index of the whole enterprise. Chapter 2 — The Global Context of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy CONTENTS Page Detente Vis-a-Vis the U.S.S.R 41 Deterrence 42 Weaponry 42 The P.R.C 42 Isolationism 43 U.S. Economic Burdens 43 The Changing U.S. Industrial Economy 43 The Shaky Global Economy 45 Atomic Energy 45 Populations 46 Food 46 Oceans 47 Resource Allocation 47 Multinational Corporations 48 Nationalism 48 United Nations 48 Regionalism '. 49 Shrinking World Community 49 Global Flows 50 Disorientation 50 (39) CHAPTER 2— THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF SCIENCE, TECH- NOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY U.S. foreign policy today as never before is confronted by a world of restless strivings and uncertain directions. The modern world presents a complex mixture of dynamic new forces and drift, of active or potential conflict and detente, of wayward nationalism and a grow- ing curriculum of multinational cooperative activities. The 200th anniversary of the beginnings of history's most successful experiment in political democracy finds the Nation pondering the question of how to define and advance those aspects of its heritage of independence that are valuable in a world of growing interdependence. The mid- 1970s are thus a pivotal time: a time of reassessment of U.S. foreign policy, a time to search for a new and more stable, more durable world structure that could be realized by creative diplomatic initiatives, built deliberately according to a purposeful and coherent design. The resources that the United States can mobilize to meet this challenge are mainly the technology and managerial skills in which the Nation enjoys an unchallenged superiority. These two strengths, by a con- venient fact of history, are precisely those needed by most of the other nations of the world in order to achieve progress toward their own internal national aspirations. However, elements of this changing world do not automatically simplify or facilitate the exercise of U.S. leadership in applying these needed skills toward the achievement of a more stable, more durable world structure of cooperative and peaceful nations. The enormous complexity of the world of the 1970s derives from the great variety of nations and groupings of nations, each with its own rate and direc- tion of political, economic, and technological change, leading in turn to changing goals and national attitudes. Change can generate conflict or it can promote harmony and cooperation. All of diplomacy resolves ultimately into the balancing of these opposites. Whether by bold creative moves or by slow and cautious increments, the largely un- recognized challenge facing the United States is to use its skills of technology and management to assemble the elements of the present changing world into the more constructive and reliable order on which the future of civilization so manifestly depends. As the first consideration, what are the salient elements of the modern world? Some of them are the following: Detente Vis-a-Vis the U.S.S.R. The rigidities of the cold war are being replaced by a new flexibility in which the still-potent, still-dangerous adversary relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is moderated by an uneasy and partial truce. This truce is marked by trade agreements, grain transactions, agreements on scientific and technological co- operation, technology transfers, and other unwarlike dealings epit- omized by the term "detente." (41) 42 Deterrence The underpinning of detente remains the possession by both the United States and the Soviet Union of an overwhelming nuclear destructive capability sufficient to deny survival to either party in the event of its use. Having learned to live with this fact for nearly two decades, leaders of each nation, while still maneuvering for some slight and transitory technological advantage. 1 are mainly seeking a pattern of beneficial relationships for their own country — recognizing that it may incidentally be beneficial to the adversary, but in the nonmilitary sphere. Emerging out of this uneasy truce may possibly be a more or less conscious balance of cooperation and conflict reflecting both ideological opposition and mutual anxiety over survival. Weaponry The purpose of weaponry is national security. However, the enor- mous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons accompanied by irresistible delivery system possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union has created an impasse. Both parties continue to invest scientific talents and resources in further refinements of nuclear weaponry but after a epiarter century of this arms race the impasse continues, the destructive capability on both sides has increased, and the national security on both sides has diminished. Beneath this nuclear umbrella that makes overt conflict between the two super- powers an act of insanity, the adversaries have experimented with various kinds of war by proxy. Experiments in limited war by the United States in Korea and Vietnam showed that U.S. high technology weaponry had limited utility against a determined adversary in open warfare. Competitive supply of weaponry to the opposing sides in the Middle East has raised the level of intensity of that conflict and in- creased the risk of confrontation between the superpowers. Exports of U.S. weaponry to Latin America, Iran, Jordan, and other countries has multiplied the potential destructiveness of warfare involving these recipients; the gain to the United States has been measured in favorable balanee-of-paymenis increments and varying degrees of transitory influence, but the cost has frequently been diminished national security for the United States. Proliferation of subnuclear weaponry continues but the ultimate consequences appear to offer no significant benefit to the United States while making small wars more lethal and draining the resources of -mall States to maintain their arsenals of high technology. The P.R.C. Emergence of the world's most populous nation from the self-im- posed isolation of the period of painful transition to ;i Communist dictatorship i- now in process. The growing military and economic power of t hi- former "sleeping giant" gives indication that in time the People's Republic of China will become, in some respects at least, the coequal pa rt ner ad \ er-a ry of holh the United States and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile the l\ \i.(\, currently more hostile toward the Soviel Union than toward the United Slate-, seeks to persuade t he la t ter of the dangers of Soviel aggressive designs. 1 A major technological advantage by either adversary would be Intolerable to th<> othor, iiikI wniiiil pose :i serious Invitation t" preemptive attack before the new weapon could \w deployed. 43 Isolationism One lively dispute that divided Americans in the period between the two great wars concerned the extent to which this country could re- main aloof from European conflicts. The rise of Nazi Germany made the dispute salient but it was not resolved until Japanese ambitions for Asiatic hegemony precipitated a conflict halfway around the world from the initial theater of war. Thereafter, the ties among the Axis Powers undercut the position of those who favored U.S. isolation. The views of the interventionists were confirmed by events: It became fixed in U.S. foreign policy that the United States had an inescapable role, a compelling interest, and a great power responsibility in assur- ing world peace and stability. During the cold war, this theme domi- nated U.S. dealings abroad. An attempt to withdraw from this re- sponsibility on the mainland of Asia led to the Korean war. The attempt to assert it led to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The declining fortunes of the United States in Vietnam led to renewed questioning of the extent of U.S. responsibility for maintaining peace and stability abroad, and even to a denial of such respon- sibility. The rationale of great power control over small-country wars and internal disturbances remains ill-defined, but recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated the hazard of a unilateral withdrawal of one great power from the scene, and the perhaps equal hazard of several great powers' committing themselves to opposing causes of small nations. Several lessons can be drawn from this sequence. The most obvious is that the diplomatic reaction to this kind of crisis is necessarily ad hoc and governed by circumstances; rigid adherence to either isolationism or interventionism would invite disastrous consequences. A less obvious but more fundamental lesson is that the most successful kind of diplomacy is that which anticipates, and devises initiatives to keep small crises from developing. It is note- worthy that such successes generate no headlines and create no popular heroes, and are recognized only in a small community. U.S. Economic Burdens Since World War II the U.S. dollar has remained the primary — and until recently the strong and stable — currency of international commerce. U.S. assistance has been extended to many nations abroad in the form of nuclear deterrence, trained soldiery, and arms ship- ments to treaty allies and developing nations. These economic bur- dens have been increased by U.S. efforts to raise the technological levels of developing countries and by commitments to supply ag- ricultural products to needy countries at less than market value. Efforts to persuade other developed countries to shoulder more of the burden of maintaining an international currency and credit system and to evolve, with the Soviet Union, a less demanding level of armament programs are features of the contemporary economic scene. However, the abrupt rise in world petroleum prices, unease in the Middle East, and persistent ideological and organizational ob- stacles to U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation tend to perpetuate the U.S. economic burdens. The Changing U.S. Industrial Economy The word "developed" applied to the U.S. national economy means that a large territory was settled, and that the predominant form of 44 productive activity changed from agriculture to manufacturing during the first third of the 20th century, and from manufacturing to services in the second third. The products of agriculture and other extractive industries are food, fiber, lumber, and minerals; those of manufacturing are the highly diversified items ranging from clothing to automobile-; those of services industries are information and noncommodity- related activities. This sequence is probably not reversible, and the future health of the U.S. economy depends on the development of the services industries and the enhancement of their productivity. How- ever, much of the services industry is in Government services which consume but do not generate income: Teachers, police, firemen, other State and municipal employees, Federal workers, and those in military service. The trend in the United States toward services industries is the central feature in a complex of developments that include increased emphasis on the quality and quantity of security services that are provided by governments, such as protections against crime, unem- ployment, old age, and medical costs. Environmental protection has recently been added to this list. These services are costly and most of them are tax-supported instead of yielding tax revenues. Even as population movements toward urban centers have increased, erosion has occurred in the urban tax base as the wealthier segment of the urban population — and industry as well — has left the central city for the suburbs. Another complicating factor, perhaps more transient, is the shift in the demographic distribution of population toward the young and old parts of the lifescale; these are less productive than persons in the middle range but absorb services at a higher rate. The U.S. tax structure, which is effective in an expanding economy, tends to amplify cycles of high and low economic activity. In turn, depression of the economy tends to worsen all the other economic problems that appear as the Nation proceeds further into the "services" phase. As the tax base shrinks and the service- industries grow, the ability of the Federal Government to support ambitious programs diminishes, while the demand for services and payment for them continues to grow. The extractive industries in the United States (accounting for half the labor force in 1890) now employ less than 5 percent of the labor force; manufacturing perhaps another 25 or 30 percent: and services the rest. The trend is toward further shrinkage of the first two and expansion of the third. Shrinkage of the tax base and expansion of tax-supported activities have important implications for diplomacy: as to ability to fund military programs, support foreign assistance, contribute to United Nation-, agencies a major fraction of their support, and invest in large re earch and develop nt efforts whose product is increasinglj resisted h> the industrial sector as profit margins narrow. The pattern of U.S. trade is likewise disrupted by internal economic dislocations. Stag- flation, decline in the value of the dollar, and increasing compel it ive difficult} of U.S. industry all lead, in turn, to balance-of-payments deficit-, making funding of U.S. programs abroad difficult. A public stniithiKi in services and welfare rise, demands grow for a afer and more wholesome environment, control over hazardous condil ion in indust rj , and reduced impacts of mining and forestry on wilderness area-. 45 While these brakes on industrial growth and productivity have not yet reached full strength, they have served to warn that these rising long-term and incremental costs in the industrial economy are ap- proaching a serious stage. When such costs were coupled with the im- pact of the petroleum embargo and price increases from 1973 on, the observable result was a mixed situation of recession combined with inflation. The effects of these forces were felt most keenly in areas of largest populations, notably New York City. Escape from this dilemma is vital to the future health of the U.S. diplomatic posture in the world — as indeed also for U.S. domestic economic health — but the escape route remains undefined. The economic surplus needed to fund past levels of global programs may be a product of the U.S. past. U.S. foreign policy may rest more in the future on the skill of its diplomacy than on the weight of its economic programs. The Shaky Global Economy Economic interdependence has long prevailed in international re- lations. In the 19th century, Central Europe fed on American grain; agricultural nations relied on Chilean nitrates; England supplied capital to develop rail transportation systems in Argentina, India, the United States, and China ; English textile mills wove cloth with United States and Indian cotton; and so on. During the 1920s efforts to restore this global economy conflicted with internal efforts to stabilize na- tional economies and employment; the global monetary system col- lapsed in the face of stiff tariff barriers, competitive devaluations, multiple currency schemes, and quotas. Restoration of the global economy was a high-priority U.S. goal after World War II but, despite real progress, its achievement was obstructed by cold war divisiveness, nationalistic tendencies of former colonial regions, and — ultimately — the inability of the dollar to serve as a global currency in place of the long-defunct gold standard. Achievement of a stable global economy continues to be a U.S. goal. D6tente with the Soviet Union was con- sidered a positive move toward its achievement. But many old and some new forces obstruct progress toward the goal: internal obligations of developed countries to sustain economic growth and high levels of employment; resistance of developing countries to terms of trade which they see as blocking their escape from economic colonialism; and most recently the exploitation by the OPEC countries of a (probably temporary but severely acute) monopoly position in world petroleum supply. Efforts at reaching international agreement on a new world economic structure were underway at the time of this writing but the issue remains in doubt. Atomic Energy Atomic energy places such extreme demands on technology that its advance in competition with fossil fuels as a source of electrical energy has been slow. However, the manipulated rise in petroleum prices by OPEC and the complex environmental problems in the return to coal as a principal energy source are making atomic energy potentially more attractive for the future. This trend makes more and more difficult the maintenance of control over fuel elements and by- product plutonium to protect the world and its peoples against en- vironmental insults and irresponsible conversion of plutonium into weapons. Since the early 1960s a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy has been prevention of nuclear proliferation. The economics of energy now places that goal in serious jeopardy. Scientific efforts to develop 46 a safer form of energy from nuclear fusion are proceeding but the prob- lem is one of greatT technical difficulty and the estimates of time to achieve success range from 20 to 50 years. Half a century of uncon- trolled nuclear proliferation as a consequence of supplying electricity to mankind is a fearsome prospect. Populations The ultimate concern of all governments, in terms of both ends ;md means, is people. Of growing concern is the relationship between total available resources and population in the entire world, but especially in the most populous regions and those in which the rate of population increase is sharpest. Populations are significant in relation to resources of arable land and materials, ability to buy food, levels of consumption of all goods, rates at which environmental pollution occurs, and ability to extend governance. As populations increase, problems worsen in all these categories unless means are found to exert strong positive con- trols or motivations. In an interdependent world, population problems in any country have effects on all countries. Rates of population increase of different countries in the contemporary world tend to be in inverse proportion to achieved levels of development. Technology is available to feed large increases in populations as well as to control the rates of increase, but the enlistment of technology toward either purpose requires institutional support which is generally inadequate. Many forces are at work that cause population increases while few forces have been devised to inhibit population growth in poor coun- tries, other than food deprivation as a consequence of food/population unbalance. International tensions resulting from population pressures are regarded as serious and worsening but international agreement on the resolution of the problem is lacking. The dilemma facing the world is that governments of poor countries call for aid from developed countries to secure the rights of their citizens to living standards achieved by developed countries, but cannot reconcile these expecta- tions with their practical impossibility in the face of uninhibited increases of populations. Food As with population control, the limiting factor on food supply is not primarily technological but institutional. Wider exploitation of well- established technology of plant genetics, fertilization, storage, process- ing, and marketing could treble or quadruple the available food supply of the world. But the institutional remedies for the almost inevitable increase of famine conditions in the closing quarter of the 20th century must deal with food production and distribution as only one ingredient in a pattern of development that encompasses health and education, nonagricultural employment opportunities in urban and rural area-, stable currencies and' international exchanges. Land management reform, and stable institutions of government able to administer effective tax and investment programs. Failing achievement of these conditions, the poor countries will need to rely increasingly on imported supplies of food of which the United States is the leading exporter. For the United Slate, the options include (a) short-term economic advantage by sales to the best market, (b) stern compulsion on the poor countries to effect reforms by deliberate choice of markets to reward the countries that do so, ami (c) compassionate doling out of dwindling food reserves to populations on the basis of relative extremes of need. Averting so painful a decision rests not with the United States 47 alone but with all potentially food-deficient countries as well. But if effective means of cooperation in development are not achieved, the ultimate decision will rest inescapably with the leadership of the most productive country, the United States. Oceans The status of the three-fifths of the globe covered by oceans was in question in the mid-1970s. Squabbles over fishing rights and seaward extent of national sovereignty were frequent. U.S. entrepreneurs impatiently waited for some sort of legal determination of seabed sovereignty and property rights in order to exploit emerging tech- nologies for securing the petroleum and metallic wealth of this remain- ing frontier. Naval use of the international medium of the oceans remained a plausible exercise of national power, but question was being raised as to U.S. supremacy at sea, once taken for granted and now seriously challenged. Environmentalists were vocal in denuncia- tion of Japanese and Soviet overfishing of the dwindling population of whales and of the pollution of the oceans by oil spills and chemical effluents. Failure of the maritime nations to agree on a new law of the sea in pending negotiations threatened to leave the ocean commons in a state of anarchy, instead of leading to a system of cooperation to maximize the management of the oceans as a sustained source of food and mineral wealth. Resource Allocation Consumption of minerals and fossil fuels is proportional to the level of economic development of nations, and levels of development differ greatly. Production of minerals and fossil fuels is related to their occurrence in the earth, and they are unevenly distributed among nations. Since extractive industries are first to be attempted by developing nations, the effect is that of a flow of materials from the poor countries to the rich, and a flow of processed goods from the rich countries to the poor. Efforts by poor countries to correct these evidently disadvantageous terms of trade have brought controversy into the United Nations and other forums. For all poor countries to reach the levels of materials consumption already achieved by the developed countries would far exceed the available reserves of the earth. Demands by the poor countries for a larger share of the benefits of the wealth from their mines and oil fields signal the need for eventual agreement among nations as to an equitable allocation of these resources. The wealth of developed countries is in the form of tech- nology, management, a built industrial plant, and investment capital. It remains to be determined how much of a transfer of the technical resources of the rich nations to the poor will be acceptable, and how large a share of raw materials the poor nations will insist on retaining. Clearly, the developed nations will need to practice a greater conservation of imported resources and the developing coun- tries will need to moderate their expectations of equaling the con- sumption levels achieved by the rich. There is simply not enough to go around. But by the mid-1970s, these constraints were insufficiently appreciated in either the rich or the poor countries. An attempt to ascertain the limits to growth, though usefully signaling an alert, had foundered on dubious assumptions while neglecting the practical question of how high a standard of consumption was achievable over the entire globe with its inexorably increasing population. 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-5 48 Multinational Corporations In response to efforts by many foreign nations to protect their own balances of international exchange by restricting the penetration of foreign corporations, a form of international commercial institution has rapidly proliferated. This form, the multinational corporation or MNC, is designed to accomplish the age-old dream of the economist : to minimize the economic significance of national boundaries. It does help to alleviate once-potent economic causes of international disputes, and it can be an effective agent of technology transfer, but it also generates new causes of conflict and frustration. Charac- teristically, the MNC moves capital, materials, credit, managerial expertise, technological skills, intellectual property, and even trained labor from country to country in order to maximize its total overall and long-term profit. In the process it erodes the national sovereignty of host countries, diverts capital and labor from nationally planned economic allocations, and competes for economic and even political power, while preserving its own economic and technological power base remote from the countries it penetrates. At the same time, because of the complex and farflung nature of its operations, it tends to elude controls which the base country seeks to impose, or even at times to outpace the base country's perception that certain controls may be needed in its own national interest. In so doing it tends to neglect political, social, and institutional costs of its operations. As an institution the MNC offers the capability of influencing con- structively the evolution of a stable world economy and the develop- ment of lagging economies. But as the MNC currently operate-, it excites resentment among U.S. labor unions as an instrument to cause unemployment at home; it excites resentment in developed countries by superimposing foreign management over domestic labor; and it excites resentment in developing countries by co-opting labor and resources to feed into technologies which are often inap- propriate to, and tend to distort, the development process in those countries. Nationalism The disintegration of 10th century colonial empires has resulted in a large increase (to L59 as of mid-1977) in the number of separate sovereign slate-, each groping toward independence, governance, self- determination of national policy, and coherence. Some of these states have discovered the ancient formula whereby nationalism, in term- of a contrived hostility toward their own neighbors, toward other groupings of states, or toward one or another of the great powers, can serve to unify and promote coherence of their own political structures. At the same time, claims turn into "rights" and exchanges of values become "exploitation," creating an attitude of manifesl destiny of the poor. I r nited Nations Bom in an epoch of hope for a cooperative world of peaceful tuitions, the United Nations has degenerated into a cockpil of parochial squab- bles. Since the penalty for intransigence in the United Nations is inconsequential, the motive for compromise has disappeared and deci- sions without practical effect are arrived at in the U.N. General Assembly by counting the votes of the ministates. Effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council is largely nullified by exercise of the veto power by the leading permanent members. Constructive programs of the 49 World Bank and the World Health Organization offer a glimmer of hope but the intransigence evident in the General Assembly has found its counterpart in UNESCO and ILO. By the mid-1970s, respect for the United Nations in the United States had been seriously impaired and the cost benefit of the association of nations was widely qtiestioned. The very substantial contributions of the U.N. system were largely unseen while its futilities were highly visible. Whether public opinion would be content to tolerate this unsatisfactory state of affairs long enough to evolve a more workable and useful U.N. structure remained to be seen. Regionalism A basic building block available to U.S. diplomacy in the balancing of cooperation and conflict is the circumstance that many contiguous nations share common geographic and economic problems and oppor- tunities. Many such multinational regions exist throughout the world but their effect on the nations that share them varies widely. Some, like the Scandinavian countries, have established cooperative relations; others, like the nations of former French Indochina, have a long history of strife; some, like the States of Central America, are groping toward cooperation; and some, like the Middle East, are fiercely divided by religion and ideology. The opportunity for economic and social benefits to such regions is great but largely wasted; cooperative planning, division of labor in the development and testing of useful technology, shared infrastructures, and the recognition of commonality of prob- lems, opportunities, goals, and approaches, are all available as elements to reduce the economic significance of national boundaries. Reasons for the neglect of this opportunity to strengthen international amity are easy to find, but the want of effort to this end seems hard to justify. Shrinking World Community Instant global communications, verbal and visual, bring the whole world into the living room. A terrorist attack in the Middle East or Northern Ireland, an earthquake in Chile or Turkey, an election in Australia or Portgual, is described or shown minutes later everywhere else. The infinite variety of events inviting global attention over- loads the receptors of the individual and the time or space of the communicators. Censorship is inherent, not only for reasons of na- tional policy or economic advantage but because limited capacity compels selection according to some policy or principle. "Newsworthy" events — like war or unrest in Morocco, Angola, Belize, Ethiopia, Por- tugal, Cyprus, Lebanon, or elsewhere — are reported while crop statis- tics, new schools, technological developments, and other constructive events are ignored. Even so, the individual is told more than he can assimilate. Excessive demands are placed on his enthusiasm and indig- nation. In response, the individual tends to dismiss the information flow as irrelevant to his own interests, and to rely on the "experts" to deal with these hopelessly numerous and complex matters. Or else,- in support of his own tradition or esthetic sense, the individual may seize on some one conflict as his own, choosing a side for reasons of moral predilection or ethnic, religious, or national origin. Even so, the average American in 1977 is more aware of the world outside his own country than ever before but perhaps more depressed by what he perceives. 50 Global Flows Information on current events is only one of many kinds of flows that cross national boundaries. The entire globe is a complex network, bound together by systems of transportation and communication by land, sea, air, and electronic linkages. Almost all nations contribute to and receive these flows, and the traffic along the various media continues to grow. The flows include trained persons moving to new homes, students seeking further education, tourists learning about the world, business people looking for opportunities for profit, scien- tists seeking to exchange knowledge, and diplomats bent on facilitating the conduct of international relations. Transactional flows also take place, in the form of credit, materials and products, ideological views, information, diplomatic influence, and expressions of national interests and goals. Still other flows, ranging from highly destructive to some- thing less than constructive, take the form of terrorist attacks, dis- semination of weaponry, the international movement of dangerous, drugs, the spread of disease epidemics, hostile signals and threats, guerrilla and "underground" movements, and covert operations. Encouragement and discouragement of various of these flows is the business of every government, some more than others. Together with the responses to them that feed back to the original source country, these flows aggregate into what is called "foreign relations." Since most flows are on the increase, it can be said that foreign relations are progressively intensifying for all countries. In the case of the United States, the indices of size, wealth, economic activity, military strength, and other measures of a dynamic society, are all surpassingly high; U.S. foreign relations are accordingly more intensive and com- plex than those of any other country in the world. However, U.S. institutional mechanisms to manage, plan for, or even keep track of these increasing flows are not growing correspond- ingly. This fact suggests that the United States is less and less able to administer a more and more demanding responsibility for foreign policy. It is also probable that the same deficiency exists in other highly dynamic developed countries. Disorientation Rarely, if ever, has U.S. foreign policy faced so many fundamental changes — in the power base of its own political system, in the com- plexities of the external world, and in the challenges and obstacles to be met in furtherance of its goals. Disorientation is not too strong a term for the state of U.S. foreign policy in the mid-1970s. The Nation has recently emerged from a tragic, divisive, and in the minds of ninny a futile, war. National attitudes are mixed toward further exercise of U.S. power and influence in the world, even to the revival of the isolationism of the 1930s. Domestic issues are most salient : worries oxer unemployment and inflation, apprehension over threatened shortage of energy, concern for the deteriorating environ- ment. A long list of disrupt ions abroad have also been of public and official concern: the festering and periodically explosive A.rab-Israeli con- did, the revolt of the Third World in the U.N. General Assembly. Third "World economic challenges to prevailing patterns of commerce, periodically renewed concern over the global increase in populations 51 relative to global food supply, assertions of nationalism and intran- sigence by the many new nations, incidents of bombing and terrorism around the world, hijackings and kidnapings, urban guerrilla move- ments in several countries, religious conflict in Northern Ireland and communal conflict in Cyprus and Lebanon, power shifts or active contests at many points in Eurasia and Africa, unease over prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons and the stability of the nuclear deterrent, frustration over the issue of seabed sovereignty, growing awareness of the disintegration of the world monetary structure erected after World War II and of the possibility of world monetary collapse, and a general sense that national goals of the many old and new nations of the world were at cross-purposes. The want of coherence and shared common purpose in the United Nations, the superpowers, NATO, and other groups of nations that once found opportunities for cooperation is a distressing characteristic of the contemporary world. It is a time for rebuilding and new leader- ship toward purposes that all can share. That is the prime challenge of American diplomacy in the final quarter of the 20th century. PART 1— SIX CASES Chapter 3 — The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age CONTENTS Page I. Introduction 57 Definition of the Problem and Scope of the Study 57 II. A Short Chronology of Atomic Control Diplomacy After World War II _ 59 Preliminary Agreements on Nuclear Sharing; U.S. Preparations To Negotiate 59 Impasse of Negotiations in the United Nations 60 The Historical Context of the Negotiations; the Turbulent Post- war Years 60 III. The Postwar Paradox: Cold War and Internationalism 62 Preparation for International Control Efforts 62 Formulation of Atomic Policy in the United States 63 Domestic Control 64 Hasty Demobilization of U.S. Military Forces 65 Formulation of U.S. Policy on International Control 66 Early Efforts 66 Preparations for Negotiations in the UNAEC 68 The U.S. Negotiator and Final Steps to Define Policy. _ 69 Abortive Efforts in the United Nations Toward Control 71 The U.S. Proposal 71 The Soviet Proposal 72 Debate and Impasse 73 IV. Issues in the Interplay Between Diplomacy and Nuclear Technology. 76 Significance of Technological Factors for U.S. Policy 76 The Form and Purposes of International Control 80 Proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report 80 The Board of Consultants' Position Against Inspection. 80 International Ownership and Operation of Dangerous Activities. _ 82 Retention of "Safe" National Activities 84 Inspection Provisions in the Report 85 Reactions Among U.S. Policymakers to the Proposals of the Board of Consultants 8.6 Trend Toward Control in U.S. Policy 87 U.N. Stalemate Over Control and Inspection 88 Soviet Reaction to Proposed Internationalization 88 Action by the UNAEC 89 The Issue of Stages of Transition to International Control 93 The Political Basis for Proceeding by Stages 94 Insistence by Acheson Committee on Step-by-Step Approach 95 Origins of the Discussion 95 Final Version — Some Technological Considerations 97 Inconclusive Treatment of the Transition Issue by UNAEC. 99 The Issue of Enforcement: Sanctions and the Veto 103 Determining U.S. Policy on Sanctions 103 U.S. Policy on the Veto: Its Relation to Enforcement 104 Political Unacceptability of Veto-Free Control in the Nego- tiations 107 Recapitulation of the Three Issues of Atomic Control 108 V. Some Distinctive Features of the Negotiations 110 Excessive U.S. Reliance on Technical Control Plan 110 Lack of U.S. Attention to Soviet Requirements 111 Soviet Calculation of U.S. Position 112 (55) 56 V. Some Distintive Features of the Negotiations — Continued P a K« One Attempt at Technical-Diplomatic Coordination 113 Underlying Misconceptions in U.S. Policy 114 VI. Concluding Observations 118 Impact of New Technologies on International Relations 118 The Diplomatic Task: Combining Effectiveness and Acceptability. 119 U.S. Attitudes in the Conduct of the Negotiations 122 CHAPTER 3— THE BARUCH PLAN: U.S. DIPLOMACY ENTERS THE NUCLEAR AGE I. Introduction This study is concerned with the first international negotiations on the control of atomic energy, during the years immediately following "World War II. The arrival of the atom bomb was a technological event of unparalleled significance for international affairs. The ulti- mate meaning of the bomb itself, as distinct from the possible peaceful applications of atomic energy, was that it raised the cost of general war for total victory to an unacceptable level. This fact radically altered the basis for the positions of the diplomats at the bargaining table, and brought with it the problem of how to evaluate and to com- municate the significance of the new development. At the same time, a changed pattern of relations among nations had emerged as a result of the worldwide upheaval of World War II. Participants in this new configuration of power faced the unique technological and diplomatic situation created by atomic energy. Technological advances in the field of atomic energy added a new dimension and a new vocabulary to world affairs through such con- cepts as mutual deterrence and preemptive strikes. The dynamics of a nuclear arms race were dimly perceived at the outset of the nuclear age; even so, it is not clear that awareness of this potential would have prevented its development. In retrospect, it is understandable how the atom bomb, a product of science and technology and a tool of diplomacy, prompted a world drive for control. More important to this study is the fact of failure in the initial efforts of this drive. Despite the strong impetus for diplomatic initia- tive in response to a great technological achievement, the negotiations got nowhere then and have made little progress since. A principal aim of the study is to examine the causes of this costly failure in order to provide insights into the interactions among science, technology, and diplomacy when they are confronted with a technological development of the first magnitude — in this case, one with urgent implications for the future of all mankind. Definition of the Problem and Scope of the Study Because these early efforts to control nuclear weapons occurred more than 25 years ago, much historical discussion has accumulated in pub- lished sources. In light of this fact and considering the purpose of this series of reports, the study will not duplicate the history of these early international negotiations. Rather, it will focus on issues associated with the interaction of science, technology, and diplomacy. The advent of the atomic weapon in 1945 represented a unique tech- nological advancement: applications of the newly acquired knowledge regarding atomic energy could serve either constructive or destructive purposes. This factor, combined with the immediate recognition of atomic energy development as a great step forward in man's inquiry into scientific knowledge, signified that such development had political implications of global proportions. Further recognition of the im- portance of the technological development of atomic energy for U.S. Note : This chapter was prepared in 1972 by Leneice N. Wu. , (57) 58 foreign policy was inevitable. Its significance was enhanced by the fact that the first demonstration of the technology was its use as a weapon in actual warfare. Considering the decisive role which the atomic weapon played in ending the war with Japan, its use gave rise to a number of questions for the United States on both the international and national levels. On the international level, the nations of the world recognized a need to prevent proliferation of atomic energy weapons technology and capabilities. Questions were raised in official quarters both at home and abroad with regard to the intentions of the United States, as sole owner of atomic weapons, and how this fact would affect its relations with the rest of the world. Officials in the U.S. Government perceived the urgency of devising a policy regarding the U.S. contribution to an international arrangement for the control of atomic energy to pre- vent its employment for weapons purposes, and also perceived the need for monitoring by some international means the country-by-count re- development of atomic energy. The new nuclear science and its early technology also offered the potential for development of atomic energy to serve beneficial pur- poses, national and international. Traditionally, scientific advance- ments are shared readily within the scientific community without re- gard to national boundaries. However, the military implications of atomic energy generated pressures to prevent traditional free com- munication in this instance. 1 Moreover, concern for the military applications of atomic energy necessarily overrode attention to peaceful uses. In turn, these military security factors presented obstacles and limitations for the hoped-for international cooperation in developing peaceful uses, for the formu- lation of a U.S. policy regarding its role in international cooperation, and for a program within the United States itself to pursue peaceful exploitation. What challenges did the innovation of the atom bomb present to traditional concepts of diplomacy ? Did the policymakers in the United States or the diplomats of the negotiations meet them ? Were the scien- tific and technological factors of the situation used to support or to correct established principles of U.S. foreign policy? What steps were taken by diplomats and scientists to understand each other's points of view ? Were they successful ? How did they fail? These are a few of the salient questions to which this study is ad- dressed. The following discussion offers a brief historical overview mikI an explanation of the political, military, and technical factors of (he atmosphere in which the negotiations took place. During the nu- clear policymaking process in the United States and in the interna- tional negotiations, certain issues arose which are pertinent to this series of studies on science, technology, and American diplomacy. The study examines the development of these issues from (he I'.S. policy deliberations through their outcome in the negotiations. Finally, it discusses a number of prominent features in the negotiations and sets forth some general concluding observations. 1 It was the early nuclear scientists themselves who adopted a policy of secrecy In the United States, well before the start of the Manhattan Project, the wartime Rovernment effort which developed the atom bomb. II. A Short Chronology or Atomic Control Diplomacy After World War II A chronological summary of the sequence of early developments aiming toward international controls may be helpful in. setting the stage for consideration of the international negotiations and why they failed. Deliberations on U.S. policy in light of the development of the atom bomb had been initiated as early as May 1945, when Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, led a committee which reported to President Truman on the subject. Shortly thereafter, in June, the stage was set for the machinery to handle the international negotiations on the con- trol of atomic energy, with the signing of the United Nations Charter. Two months later the weapon was actually used on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Once the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been demonstrated, the Administration took action to publicize as much in- formation as was judged appropriate to contribute to public under- standing of the weapon and its significance for the United States. An important step in this direction was the publication in August 1945 of the Smyth report, 2 which explained the basic scientific information on the bomb but kept its disclosures within the limits defined by security considerations. President Truman took initial steps to enunciate U.S. atomic energy policy at both the national and international levels in two major addresses in October 1945. 3 Preliminary Agreements on Nuclear Sharing; U.S. Preparations To Negotiate Public attention shifted to international activity during the closing- months of 1945. On November 15, an agreement was concluded by the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Called the "Three Nation Agreed Declaration," this agreement laid a foundation for in- ternational action to control atomic energy. The Soviet Union was in- cluded in this endeavor when the Moscow Declaration was signed the following month, as a result of meetings of representatives of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. In the United States, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson had been appointed earlier in December to head a committee to report to the Secretary of State on U.S. policy for the international control of atomic energy. In January 1946, the newly formed United Nations created an orga- nization to deal with the specific problem of controlling atomic energy when it drew up the terms of reference of the United Nations Atomic 2 Henry D. Smyth. A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes Vnder the Auspices of the U.S. Government, 1940—^5. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945.) 3 President Truman delivered a message to Congress on atomic energy on Oct. 3, 1945, and elaborated on U.S. atomic energy policy in his Navy Day address on October 27, in New York. Complete texts of both can be found in Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1945. (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961). pp. 362-366, 431-438. (59) 60 Energy Commission (UNAEC). At the same time, the deliberations of Acheson's group were getting underway as an additional group of policymakers, largely from the scientific community, provided the technical advice necessary to an understanding of the problem and to formulating an appropriate policy. This group, known as the Board of Consultants, was led by David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennes- see Valley Authority. The findings of these two groups, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal report, 4 were released in March 1946. In the same month, Bernard M. Baruch was appointed by President Truman to speak for the United States in the UNAEC. Combining his own views on interna- tional control of atomic energy with the proposals set down in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, Baruch presented the U.S. proposal, which became known as the Baruch plan, at the opening session of the UNAEC on June 14, 1946. Impasse of Negotiations in the United Nations Opening proposals of the Soviet Union were presented to the UNAEC on June 19. The extensive differences between the policies of the two countries were to undergo few modifications during the negotiations to follow. Once the initial proposals of the major powers had been made, procedural arrangements of the UNAEC were devised and implemented. An important group was the Scientific and Tech- nical Committee, which examined the technical feasibility of con- trol. The report of this group was issued to a major organ of the UNAEC, called Committee Two, in October 1946. Following discus- sions by this latter body, a report of the whole UNAEC was made to the United Nations Security Council on December 31, 1947. The Security Council did not resolve the questions raised by the first report of the UNAEC on international control of atomic energy, and referred the problem back to the UNAEC in March 1947. The second session of that body had been underway since January 1 and continued until September 1947, when a second report was issued to the Security Council. Again, decisive action was not forthcoming from the Security Council, and further deliberations were carried on by the UNAEC, which issued its third and final report on May 7, 1948. This document recorded the admission by the negotiators that their deliberations had reached a stalemate. The General Assembly pressed for continuation of the discussions, but they were finally suspended in November 1949. In the meantime, an important event substantially altered the char- acter and outlook of the negotiations and added to the existing diffi- culties of an extremely complex international problem. This event was the explosion by the Soviet Union on September v 2.">. L949, of its own nuclear device. The Historical Context of the Negotiations; the Turbulent Postwar Years The events reviewed in this study occurred during a turbulent I years during which the great powers and the lesser powers moved to establish post war mechanisms and configural ions of power, security. and influence. The splitting of Europe occurred ns Bulgaria (Septem- u IS Department of State t Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, Publication No. 2498 (Washington, D.C U.S. Government Printing Office, 1040), re- ferred to as the "Acheson Lilienthal Report." 61 ber 1946), Czechoslovakia (June 1948), Hungary (August 1949), and East Germany (October 1949) became Communist People's Republics. The Greek civil war raged through the early postwar years; the Truman doctrine and Marshall plan proposals came in March and June 1947 ; the Berlin blockade and airlift began in mid-1948 ; and the NATO Treaty was signed in April 1949. The Far Eastern world was no less in flux. Indochina and Indo- nesian anticolonial wars were in progress by 1946. The Philippines, India, and Pakistan attained independence in 1946 and 1947. U.S. dominance in the Pacific was consolidated from Hawaii to occupied Japan. And the Chinese civil war ended in 1949 with Communist ascendency over the mainland. The rapidly changing system of international power relationships and national interests in the postwar world made more difficult the analysis of policy alternatives in the national and international con- trol of the atom. Viewed as the most commanding source of military power in the postwar world, the atomic weapon altered the world power structure immeasurably, and the United States tried to use the fact of its possession as a surrogate for great troop strength. But its very potency made it an unusable weapon in influencing the shifts of power alignment during these years. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union sought to blunt the bomb's influence in diplomacy while striving vigorously to secure its own nuclear capability. Taking into considera- tion all these parallel developments, it is clear why the negotiations to bring the new force under international control yielded no useful diplomatic product. III. The Postwar Paradox : Cold War and Internationalism The historical setting for U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at the inter- national control of atomic energy contained two opposite and irrecon- cilable trends. On the one hand, the end of World War II had wit- nessed the emergence of two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, whose basic ideologies were intrinsically at odds with one another. The early years of the postwar period when the Baruch plan was being negotiated were to reveal a growing antagonism in United States-Soviet relations which was to become known as the cold war. On the other hand, there also emerged a widespread attitude of international cooperation in world affairs, as, in June 1945, the diverse' powers attempted to establish a framework for peace through the United Nations, an organization which was to receive a serious chal- lenge in its attempts to establish international control of atomic energy. And despite the increasing awareness of the widening breach between the United States and the Soviet Union, efforts were made to achieve some measure of cooperation between the two countries, e.g., the post- war conferences of ministers. Preparation for International Control Efforts On the international level, a major concern was the control of atomic energy, both as a means of destruction and as a new power which could benefit mankind, and the nations of the world acted to set up international machinery to cope with this problem. The first step was an agreement among those powers which had been involved in the development of atomic energy during the war, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. Meetings were held in Washington among President Hairy S. Truman, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King; as noted above, the resulting agreement of November 15, 1945 is known as the Three Nation Agreed Declaration. In it, the three countries declared their intention to share with all nations the scientific information associated with atomic energy for peaceful purposes. However, the Declaration acknowledged the dilemma posed by the practical applications of atomic energy, in that much of the information necessary to carry out the industrial applications was virtually the same as that needed for weapons production. It was agreed, therefore, that it was necessary to withhold this information until appropriate safeguards could be es- tablished to insure that it would be used only for peaceful purposes. To this end, the three heads of state suggested that the United Nations Organization set up a Commission which would make recommendations on the question of international control to the United Nations. 5 Russian agreement to the principles of the Three Nation Agreed I teclaration was obtained the next month, at the Conference of Minis- ters in Moscow, and was made public on December 27 in the Moscow 'For a complete text of the Three Nation Agreed Declaration, sre U.S. Department of State The international Control of Atomic Energy, drouth of a Policy, Publication •J702 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing office, 1946), pp. 118-120. (62) 63 Declaration, a Soviet-Anglo-American statement. In addition to sup- porting the idea of establishing a Commission in the United Nations, the Moscow Declaration contained the text of a proposed resolution to establish the organization, and invited Fiance, China, and Canada to cosponsor it at the first session of the U.N. General Assembly in January 1946.° The text of the Moscow Declaration was incorporated unchanged in a resolution which was passed by the General Assembly without a dissenting vote on January 24, 1946, and which thereby es- tablished the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) . Under the terms of the resolution, the UNAEC was to operate closely within the framework of the Security Council, with its provi- sion for the veto power, a fact with significance for subsequent nego- tiations on the control of atomic energy. The Commission was to be composed of one representative of each country on the Security Coun- cil and receive directions from the Council "in matters affecting secu- rity." The resolution added, "On these matters, the Commission shall be accountable for its work to the Security Council," a provision which was included as a result of the initiative of the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference. The rationale behind this approach rested on the assertion that the most important aspect of the control question was the assurance of security. Even at this early stage, the concern over the military applications of atomic energy dominated the discussions, diverting attention from ways to share knowledge necessary in the economic or industrial applications of atomic energy. 7 The resolution also set down the terms of reference for the Commission's proposals as follows : (a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; (b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes ; (c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction ; and (d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasion. 8 Formulation of Atomic Policy in the United States The commanding position of the United States as a world power resulting from its role in World War II and in helping to shape the postwar world led to an unprecedented involvement in international relations. As the nation in sole possession of atomic weapons, the United States bore an added responsibility to seek international con- trol over this new and terrible form of destruction. Not onlv was it necessary to define national policv on international control, but it was also important to determine an appropriate means of domestic control, a responsibility which had been given to the Army 6 See Ibid. pn. 125-127 for the text of the Moscow Declaration. 7 Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 191,5-1,9 (Boston, Mass. : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 213. 8 "Establishment of a Commission to Deal With The Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy," United Nations General Assembly Resolution I, Resolutions Adopted b?/ the General Assembly During the First Part of Its First Session from 10 January to 11, February 191,6, United Nations Document A/64 (London, England: Church House, 1946), p. 9. 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-6 64 during the war. National control of weapons production and disclos- ure of information necessary for this purpose posed controversy. In addition, consideration was given to the role of U.S. domestic control in relation to international negotiations and control. DOMESTIC CONTROL The congressional controversy over domestic control of atomic en- ergy occurred during the early stages of formulation of U.S. policy on international control and during the first months of the negotia- tions in the United Nations. A prominent issue in the vigorous public debate concerned the extent of the military role in U.S. atomic energy programs. Proposals ranged from a military-dominated commission responsible for U.S. development of atomic energy to complete ex- clusion of the military. Equally difficult was the issue of the kind of control to be placed on the release of information on industrial appli- cations, that is, data which could apply to weapons production as well, without obstructing the exchange of information within the scien- tific community necessary to foster maximum development of atomic energy. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, approved July 26, provided for a full-time civilian Atomic Energy Commission whose members were to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. It also established the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress to oversee atomic energy matters. Provision was made for consultations with and recommendations from a Military Liaison Committee on "'matters relating to military applications," 9 but final decisions were left to the civilian Commission. As far as dissemina- tion of information was concerned, the law set up a category called "restricted data,"" which included primarily data associated with atomic weapons and fissionable materials. The law then set down the nature of the punishments to be used against those convicted of trans- mitting restricted data for the purpose of injuring the United States or for granting an advantage to a foreign country. Exchange of in- formation with foreign countries on the use of atomic energy for in- dustrial purposes was forbidden until Congress declared "by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established." 10 One section of the law was devoted to the relationship between do- mestic control and any international control arrangements which might be concluded. The law defined "international arrangement" as a t reaty approved by t he Senate or ( )ongress, and recognized the possi- bility t hat portions of the U.S. law might be inconsistent with such an arrangement. If this should be the case, according to the law, the pro- visions of the international arrangement would take precedence as long as the agreement was in force. Moreover, tin- Commission was to "give maximum effect to the policies contained in any such interna- t ional arrangement." " The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 may have had some effect on foreign perceptions of ih<> U.S. position in the negotiations on international " Sec. •_'(<■). nil Stat. 757. "■ Sec 10(a)(1). «;<> stat. 7<;<; " Soc 8(C), 00 Stat. 765 65 control. For example, an argument in the United States which favored complete civilian control had been the assertion that a military-con- trolled program might convey the impression that the general purpose of U.S. atomic energy programs was oriented toward weapons pro- duction, thereby presenting an unfavorable prospect for U.S. willing- ness to seek or accept international control. As the bill was finally passed by the Congress, the emphasis on civilian control may have helped avoid such an impression. Moreover, the law marked an un- precedented intrusion of the Federal Government into private enter- prise through its provisions for Government ownership and control over fissionable materials and provisions for various licensing powers with respect to facilities and activities. Thus, by these provisions the Congress demonstrated its awareness of the unprecedented importance and dangers of the development of atomic energy. The section on international control may have served to show a positive U.S. view toward international control and preparedness to implement it. However, the considerable precautions which were taken regarding release of information may have served to reflect a U.S. desire to retain its atomic monopoly. Although these precautions were also based on U.S. security considerations and on U.S. suspicions of how other coun- tries might use atomic weapons once they had acquired them, nonethe- less, the debate on this issue and the resulting provisions in the law may have inspired doubts in other countries as to the sincerity of U.S. pledges to relinquish its monopoly to an appropriate international au- thority. In any case, the following conclusion of a State Department publication seems applicable: The evolution of a policy for domestic control not only pro- vided parallels for the problems that were certain to be met in international planning, but it illustrated as no other process could the magnitude and complexity of the task that awaited inter-Governmental collaboration. 12 HASTY DEMOBILIZATION OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES A relevant consideration in the evolution of early U.S. policy for the atom is the overall state of the U.S. defense posture in 1945 and 1946. 13 With the advent of peace, the American public and the troops themselves clamored to bring the armies home, on the grounds that there was no longer a need to maintain the wartime level of military manpower. Besides being influenced by the euphoric atmosphere brought on by the end of war, many people looked to the newly de- veloped atomic bomb as a sufficient source of military strength. A week after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945. President Truman responded to public and congressional pressure, and announced that inductions would drop from 80,000 to 50,000 per month and that within 12 to 18 months, 5i/ 2 million men would be released from the service. By April 1946, the number of those dis- charged from the Army had reached nearly 7 million. By June 30, 1946, out of a total of about 3 million military personnel remaining on 12 State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 21. "The following discussion is based primarily on Lieberman. The Scorpion and the Tarantula, pp. 227-234. 66 active duty in all of the U.S. armed services combined, approximately 1.4 million were in the Army. 14 Many U.S. Government officials, especially among the military services, had opposed such rapid demobilization of the armed forces because of their mistrust of the Russians. One historian cites the power vacuum in Europe which resulted from rapid U.S. withdrawal as at least one reason for the imposition of Soviet hegemony in East- ern Europe during this period. 15 The dramatic cuts in the armed forces also were to have an effect on the negotiations for the control of atomic energy. One source interprets the situation as follows : As the nation's conventional military resources grew w T eaker and weaker at a time when Soviet dynamism made it imperative that the United States be strong, the place of atomic weapons in the overall American military posture would naturally become more critical and worthy of protection. 16 FORMULATION OF U.S. POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL CONTROL Early efforts: Even before the first atomic bomb was used during the war-, some persons in the United States were aware of the potential need for control of atomic energy and encouraged the Administration to initiate action to formulate its policy on the subject. Largely at the recommendation of Vannevar Bush, a scientific advisor to President Truman and Chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and Devel- opment, and another presidential advisor, Harvard University Presi- dent James B. Conant, Truman called on Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, to appoint a group to consider the future needs in the area of control, on both the international and domestic levels. Stimson recog- nized that to deal with the unique situation created by the development of the atomic bomb required knowledge in both science and politics; he gathered advisors from these areas, including Bush and Conant, Ralph Bard, the Undersecretary of the Navy, William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and James F. Byrnes, who would become Secretary of State two months later, to serve as the President's personal representative on the Committee. Other members were George Harrison, president of the New York Life Insurance Company and a Special Assistant to Stimson, Karl Compton, a physicist and president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and several scientists who had led in the development of the bomb: Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, Dr. Arthur II. Compton, and Dr. Enrico Fermi. The unpublished report of what is known as the Secretary of War's Interim Committee, which nut during May L945, reached a number of conclusions affecting inter- national control which were to remain at, issue in future attempts toward such control. Within a month after the first atomic weapons were used, in August 194.">, a report w as issued which explained the basic scientific facts asso- ciated with the development of atomic energy. Prepared in 1944 by a physicist who had been involved in the bomb effort, Dr. Henry I). 11 U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, l!»7i >. p. lit. 16 Thomas A. Bailey, ' Dlplomatio History of the American People (New York : Appleton- Century Crofts, 1964), p. 778. 19 Lleberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 234. 67 Smyth of Princeton, the report was released to avert any misconcep- tion or wild speculation by the public concerning the new weapon. Moreover, it v as hoped that by supplying a substantial amount of in- formation at this time, the report would alleviate public pressure, espe- cially from the scientific community, for release of all pertinent infor- mation. The Smyth report supplied basic facts, but not enough to aid rival efforts to develop an atomic weapon. 17 The decision to release the Smyth report was much debated within the Administration, but the reasons noted above prevailed. The Smyth report was later used as a basic source for the discussions in a Scien- tific and Technical Committee of the UNAEC. The conclusion of the report is often cited when the study is considered in relation to inter- national control : We find ourselves with an explosive which is far from completely perfected. Yet the future possibilities of such explosives are appalling, and their effects on future wars and international affairs are of fundamental importance. Here is a new tool for mankind, a tool of unimaginable destructive power. Its development raises many questions that must be answered in the near future. * * * These questions are not technical questions ; they are political and social questions, and the answers given to them may affect all mankind for generations * * * In a free country like ours, such questions should be debated by the people and decisions must be made by the people through their repre- sentatives. This is one reason for the release of this report. It is a semi-technical report which it is hoped men of science in this country can use to help their fellow citizens in reaching wise decisions. The people of the country must be informed if they are to discharge their responsibilities wisely. 18 Among the initial public statements of U.S. policy on arrangements for international control was President Truman's address to Congress on October 3, 1945. Affirming the U.S. commitment to seek interna- tional control of atomic energy and the U.S. desire to share informa- tion for peaceful purposes, the President announced the impending discussions with Canada and Great Britain which were to result in the Three Nation Agreed Declaration. On October 27, 1945, he further defined U.S. policy by enunciating five basic principles which, for the most part, had originated with Stimson's committee. These con- clusions might be viewed as a combination of the primary technological and political factors which would condition the evolution of the U.S. plan for international control and the negotiations to achieve such control. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, associated with early U.S. arms con- trol negotiations in the Department of State, has summarized these principles as follows : 1. No nation can long maintain a monopoly of atomic weapons. 2. No nation could long maintain or morally defend a monopoly of peaceful benefits of atomic energy. 17 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar B. Anderson, Jr. The New World 1939/191,6, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. I (University Park, Pa. : Pennsyl- vania State University Press, 1962) pp. 400-407. 18 Smyth, General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, p. 165. 68 3. For the foreseeable future there can be no adequate military defense against atomic weapons. 4. All the initial processes in the production of fissionable materials and certain subsequent processes are identical whether their intended use or purpose is peaceful or military. 5. The nuclear chain reaction required for the release of atomic energy is now based upon uranium or thorium as the only suitable raw materials occurring in nature. Ores contain- ing these materials are only relatively rare. Although rich de- posits are not numerous, the lower concentrations of the ores have a wide geographical distribution. 19 Preparations for negotiations in the UNAEC : In January 1946, 1 month after the conclusion of the Moscow Declaration, James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, announced that he had appointed a com- mittee "to study the subject of controls and safeguards necessary to protect this 00^-61-11™^!!^' during the international negotiations on atomic energy. Assistant Secretary Acheson had been named chair- man; the other members were Bush, Oonant, General Leslie Groves — head of the Manhattan project which had developed the atomic bomb during the war — and John McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of War. Although the members of the committee had some knowledge of atomic energy matters from the standpoint of both its technological and political aspects, Acheson suggested appointing a Board of Con- sultants to advise the committee on the technological aspects of inter- national control. David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was given the task of leading the Board. Its other members were Chester Barnard, president of New Jersey Bell Telephone, who had been active in the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ; Harry A. Winne, an engineer and a vice president of General Electric Company, who had participated in the Manhattan Project ; and Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who had directed the weaponry installation of the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, New Mexico. The composition of the two groups was intended to provide the talents necessary to consider both the political and technological aspects of the problem of providing a basis for a workable system of international control. In the course of the next two months, the Board drafted a basic plan for international control. Following a series of meetings with Ache- son's committee, which led to certain modifications and additions, it produced a document entitled "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy." Known as the "Acheson-Lilienthal report," the study set down the basic technological factors involved in the develop- ment of atomic energy, particularly those which would affect the na- ture of the international control system. Once these considerations had been provided, the Hoard outlined the basic features of a control plan, governed primarily by the technological data. ( )n the whole, the Board regarded its work "not as a -final plan, but as a place to begin, a foun- dation on which to build." 20 The report was released in late March 1!» H'» as a basis for public discussion. '•Bernhard G. Ftwhhtiofer. I'ostwar Xcaotintionfi for Arms Control (Washington, D.C. : Brookings, 19fil), p. :{.'{. * State Department "Aeheson-Llllenthal report," p. vlii. 69 Writing in 1948, J. Robert Oppenheimer summarized the general trend of thinking within the scientific community toward the atomic challenge which confronted U.S. diplomacy : The control of atomic weapons always appeared possible only on the basis of an intensive and working collaboration between peoples of many nationalities, on the creation * * * of supra-national patterns of communication, of work, and of development. The development of atomic energy lay in an area peculiarly suited to such internationalization, and in fact re- quiring it for the most effective exploitation, almost on tech- nical grounds alone. The development of atomic energy lay in a field international by tradition and untouched by pre-exist- ing national patterns of control. Thus, the problem as it ap- peared in the summer of 1945 was to use our understanding of atomic energy, and the developments that we had carried out, with their implied hope and implied threat, to see whether in this area international barriers might not be broken down, and patterns of candor and cooperation established which would make the peace of the world. 21 The U.S. negotiator and final steps to define policy : In the mean- time, on March 18, 1946, to bring the issue to the United Nations, the President named Bernard M. Baruch U.S. representative to the UNAEC. One source offers the following description : Bernard Mannes Baruch * * * had by his 75th year become a symbol of America to his fellow Americans as well as to people all over the world. An immensely successful financier who had built a fortune in the lusty days of business boom, a public servant and sought-after counselor to Presidents of both political parties, Baruch was one of the most trusted men in all of America. The fact that he was Jewish seemed to assure his place in the public mind because it gave his life that quality of equal opportunity realized, of Horatio Alger, that is so important to America's self-image. 22 Included in the delegation to the UNAEC were Baruelvs choices from leading members of the banking business : Herbert Swope, John M. Hancock, and Ferdinand Eberstadt ; the fifth member of the dele- gation was Fred Searls, a mining engineer, formerly a journalist, and head of the New York State Racing Commission. Richard C. Tolman, who had served as a scientific advisor to General Groves, was chosen for the same role in Baruelvs delegation. Aside from the fact that Baruch spoke for U.S. policy on inter- national control of atomic energy, his appointment might be consid- ered in two respects with regard to the central issues of this study : the primary motives behind the appointment and his role in the policy- making process. As to the reasoning behind the appointment of Ba- ruch, at this time the issues surrounding the domestic control of atomic energy were far from resolved, and prominent among them was the possibility of excessive restrictions on the release of information. Con- gressional hesitation to allow a free flow of information had been ex- a J. Robert Oppenheimer, "International Control of Atomic Energy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 4. no. 2 (February 1948), pp. 41-42. 83 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the tarantula, p. 261. 70 pressed sufficiently to make it reasonably clear that the United States would be limited, if not completely crippled, in its ability to meet its secret agreements with the British for postwar collaboration on atomic energy matters. 23 His appointment was apparently motivated by a belief that he could help enlarge the Administration's freedom of action in the field of international negotiation. Baruch represented the kind of public servant who could be entrusted with America's security, as well as one who was respected in international circles. Indeed, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Eelations Committee pledged Baruch's con- firmation without a hearing, once he had assured the committee in writing that "there would be no treaty and no disclosures without safe- guards, and that no agreement of any kind would be entered without the consent of Congress." 24 The appointment and acceptance of Baruch appear to have been based primarily on respect for his political acumen. At any rate, the motivations behind the choice of the chief negotiator were not of the same character which prompted the appointment and work of Ache- son's committee and the Board of Consultants. Indeed, by some per- sons, Baruch was not thought to be qualified for the job. The members of the Board and Acheson's committee declined to continue in these groups under Baruch, partly on the grounds that if Baruch pursued policies with which they disagreed, they wanted to retain the right to voice their opposition. 25 One member of Baruch's group — namely, Hancock — reacted nega- tively to Baruch's suggestion that the Board of Consultants continue its work under the auspices of the State Department. Hancock stated : These problems are not often purely scientific problems. They blend very quickly into political problems * * *. The scientists tend to be unbending and calculating in the field of science — which is natural — but they carry over their in- elasticity into arguments in the field of international affairs, politics in the proper sense, and negotiation. 26 Apparently there was little common outlook between those represent- ing mainly a scientific approach, who had developed the recommen- dations for a policy of international control of atomic energy, and those representing chiefly a political approach, who were responsible for conducting the diplomatic negol iations to implement the emerging policy. 2n In August 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill had signed an executive agreement, known as thi' Quebec Agreement, which was nol made public, and affirmed Anglo-American coop eration on atomic energy during the war. A year later, the two leaders signed an aide- memoire to supplement the earlier agreement, which provided for full collaboration between the two countries following the war. Attempts were made to renegotiate the agreement al the time of the Truman-Attlee-Klng conference, when the Americans asserted that active collaboration could not be carried out through an executive agreement. Nonetheless they agreed, at least in principle, to the idea of equal partnership, in the form of "full and effective cooperation." Eventually In April 1!)4<;. when the British pressed for further fulfillments, Truman Informed them thai he Interpreted this phrase to Include only the field Of hasic scientific Information, and thereby finalized the U.S. decision to withdraw from any arrangement which WOUld have Involved lending practical assistance to endeavors such as building ami operating production plants. The primary rationale behind thi^ policy was that the agreement could aol be kept secret under the provisions of the U.N. ("barter and public control efforts which were about to begin, Afte. the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was passed, compliance with the agreements, as the British Interpreted them, would have been legally forbidden. Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, pp, i'7s 280, 177 I7:i -' Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 264 "■Hewlett and Anderson. History of tin United States Atomic Energy Commission, p. 560. " Llebennan. The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 291. 71 As to Baruch's role in the policymaking process, the negotiator's own view of the part he should play, as well as that of his advisors, would have a substantial influence on the shape of U.S. policy, and on the course of the negotiations. He resented the fact that the Acheson- Lilienthal report had been published, lest it be regarded as a statement of U.S. policy, thus placing him in the role of a mere "messenger boy." Only after consultations with the President and Byrnes was Baruch satisfied that his personal views on atomic energy control would be considered, although later accounts by Truman and Baruch differ re- garding their perceptions of the extent of Baruch's powers at that time. 27 Although Baruch had asked Acheson's committee and its Board of Consultants to remain at his disposal during the negotiations, this ar- rangement did not materialize. Some meetings were held between Baruch's delegation and the two groups. These encounters provided the forum for expression of a variety of views on U.S. policy but not on a sustained basis. Abortive Efforts in the United Nations Toward Control On June 14, 1946, the end product of these meetings, and of discus- sions within the Administration, was enunciated by Baruch at the op- ening session of the UNAEC. The views of both the military services and the Congress had been considered, and some of the basic ingredi- ents of the Acheson-Lilienthal report had been retained ; other impor- . taut characteristics had originated with Baruch and his deputies. THE U.S. PROPOSAL In Baruch's speech to the opening session of the UNAEC, he noted that his proposal was made as a basis for discussion, although it eventually came to be regarded as a rather firm statement of the U.S. position. Baruch proposed that an International Control Au- thority be established "to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy." It would control or own all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security, and would control, license, and inspect all others. Its functions would in- clude fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy, and conducting research and development in the field, in order to remain at the fore- front of potential new developments. Once the Authority was estab- lished, all bomb manufacturing would be halted and existing bombs destroyed, and the Authority would possess all the information as- sociated with atomic energy. This proposal marked the first time that diplomats had sought to establish a worldwide system of control and use of a scientific discovery. An important point which was included, and a major contribution of Baruch, concerned the issue of enforcement of the arrangement for international control. Because of the serious nature of atomic energy questions, Baruch expressed the view that any countries which pur- sued activities that ran counter to or usurped those of the Authority should be subject to punishments. Specific violations were listed, such as possession or manufacture of an atomic weapon. Moreover, in order to ensure that violators would be punished, Baruch proposed that the 27 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, pp. 557-560. 72 veto power in the Security Council would not apply on questions con- cerning the fulfillment of sanctions. 28 In the course of the negotiations, the U.S. delegation submitted three memoranda which elaborated on the U.S. position. 29 These documents and the speeches of Baruch set forth the details of the U.S. position on the various issues covered in the discussion below. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL The Soviet proposal was presented at the second meeting of the UNAEC on June 19, 1946, by Andrei Gromyko, Deputy Foreign Minister and the Soviet Representative on the U.N. Security Council. Demanding that atomic energy should be used only for peaceful purposes, he proposed that a first step should be a convention outlaw- ing the production and use of atomic weapons. Following such an agreement, he continued, there should be established "a system of su- pervision and control to see that the conventions and agreements are observed, and measures concerning sanctions against unlawful use of atomic energy." 30 At this time, Gromyko introduced two resolutions to implement the Soviet principles of international control. The first called for an agree- ment to ban the use and production of atomic bombs and to destroy existing weapons within three months of the conclusion of the agree- ment. This resolution also provided that the parties to the proposed agreement would pass legislation to punish violators of the agreement. The second resolution proposed that two committees be established : one to make recommendations on the exchange of scientific information, and another to examine methods of insuring compliance with the prohibitions of the agreement, including sanctions. The only direct response by Gromyko to the U.S. proposal was the expression of Soviet opposition to elimination of the veto: Efforts made to undermine the activity of the Security Council, including efforts directed to undermine the require- ments of unanimity of the members of the Security Council, upon questions of substance, are incompatible with the in- terests of the United Nations * * * . Such attempts should be resisted. 31 The veto question was to remain at issue throughout the negotiations. One source has described the Soviet proposals as inchoate: Gromyko's proposals of June 19 have, frequently been de- scribed in the Western press and by the Soviet representatives t hemselves as the "Soviet plan": but they really constituted no plan at all. Not, if by a plan, one comprehends a systematic 28 For a complete text of Banich's speech, see "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority." Department of State Bulletin, v. 14, no. 364 (June 23, 1946), pp. 1057-1062, or State Department, Growth of a Policj/, pp. 138-147. »The three memoranda were entitled U.S. Memorandum No. 1. Submitted to Sub- committee No. 1 <>t the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, New V>rk. July -'. 1946; D.S. Memorandum No. 'J Dealing with the Functions and Powers of the Proposed Atomic Development Authority. Submitted to Subcommittee No. 1 of the United Nations Atomic- Energy Commission, New York, July r>, 1046; and D.S. Memorandum No. 3, Deal Ing With the Relations Between the Atomic Development Authority and the Organs of the United Nations, Submitted to Subcommittee No. 1 of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, New York, July 12, 1946. _, 30 Joseph I,. Nogee, Soviet Policy Toward International control of Atomic Energy. t N.>tre l lame. Ind. : I'niversit v of Notre Dame Press, l!'t;i |, p. 36. m Ibid., p. 37. 73 and comprehensive procedure for action. Gromyko's "plan" was, in fact, the enunciation of three or four basic principles which guided Soviet policy ( promotion of peaceful develop- ment of atomic energy, prohibition of atomic weapons, agree- ment on international control, and the retention of full sov- ereign freedom of action) plus proposals for the further organization of the Atomic Energy Commission to deal with the problems of control and the exchange of scientific informa- tion. On the exact form of international control, Soviet state- ments were deliberately vague. 32 DEBATE AND IMPASSE Early in the negotiations, the structure of the UNAEC was orga- nized to include four committees : a Scientific and Technical Commit- tee, a Legal Advisory Committee, Committee Two to examine all the questions associated with a control plan, and Committee One to coordi- nate the work of the other three committees. In July 1946, at the second session of Committee Two, Soviet representative Gromyko delivered a major speech condemning the U.S. proposals, and declaring that as they are presented now [the proposals] could not be ac- cepted by the U.S.S.R., either as a whole or in their separate parts. 33 When further efforts to negotiate seemed fruitless, it was decided to postpone the deliberations of Committee Two until a report from the Scientific and Technical Committee had been submitted. The report of the latter Committee, similar in purpose to that of the Acheson-Lilienthal groups, was given to Committee Two on October 2, 1946. Committee Two had passed a resolution suggesting that the Sci- entific and Technical Committee "present a report on the question whether effective control is possible, together with an indication of the methods by which * * * effective control can be achieved." 34 The Scientific and Technical Committee had decided to confine its con- siderations to the requirements of a control system as dictated solely by the technical characteristics of atomic energy development, and disclaimed any responsibility for taking political feasibility into ac- count. Obviously, the major portion of the information on atomic energy was supplied by the United States, primarily through the Smyth report and the Acheson-Lilienthal report. In light of this fact, the Soviet representative to the Committee interpreted the conclusions of the Committee as "hypothetical and conditional" because the Soviets considered the information "limited and incomplete." 35 Despite this statement, the members of the Scientific and Technical Committee concluded that "we do not find any basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible." 3G 33 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 33 State Department. Growth of a Policy, r>. SI. 34 As quoted in First Renort on the Scientific and Technical Aspects of Control. In United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, 31 December 1946," Official Records. Special Supplement. Report to the Security Council. (Lake Success, New York : 1946), p. 20. 35 Ibid., n. 50. 36 State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 86. 74 In addition, the Committee reemphasized the scientific principle which had provided a basic element in the efforts to establish international control of atomic energy, when it stated : There is an intimate relation between the activities required for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production of atomic weapons; most of the stages which are needed for the former are also needed for the latter. 3 ' The report defined the various dangerous points in atomic energy development at which some form of safeguard should be applied, but made no recommendations for specific methods of safeguards. Committee Two continued its deliberations and prepared a report which set forth specific safeguards for various activities, but these were deemed only the basic elements of a plan and not a complete plan for control. The report on safeguards and that of the Scientific and Technical Committee were included in a report prepared by the full membership of the T T .X. Atomic Energy Commission, and submitted to the Security Council on December 31, 1946. The report had been approved by 10 members of the Commission, with the remaining two, the Soviet Union and Poland, abstaining. Following this expression of majority ap- proval, Baruch and his. staff resigned on the grounds that the U.S. representative to the United Nations (at this time, Warren Austin) should serve as the U.S. spokesman in the Security Council. This first report of the UNAEC offered various findings and recommendations based largely on the proposals submitted by the United States. By March 1!> 17. when its debate on the provisions of the first report failed of agreement, the Security Council passed a resolution which referred the discussions back to the UNAEC and requested a second report from that body. The major sources of disagreement in the negotiations are discussed below. There was to be little narrowing of these differ- ences in the subsequent negotiations of the UNAEC. One source describes the "deadlock" at this time as "particularly ominous not because of specific Soviet objections to the majority plan, but because Soviet criticism was made a part of its ideological con- flict with the West." !s Some of the U.S. policymakers who had engi- neered the U.S. plan, including both scientists and politicians, became disillusioned with the negotiations, and even suggested that the United States withdraw from them. However, consultations with U.S. allies had discouraged such an idea, and the negotiations continued "'because world opinion would not let them stop." 39 In September 11)47, the UNAEC submitted the second report to the Security ( louncil, elaborating on the specific recommendations for con- trol in the first report. Besides engaging in this exercise, the second round of the. UNAEC deliberations had considered a list of 12 amend- ments which the Soviet Union proposed be applied to the findings and recommendations of the first report. These amendments, which sought to alter some of the fundamental features of the majority plan, were not accepted by the Commission. Examples of the questionsot principle ; [bid., p. 36. Is NoRee, Soviet Policy, p. 88. 80 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 391. 75 raised by the Soviet amendments on which no agreement had been reached are the question of what was required for strict international control of atomic energy, whether international control, including the prohibition of atomic weapons, was to be established by one treaty or several and in the latter case, the question of priorities, or the question of the right of the proposed Authority to conduct research in atomic weapons. As was the case with the first report of the UNAEC, the second report had been approved by 10 members of the Commission, but this time only Poland had abstained, while the Soviet Union had registered opposition. Because of more pressing matters on its agenda, like the Palestine question or the India-Pakistan question, the Security Council de- cided not to consider the second report of the UNAEC. Deliberations continued in the latter institution through the remainder of 1947 and the spring of 1948. These discussions prompted the UNAEC third re- port to conclude that an impasse had been reached, and to request that UNAEC negotiations be suspended. A resolution for Security Council approval of all the reports of the UNAEC was vetoed by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1948 ; in the fall, General Assembly consider- ation of the question of atomic energy control resulted in a 40-6— 1 ap- proval of the majority plan, but the value of this non-binding reso- lution lay in propaganda more than in support for successful collabora- tion. Further negotiations in the UNAEC, which were continued at the insistence of the General Assembly, rapidly deteriorated, and by No- vember 1949, the General Assembly agreed to suspend the work of the UNAEC. IV. Issues in the Interplay Between Diplomacy and Nuclear Technology Identification of a number of basic issues prominent in the U.S. policymaking process and in the negotiations will help to clarify the way in which technological and diplomatic factors interacted during the formulation and negotiation of the Baruch proposals. These basic issues will be explored to show this interaction, and also how it affected the outcome of each issue. Each issue will be examined in this man- ner, first in the course of the U.S. policymaking process and then in the international negotiations. Special attention will be given to the U.S. proposals as finally presented, the Soviet reaction to them, and the outcome of the negotiations. Broadly, these issues all dealt with the interlocking concerns of national power, human safety, secrecy of atomic technology, privacy of the Soviet Union, and the potential utility of peaceful atomic en- ergy. Three broad issues emerged : ( 1 ) the form of control, that is, international ownership and management versus inspection ; ('2) transitional stages for the establishment of international control, involving transfer of control of information and nuclear production facilities from the United States to the international authority; and ( 3 ) the question of sanctions and the veto. Significance of Technological Factors for U.S. Policy Before these issues are discussed in detail, it might be helpful to note a number of general factors of technology and diplomacy which may have influenced U.S. policy and the outcome of the negotiations. Foremost among the technological considerations was the U.S. monopoly over atomic weapons. The very nature of scientific inquiry made it axiomatic that the U.S. monopoly was transitory. Acceptance of this factor was a major political motivation for U.S. efforts toward international control. Nevertheless, the question arose as to how the United States could prevent a premature end to its monopoly and thereby avoid endangering either its own security or world security while an international system of control was being established. U.S. policy on this question would influence the general political atmos- phere surrounding the effort to establish international control. Among the possible measures which the United States could use to protect itself and the world from proliferation of atomic weapons until an international system could be set up was stringent control of the dissemination of information which would contribute to devel- opment of military applications of atomic energy. This idea led to a persistent popular misconception regarding the "secret" of the atomic bomb: Many of the semantic difficulties dated from the first months of public knowledge of the wartime program. The "secret" of the atomic bomb was a case in point. After more than two years of efforts to explain this term accurately, use of it still induced an almost automatic emotional response. (76) 77 Polling questions which contained references to both "bomb secrets" and "international control"' invariably brought fewer approvals of the control principle, the automatic reac- tion being to "keep the secrets." 40 At the time of the December 1945 conference which resulted in the Moscow Declaration, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and other members of Congress repeatedly sought and obtained assurances from the President that the United States would not release atomic energy information prior to the establishment of adequate safeguards. The protective attitude to- ward the U.S. "secrets" was heightened by the revelation in early 1946 of evidence of espionage in Canada involving the transmission of atomic energy information to the Soviet Union. These events served not only to reinforce the public attitude toward nuclear secrecy sur- rounding the bomb, but also to engender a growing mistrust in the United States of the Soviet Union. 41 In general, the attitude of the United States toward the secret of the bomb may have had several effects on its policy and on other coun- tries' conceptions of that policy. Mistrust of the Soviet Union, coupled with the idea that sole possession of the atomic weapon represented a "sacred trust" 42 in terms of U.S. responsibility for world security, may have acted as a motive to withhold as much information as pos- sible, for as long as possible, until the international control system was secure. But a marked reluctance on the part of the United States to part with information or facilities may have encouraged critics of the U.S. proposals, especially in the Soviet Union, to conclude that the United States did not intend to relinquish its monopoly and eventually would exercise "atomic diplomacy." The notion of devising methods to protect the secret of the bomb figured importantly in U.S. policy discussions on international control of atomic energy. However, considerations of this nature ran counter to a principle which might be deemed applicable to any field of scien- tific inquiry : that secrecy cannot long delay the independent acquisi- tion of scientific and technological information. This principle had special force in the case of atomic energy, in light of the inherent im- portance of this information to other nations, especially a great power like the Soviet Union. A related question which entered U.S. policy deliberations involved estimates of how long it would take the Soviet Union to develop its own atomic weapon without access to outside information. Such esti- mates would indicate how long the United States could expect to enjoy its preeminence in the field of atomic energy even if its efforts to maintain secrecy, before establishment of effective international control, should be entirely successful. Thus, the U.S. assessment of Soviet technological capabilities was a factor to be reckoned with in the U.S. diplomatic approach to the international negotiations. "U.S. Department of State, The International Control of Atomic Energy, Policy at the Crossroads, Publication 3161 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 4 R,P ewlett and Anderson - History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, I>. 5(11. The spv cas"8 also had an effW-r on Oip concessional deliberations oi domestic control of atomic energy and on the U.S. attitude toward international information ex- change, e.g., wartime agreements with the British. Ibid., p. 480. 4 -This phrase was used by President Truman to describe the U.S. role in relation to its monopoly on atomic weapons. State Department, Growth of a Policy, p 117. 78 Opinions varied within the Administration as to the length of time necessary for the Soviet Union to develop an atomic weapon. As early as 1D4T). the question was raised in Administration circles. During a meeting of Stimson's Interim Committee, a memorandum was cited which reflected the estimate by Bush and Conant that it would be 3 to 4 years before the Soviets could develop an atomic weapon. General Groves' estimate is described as follows: ''Taking a very low view of Russian ability, he considered 20 years a much likelier figure." 43 Conant called this figure "highly unsafe." The Acheson-Lilienthal report noted the speculative nature of esti- mates of this kind. In order to assess a technological situation accu- rately, the report contended, it was necessary to have a knowledge of the progress of foreign development. Such knowledge, of course, was not then forthcoming. But on balance, the report seemed to minimize the possibility of an imminent acquisition of atomic weapons by other countries. The Consultants touched on this question insofar as it re- lated to how much a rival effort would be accelerated by the release of U.S. information. Even with the release of purely theoretical in- formation, according to the Consultants, "a major program, surely lasting many years, is required for the actual production of atomic weapons." 44 It might be inferred from this statement that the Con- sultants' view of rival efforts, without access to theoretical informa- tion, could hardly have been an imminent cause for alarm to U.S. policymakers. One high Administration view, even more explicit regarding esti- mates of Russia's ability to develop its own bomb, was conveyed to the U.S. negotiating team. Hancock kept a record of a meeting which he attended between Byrnes and Baruch, which states : Mr. Byrnes briefly reviewed his impression that the Rus- sians don't know much about atomic energy or its use in bombs. Dr. Conant got no facts regarding it while he was in Russia and the assumption is that they know nothing.' While it is difficult to appraise the extent to which these assessments of Soviet nuclear development influenced U.S. policy, one might infer from the course and outcome of the negotiations that these considera- tions had weight. Considering the fact that differing estimates were made regarding Soviet atomic capabilities, it is possible to note an example of one problem which can arise when diplomacy is depend- ent upon science and technology. Policymakers do not always receive" a technological assessment to which all members of the scientific com- munity agree. A wide divergence only complicates the diplomat's task. If. for example, there is no clear consensus that an imminent danger exists, the diplomat will probably tend to be guided by counsels of compromise rather than urgency. And perhaps he should be — but it must also be noted that the counsels of urgency could be right, ami that in the present instance it was the conservative estimates of General Groves which turned out to be the furthest from the true situation. An equally thorny political factor which would enter into the dis- 11 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, p. 3. r >4. 11 state Department, "Acheson Llllentbal Report," p. 51. ** Lleberman, The Scorpion and tin- Tarantula, p. 274. Hancock may have been referring ti. Conant's trip t" Russia with Byrnes, for the meetings which resulted in the Moscow Declaration. Ibid., pp. iog-107. 79 cussions was the secrecy shrouding Soviet activities. One source de- scribes this phenomenon as follows : Western ignorance about the real condition of Russia was deemed by the regime, quite logically from its point of view, as one of the greatest assets it had in its conduct of foreign relations. Access to the U.S.S.R. was never so difficult — i.e., virtually impossible — for a foreigner who was not a diplomat or Communist, travel throughout the country never so limited as between 1946 and 1954. Not even during the Great Purge of the 1930's were restrictions so all-encompassing. The fear which this restrictive behavior suggests cannot have been simply a concern over revelations about the police-state aspects of Soviet life. By 1947, only Communists, fellow travelers, and the most naive of Western liberals denied that aspect of Soviet reality. Much more dangerous was any revela- tion of Russian weakness, of the magnitude of the tasks of industrial reconstruction and rapid demobilization lying ahead of this still primitive society. A truer picture of Rus- sia's strength and weaknesses might induce some new and unwelcome thinking in the State Department and the Pentagon. 46 Just as U.S. secrecy surrounding the bomb presented problems for its policy and the negotiations, the secretive nature of the Soviet Union would have a serious effect on the efforts to reach agreement on some of the fundamental elements of control. Soviet development of atomic energy had proceeded quite well until World War II. 47 In terms of the quality of research, the Soviet capa- bility at that point has been estimated to have been on a par with that of the United States, and the Soviets were catching up in the field of equipment. As the extent of Soviet involvement in World War II in- creased, however, they apparently found it necessary to abandon their efforts. All available manpower and resources were directed to meet the German attacks, rather than toward the "calculated gamble" of research for a nuclear weapon, at least until the setback for the Ger- mans at Stalingrad in 1943. Moreover, as one writer has asserted, "the Soviet military strategy of enormous masses of ground troops, backed by artillery and close air support was not conducive to a whole-hearted search for weapons useful to strategic aircraft." 4S Nuclear research in the Soviet Union was resumed in 1944, but a blackout was imposed on information at that time. It has been theorized that the first Soviet nuclear reactor was in operation by late 1947. This occurrence was considered a turning point in the Soviet efforts, a point which was reached less than two years after the opening of the nego- tiations for international control of atomic energy. It was only a matter of time before the Soviet research efforts succeeded, as evi- denced by the explosion of its first nuclear device in 1949. The contribution of Soviet espionage activities in the United States to progress in the field of atomic energy is hard to assess. One writer ^Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals. America and Russia Since World War II. (New York: Viking Press. 1971). pp. 106-107. 47 The following discussion is based on Kenneth Whiting. "Post-War Strategy," in Asher Lee, ed. The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces. (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 91-95. «Ibid., p. 92. 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-7 80 has attempted to put this question in perspective when he comments on this possibility as follows : We still do not know how much the relatively short gap between the first American and the first Russian explosion was due to successes in Soviet espionage, and how much it was due simply to native Russian capability. At the time it seemed to many of us that espionage must have been far and away the main reason they were able to accomplish the job so quickly, especially after the devastation that had been wreaked on them by World War II. Haying since seen some excellent Russian technological progress in other fields, we are no longer quite so sure that this was the case. We should note, furthermore, that it is always easier to do something a second time, even if the only thing known from the first time is that it can be done. 49 All things considered, an awareness of the progress of Soviet nuclear technology may contribute to an understanding in retrospect of the Soviet perceptions and attitudes during the negotiations of the UNAEC. The Form and Purposes of International Control The first question which arose in connection with the atomic energy policy formulation in 1947 was whether the general form of control should depend primarily on a system of international ownership and management, or on a system which left atomic energy development in national hands and relied on inspection to assure compliance with an agreement not to develop atomic energy for military purposes. Few specifics regarding the substantive aspects of this control issue were offered in the early international political actions on the subject. The resolution which established the UNAEC simply called on the pro- posed Commission to make proposals for "effective safeguards" to in- sure compliance with the control arrangement. Although it mentioned inspection as one type of safeguard, it offered no commitment to a particular method. PROPOSALS OF THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL REPORT The Hoard of Consultants' 1 position against inspection: The con- cept of inspection was distasteful to the members <>!' the Hoard of Con- sultants. The Hoard saw it as inherent in the leading alternative to their own proposals: to leave atomic energy development in the hands of individual nations while prohibiting its development for military purposes would require inspection of national activities. Thus, inspec- tion would be the sole means of verification of the control system, an arrangement which t he ( lonsilltants opposed. The Hoard's position, as expressed in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, was not based solely on technological considerations; it included "the inseparable political, social, and organizational problems involved in enforcing agreements between nations, each free to develop atomic energy, but only pledged not to use it for bombs." " Nevertheless, the argument against inspection in the report originated with the techno- '"Herberl York, Race to oblivion: A Participant's liar of the Arm* Race. (New York: Si d & Schuster, 1971 >, pp. 34 35. 60 State I)t'i>iirtinent, "Acheson-Lilienthal report", p. 4. 81 logical premise that the processes associated with the development of atomic energy, whether for military or peaceful purposes, "are in much of their course interchangeable and interdependent." Because of this factor, it was considered necessary under a control arrangement to monitor each stage in the process of developing atomic energy, from raw materials to finished product, to insure that the materials were not diverted at some point in the process to weapons development by an individual nation. Such a comprehensive inspection system would take a great number of inspectors; moreover, the inspectors would be called upon to determine intent behind an operation associated with atomic energy development. The Consultants asserted that "at no single point can external control of an operation be sufficiently reliable to be an adequate sole safeguard." 51 Another technological argument against inspection concerned the need for technical expertise in the staff which monitored atomic energy activities. To determine the existence of violations, staff members of an inspectorate would have to be highly trained in the field of atomic energy development. Moreover, the organization would have to be involved in research and development activities to keep abreast or ahead of advanced and changing developments, in a field which is "es- sentially a living art." Otherwise, would-be violators might try to exploit breakthroughs if they discovered them first. According to the Board of Consultants, an inspection system would "inevitably be slow to take into account changes in the science and technology of the field." 52 The remainder of the remarks against inspection in the Acheson- Lilienthal report seem to be derived from the "political, social, and organizational problems" of a control system, rather than from the technological requirements. The Consultants asserted that an inspec- tion system having a generally policelike character, would be deemed negative and suppressive. This quality would have a number of ill effects on the control system and its personnel. First, it would be diffi- cult to attract highly qualified personnel in the field of atomic energy to an inspection team having this character, and the team itself would encounter problems in morale. Second, because inspection of facilities would require a large number of inspectors, the presence of many for- eigners in participating countries would intrude excessively into na- tional activities, challenge the good faith of the nations, and provide a likely source of tension and friction. On this particular point, the Consultants declared that this arrangement would be "as obnoxious to Americans as to any others." 53 Finally, the Consultants contended, un- der a system which entrusted atomic energy development to individual nations, "suspicion by one nation of the good faith of another and the fear engendered thereby are themselves strong incentives for the first to embark on secret illicit operations [and] any system based on out- lawing the purely military development of atomic energy and relying solely on inspection for enforcement would at the outset be surrounded by conditions which would destroy the system." 54 Indeed, a basic source of the problem associated with inspection, according to the 51 Ibid., p. 6. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid., p. 7. 54 Ibid., p. 8. 82 Board, was the national rivalries which would result as countries en- gaged in atomic energy development : National rivalries in the development of atomic energy readily convertible to destructive purposes are the heart of the difficulty. So long as intrinsically dangerous activities may be carried on by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are engendered that place so great a pressure upon a system of international enforcement by police methods that no degree of ingenuity or technical competence could possibly hope to cope with them. 55 International oionership and operation of dangerous activities: Awareness of the political problems caused by inescapable national rivalries provided the main basis for the Consultants' proposals. The Consultants sought to eliminate these rivalries by internationalizing certain activities which might become a source of competition among nations. As was the case with the Consultants' views of inspection, they looked to both technological and political considerations to support their ideas for assigning certain activities to an international Authority. The practicability of such an international Authority, in their view, would be derived from certain technological characteristics of atomic energy development. An inherent technological difficulty of an inspec- tion system was how to determine the intent behind an activity in atomic energy development, that is. whether it was designed for peace- ful or military purposes. The Consultants asserted that specific categories of activity could be identified which, if undertaken by an individual nation, clearly would constitute a violation of the control system: such activities should be assigned to an international Authority. This arrangment would elim- inate the need to determine intent behind a national activity in the atomic energy field. This concept was developed to the extent that the Board named in broad terms certain '"safe" and "dangerous" activi- ties. They warned, however, that these categories would have to be subject to constant reevaluation and revision in light of potential ad- vances in atomic energy. One example of how internationalization would function concerned the raw materials needed for atomic weapons; namely, ores of uranium and possibly thorium. 5 " The existing technical knowledge at that time supported the conclusion that these materials were the only source of nuclear fuel materials 57 which could energize nuclear reactors for use either to produce fissionable materials for nuclear explosives, or to generate electricity. The practical problems posed by attempting to monitor the use of these raw materials were considered "most difficult." Hut management of actual mining operations by an international Authority would provide assurance that it could account for all sources ra Ihid ]> 5 w The role of thorium in atomic energy illustrates the difficulty Imposed by secrecy. The fact was still "classified" In 1946. that the addition of slow neutrons to thorium converted it Into U 238 , which was fissionable. Nevertheless the Acheson-Lillenthal report proposed thai its presence In a nuclear reactor Bhould be prohibited withoul Baying why. Uranium ores could provide the raw material for production of the fissionable isotope uranium-235, and also for the manufacture of plutonlum by the exposure of uranium-238 to neutrons within a nuclear reactor. Uranium 235 and plutonlum could be used for nuclear weapons. 83 of raw materials. Moreover, if possession of raw materials should be- come the exclusive prerogative of the international Authority, any at- tempt on the part of an individual nation to exercise control over raw materials would represent a clear violation. Mere possession, irrespec- tive of use or intent, would be illegal. An added advantage owing to technological factors was that this particular violation would occur early enough in the development process to allow other nations to take appropriate action to prevent national production of atomic weapons. Another advantage created by technological circumstances was that uranium and thorium occurred under special geological conditions which reduced the task of controlling the raw materials to "manage- able proportions," a characteristic of a control system which the Con- sultants considered essential to effective safeguards. Moreover, the Consultants concluded that enough knowledge had been acquired to indicate that this principle regarding raw materials (as well as others) was not likely to be altered significantly by further scientific discoveries. 58 A similar case could be made for the plutonium-producing atomic reactor, a design which produces material usable for either atomic weapons or power. By granting responsibility for building and operat- ing such reactors solely to an international Authority, an attempt by a country to usurp this activity would represent an unambiguous viola- tion. Determination of intent for the use of the product of the re- actors would not be necessary. Aside from the technological concepts which were considered to justify international operation of a number of specified activities, the report commented on another quality of such an approach which would make it advantageous to a secure system of safeguards. The activities which the Consultants contemplated turning over to an international Authority were also considered those most likely to foster rivalry among nations. Removing these from national hands would greatly reduce, if not eliminate competition among nations in atomic energy development, thereby enhancing the security of nations under the con- trol system. Another advantage of internationalization was illustrated by the proposal to give the Authority the function of development and re- search in the field of atomic energy. This function would be aided by the fact that the Authority would conduct the principal processes of atomic energy development. Both practical and political concepts played a role in establishing the report's position on this point. In the opinion of the Board, the control organization would have to stay in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy to maintain awareness of discoveries which could have a potential for violation of a control agreement. Thus a research and development function for the international agency would enhance the efficiency of the control or- ganization in detecting violations. An additional reason for assigning this function to the international Authority was based partly on the technological prospect that in the foreseeable future, atomic energy could be used substantially in a beneficial way. This function, it was suggested, would attract and hold the skilled, imaginative staff so vital to the successful operation of a control authority. But the prin- 58 Indeed, one section of the report, "The Adequacy of Present Scientific Knowledge." is devoted to explaining that there were basic scientific principles which could be expected to remain unchanged, and would therefore provide a reasonably sound basis for devising a control system. 84 ciples to support this idea are expressed in terms which hardly could be considered scientific or technological : While suppression is not possible where we are dealing with the quest for knowledge, this thirst to know (that can- not be ''policed" out of existence) can be used, affirmatively, in the design and building of an effective system of safe- guards. Human history shows that any effort to confine the inquir- ing human mind * * * is doomed to failure. * * * Like the jiu jitsu wrestler whose skill consists in making his opponent disable himself with his own thrusts, the designers of a sys- tem of safeguards for security should and can utilize for en- forcement measures that driving force toward knowledge that is part of man's very nature. 59 Retention of "safe" national activities : The Consultants recognized that a complete monopoly of atomic energy activities by an inter- national Authority would not be acceptable politically or economically. Therefore, based on the existing technical knowledge, certain types of activities were classified as "safe" and Mould be allowed to remain in national hands. The judgment that such activities could be retained safely on a national level relied primarily on a technological assump- tion that "denaturing" of atomic fuel was possible. The Consultants asserted that fissionable materials could be contaminated in such a way that they would "not readily lend themselves to the making of atomic explosives, but they can still be used with no essential loss of effectiveness for the peaceful applications of atomic energy." 60 Re- versal of the denaturing process, to make the materials suitable for weapons production, was thought to involve a difficult and easily de- tectable effort. Using denatured materials, the Consultants declared, nations could puisne a number of legitimate activities, such as the operation of re- search reactors (kept below a certain power level), construction and operation of reactors to produce radioactive materials, and construc- tion and operation of reactors to generate electric power. For these activities to be entrusted to national hands, designs would have to be devised for reactors which could not be diverted to dangerous use. The denatured materials and operation of these activities would have to be licensed or controlled in some way by the international Authority. In discussing the Authority's licensing functions under which national activities would operate, the Consultants raised the following questions : How shall control be exercised lightly enough to assure the free play of national and private enterprise without risk to security? I low shall facilities and materials available for national and private exploitation 1m> allocated and at what cosl '. How may safe activities, assigned to national hands, be withdrawn if new discoveries show them to be dangerous? 61 The entire discussion of national activities in the Acheson-Lilienthal report would seem to imply that the Consultants envisioned and sup- ported rather active national programs in atomic energy development. These activities would be of a sufficient scale and variety to encourage m Ibid., p. 15. 00 Ibid . p. 2\\. 81 Ibid., p. 35. 85 development and competition among nations and private industry. Moreover, active national participation in atomic energy development, they hoped, would "help correct any tendencies that might otherwise develop toward bureaucratic inbreeding and over-centralization, and aid in providing healthy, expanding national and private develop- ments in atomic energy." 62 Although the Board contended that the technological factors associ- ated with denatured materials lent credence to their expectations for national activities, they warned that : Although as the art now stands denatured materials are unsuitable for bomb manufacture, developments which do not appear to be in principle impossible might alter the situation.'"' 3 During Administration deliberations before the opening of the UNAEC, Baruch said denaturing had inspired false hopes, and in his initial address to the UNAEC he stated that "Denaturing seems to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure.'' G4 Both the first and second reports of the UNAEC granted the possibility of permitting national activity using denaturing mate- rials only if the denaturing process proved technologically feasible. This skepticism of the reliability of denaturing, as well as Soviet op- position to proposals for international ownership and inspection, ap- pear to have been responsible for the fact that the proposed reliance on denaturing did not become a major issue in the negotiations. In retrospect, the U.S. position on denaturing appears to have been based upon a technology forecast — the assumption of a principle which today, 25 years later, has remained undemonstrated in practice. This fact points up one occasion when forecasts by scientific advisors would not have met the needs of the diplomats. Inspection jrrovisions in the report : Despite the number of nega- tive aspects of inspection, the Board members pointed out that the need for it could not be eliminated entirely. However, the overall plan they recommended was aimed at making inspection "so limited and so simplified that it would be practical and could aid in accomplishing the purposes of security." 65 The requirements for inspection are dis- cussed in detail among the functions of the proposed international Authority. The discussion of the issue tended to emphasize that inspection could be beneficial. Because inspectors would also be engaged in research on atomic energy , GC their "policing" of national facilities (for example, those using denatured materials) would offer opportunities to provide helpful guidance and advice to the operators of those facilities, mak- ing inspection less objectionable. The only "systematic or large-scale inspection activities" contemplated for the proposed Authority were those which would be used to take control over raw materials. 67 In addition, the report recognized that some procedure would have to be devised for the investigation of suspected clandestine dangerous activ- 82 Ibid., p. 22. 83 Ibid., p. 23. 64 Baruch, "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority," p. 1061. 65 State Department, "Acheson-Lilienthal report," p. 5. 98 The inspectors of tlie International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today do not reflect this concept of the scientist-inspector. Rather, present-day inspectors are precisely that, professional men in the complicated and uncertain art of nuclear materials. 87 Contemporary inspection is focused more on processing, fabrication, use. and reproc- essing of nuclear fuel materials than upon mining and refining. 86 ities, which might involve the International Court of Justice or some similar body, to determine if enough evidence of clandestine activity existed to warrant investigation. 68 The report stressed that operation of dangerous activities by the proposed international Authority could eliminate the need for deter- mination of intent behind national or private facilities, and would thereby avoid the need for extensive and intrusive inspection. In addi- tion, the following statement regarding some of the technical diffi- culties of engaging in clandestine activities seemed to minimize not only the need for inspection but also, perhaps, the possibility that evasions might be attempted : It is true that a thoroughgoing inspection of all phases of the industry of a nation will in general be an unbearable burden; it is true that a calculated attempt at evasion may, by camouflage or by geographical location, make the specific detection of an illegal operation very much more difficult. Hut the total effort needed to carry through from the mine to the bomb, a surreptitious program of atomic armament on a scale sufficient to make it a threat or to make it a temptation to evasion, is so vast, and the number of separate difficult undertakings so hard to conceal, that the fact of this effort should be impossible to hide. The fact that it is the existence of the effort rather than a specific purpose or motive or plan which constitutes an evasion and an unmistakable danger sig- nal is to our minds one of the great advantages of the pro- posals we have outlined. 60 REACTIONS AMONG U.S. POLICYMAKERS TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE BOARD OF CONSULTANTS When the Board originally presented its plan to Achesoirs commit- tee, both Conant and Groves voiced apprehension that the need for inspection had been minimized too much and that the terms which the Consultants used to characterize it were too negative. Conant con- sidered it vital that there be freedom of access for inspectors. At one point McCloy raised the possibility that this plan might be one way "'to alter Russia's closed society.'' 70 But Acheson discouraged the idea on the grounds that the basic political issues associated with the diffi- culties in United States-Soviet relations could not be resolved through the efforts to deal with the problem of international control of atomic energy. Although Lilienthal agreed readily to make changes appropri- ate to the views of Conant and Groves, the report's general tone on the issue of inspection remained negat ive. Despite the fact that the Board had retained the idea of some na- tional activity, significant forces at work in the policymaking proc- ess opposed extensive internationalization, for technical and other 98 For a discussion of Inspection, sop State Department, "Acheson-Lillenthal Report", pp. 35 39. •"Ibid., pp. 36 ':t The Board seems t<> have given little thought to the possible emer gence <>f an international black market in fissionable materials, an issue that is attracting considerable attention todaj as the United states and other governments push ahead with die development "i i>r ler reader technology, which can greatly increase the amount "i fissionable material available for direct use in weapons manufacture, Today it' a nation or other institutions can obtain nuclear materials en q black market, it is probable that such an instrumentality could fabricate small, inefficient, but still enormously destructive at Iininhs. 7 " Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United Stairs Atomic Energy Commxxsion, p. 548. 87 reasons. The issue of ownership of raw materials is an apt example. Searls, the mining engineer on Baruch's delegation, did not share the Consultants' view regarding the manageability of all the sources of raw materials, and advised Baruch that the arrangement proposed in the Acheson-Lilienthal report would be difficult. His views were sec- onded by representatives of mining interests who sought out Baruch to argue against international ownership. One mining executive told Baruch "an international administration would upset wages, dissat- isfy people, and, on account of the different nationals involved, present tremendous management difficulties." 71 Another argument against international ownership was that it vio- lated the rights of private enterprise. Hancock, of Baruch's group, contended that if uranium was the byproduct of mining operations which contributed significantly to a country's economy, international ownership would be unacceptable to that country. At one meeting, when Hancock expressed his preference for more inspection over own- ership, Acheson pointed out that the Russians would not accept this arrangement as the predominant safeguard. Hancock disagreed, and the two men did not resolve the issue. 72 An alternative plan called for operation of nationally owned mines under "reasonable regulations" of the Authority or "a system of rigorous inspection and accounting procedures for the separation operations at mining locations through- out the world." Baruch's team was willing to support this position against international ownership. 73 When Baruch met with the Ache- son and Lilienthal groups, he announced the delegation's preference for "some form of licensing of private mining operations" and sug- gested using the term "dominion" to describe the relationship between the international Authority and raw materials. 74 Apparently, the tech- nological assertions which were advanced to support the Consultants' proposals for ownership of raw materials were insufficient for the United States to overcome traditional political and economic concepts of sovereignty and private ownership. The varying assertions by the qualified experts on the manageability of raw materials compounded the confusion surrounding the problem of atomic energy control. In retrospect, a more important factor was the discovery of uranium in the years following the negotiations in places where it was not anticipated in 1946. TREND TOWARD CONTROL IN U.S. POLICY As enunciated at the negotiations, the main thrust of U.S. policy on the general form of control shifted somewhat from the plan proposed in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. In describing the international Au- thority, Baruch's speech to the UNAEC offered a variety of specific methods of control over various phases of atomic energy development. Among the safeguards he proposed were "various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research, and manage- ment." 70 While Baruch stated that these duties should interfere as little as possible with the internal affairs of the states involved, every phase of atomic energy development would be placed under the juris- 71 Ibid., p. 563. 72 Ibid., p. 569. 73 Lieberman. The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 276. 74 Ibid., p. 281. 75 Baruch, "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority," p. 1060. 88 diction of the international Authority, in one way or another. One point on which the United States yielded to private and national in- terests concerned raw materials, which were proposed to be placed under the international Authority's "dominion" 1 ; specific forms of control over the natural deposits would depend on the geological, min- ing, refining, and economic circumstances of the various locations where they were found. While the second U.S. memorandum stated that the Authority should have such control as would insure "its com- plete and absolute ownership of all uranium and thorium produced,'' the proposal involved a control system imposed upon national mining and concentrating operations, rather than simply transferring these activities to the international Authority, as the Acheson-Lihenthal report had proposed. It will be recalled that the Acheson-Lilienthal report displayed some enthusiasm for allowing national and private participation in certain areas of atomic energy development. But when Baruch presented the U.S. proposals to the UNAEC, the main concern over national ac- tivities was that they Avould be subject to licensing and inspection by the Authority. As noted above, he questioned the effectiveness of de- naturing to prevent illegal diversion of activities in national hands. Moreover, Baruch stated that national activities should be subordinate to the international Authority and added that this represented "neither an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national author- ities." In the brief discussion of inspection in Baruch's speech, he men- tioned the advantages of the overall plan, which stressed international ownership, thus providing unambiguous evidence of violations and limiting inspection requirements. He also noted that those activities licensed by the Authority would be subject to inspection. II is third point, however, which was to become a focus for Soviet opposition dining the negotiations, was an insistence on freedom of access. He said : Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of the Authority must be assured." 7 " Less attention was given to the idea of linking the developmental function with inspection, as the Acheson- Lilienthal report had done. 77 U.N. STALEMATE OVER CONTROL AND INSPECTION Soviet reaction to jrroposed interTiationalizaiion: Typical of the Soviet I'nion's reaction to the notion of international ownership was Gromyko's comment on the IXAEC's first report; he labelled the whole concept "thoroughly vicious and unacceptable," and added that international ownership and managerial control "would lend to inter- ference by the control organ in the internal affairs and internal life of States and eventually would lead to arbitrary action by the control organ in the solution of such problems as fall completely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State." 78 Soviet reaction to the requirements for inspection set forth by Baruch was unequivocal, as indicated by a press release which dis- •" Ibid., i>. 1001. "The first U.S. memorandum touched on the issue of inspection In a manner similar to that of Baruch's speech. The second memorandum expanded on the Idea by elaborating the d( tail- of Inspection, I.e.. adequate provision would have to be made for inspectors in terms Of communication and transportation, as well as unhindered access to the facilities In question. 7 "Stat>- Department, Polioi/ at the Crossroads, p. 80. 89 cussed a speech by Gromyko to a committee of the UNAEC in July 1946: Mr. Gromyko said that the proposed inspection is not re- concilable with the principle of sovereignty of states. "No in- spection as such can guarantee peace and security." And. he added, ''This idea of inspection is greatly exaggerated in im- portance. Tt is a too superficial understanding of the problem of control." The Soviet Delegate repeated that inspection has assumed undue importance in the course of the discussions and said that the only real underlying method of control is "by the cooperation of the United Nations." 79 The origin for this opposition appears to have been in the precepts associated with the political principle of national sovereignty. One U.S. response to this argument was made by Baruch in a speech be- fore Freedom House in October 1946 : Every treaty involves some diminution of absolute national sovereignty, but nations enter into such treaties of their own free will and to their common advantage. Indeed, freedom to enter into such voluntary international arrangements is in- herent in the very concept of national sovereignty. 80 Action by the UNAEC: The first report of the UNAEC declared in its "Findings" that : Ownership by the international control agency of mines and of ores still in the ground is not to be regarded as man- datory. 81 Broad terms of reference were applied to dangerous activities, a cate- gory which seemed to include all aspects of the production of fission- able materials: * * * Effective control of atomic energy depends upon effective control of the production and use of uranium, thorium, and their fissionable derivatives. Appropriate mech- anisms of control to prevent their unauthorized diversion or clandestine production and use and to reduce the dangers of seizure — including one or more of the following types of safe- guards: accounting, inspection, supervision, management, and licensing — must be applied through the various stages of the processes from the time the uranium and thorium ores are severed from the ground to the time they become nuclear fuel and are used. 82 Looking back from the early 1970s, when most contemporary chal- lenges to nuclear power focus on safety and environmental effects, it is interesting to note that these matters received scant attention by the United Nations in the 1940s. The second report of the UNAEC elaborated on the general concept of ownership by the Agency and how it applied to source material and the operation of dangerous facilities, and thereby addressed itself to political problems inherent in such an arrangement. The report's dis- 79 State Department, Groirth of a Policy, p. 83. 80 Ibid., p. 91. He might, however, have added that the ripht of withdrawal is also in herent in national sovereignty. 81 United Nations Atomic ' Energy Commission, "First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, 31 December 1946," p. 16. 8 - Ibid. 90 cussion was premised on the assertion that it was not possible to main- tain security by allowing nations or individuals to have proprietary rights over source materials, nuclear fuels, or dangerous facilities. It recognized the need to protect certain rights of individual nations and to guard against any abuse of power by the international Agency. Ownership by the Agency would be "in the sense of a trust exercised on behalf of signatory States jointly." While broad powers over the materials and facilities would be granted to the Agency as owner, many of these, especially those dealing with ''rights of disposition." would be '"very closely controlled by the terms of the treaty or conven- tion." Certain arrangements, for example, the location of facilities within a country or compensation for source materials, would have to be determined through agreement with individual nations. Other ac- tivities would be executed by the Agency in accordance with the prin- ciples established by treaty for governing the Agency's rights and duties as "trustee." Similarly, the report proposed that the treaty or convention deter- mine principles respecting the geographic distribution of production facilities and stockpiles of materials suitable for weapons use ; these principles would be such that no particular location would have a greater share of materials, and thus would avoid the potential for a military capability or military superiority. It was decided that the Agency could not be allowed to determine policy on this subject as decisions in this area affected world security. 83 Thus, the UNAEC en- visioned that decisions on political considerations arising from the rights, duties, and limitations of international ownership would be agreed to before assumption by the Authority of the powers entrusted to it. In additional sections of the second UNAEC report, these and other concepts were developed in considerable detail ; specific proposals dealt with the mining of raw materials and with dangerous activities. Dis- cussion of "dangerous activities'' offered proposals on the refining of raw materials; the stockpiling, production, and distribution of nuclear fuels; and the design, construction, and operation of isotope separa- tion plants and of nuclear reactors. These later sections of the report contained several observations with regard to arrangements with individual nations which the Authority would have to make, some of which might have to be included in the treaty or convention establishing the Authority. The need for such arrangements was recognized, as certain activities of the Authority might a licet the economy of a nation or might otherwise warrant com pensation by the Authority. The report also listed the various forms of inspection and licensing activities and where they would be required. Although these proposals in the second UNAEC report were based primarily on technological considerations, they also involved political factors, as reflected in the prescription that : Production facilities, facilities utilizing nuclear fuel, and stockpiles be distributed in such a way as to minimize the possibility that seizure could provide an aggressor with a militarv advantage. 84 *> United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "The International Control of Atomic Energy. The Second Report • • ♦ to the Security Council.- Sept. 11. 1047. Reproduced for the United Nations Mission to the United Nations. U.N. Document S/557, Mimeo L>e« York United Nations, 1047), pp. 13 17. "Ibid., p. 3 91 Despite the kind of attention to detail which might have been expected to ease Soviet fears, the Soviets continued to express adamant opposi- tion to some of the fundamental features of the plan. This attitude may have lessened the value of the efforts by the UNAEC to formulate the finer points of the control system. The third report of the UNAEC may have been commenting on the need for the acceptance of the general concept of international owner- ship, when it stated : Only if traditional economic and political practices are adapted to the overriding requirements of international se- curity, can these proposals be implemented. Traditional con- cepts of f he economic exploitation of the resources of nature for priv • e or national advantage would then be replaced in this fielu by a new pattern of co-operation in international relations. 85 With regard to inspection, the first report of the UNAEC had stated that "only'' through an "international system of control and inspec- tion" can atomic energy be "freed from nationalistic rivalries." 86 It called for "a strong and comprehensive system of control and inspec- tion." On the "freedom of access" issue, the UNAEC seemed to put its recommendations in even more specific terms than Baruch, when the report stated that the treaty or convention establishing the interna- tioral Authority should contain provisions — * * * Affording the duly accredited representatives of the utornational control agency unimpeded rights of ingress, 3gi ss, and access for the performance of their inspections and other duties into, from, and within the territory of every participating nation, unhindered by national or local authorities. 87 Committee Two's report, appended to the first UNAEC report, had referred to the need for inspection quite frequently in regard to a num- ber of activities. The group defined inspection as follows : 2. Inspection means close and careful independent scrutiny of operations to detect possible evasions or violations of pre- scribed methods of operation. In addition to direct auditing measures as described above, inspection may include observa- tion of points of ingress to and egress from an establishment or installation to ensure that materials and supplies are flow- ing in the prescribed manner, observation of the activities within the establishment or installation, and measures in the form of aerial or ground survey and otherwise to guard against clandestine activities. To be fully effective, the power of inspection may require that the operations be carried on in a specified manner in order to facilitate the inspection. In this event, inspection verges on supervision. 88 The need for inspection was discussed in Committee Two's report, and during the negotiations, insofar as it related to examination of "declared" activities, i.e., those facilities operated by the proposed 83 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Official Records. Third year. Special Supplement. "Third Report to the Security Council. May 17. 194S." (Lake Success, New York : August 1948) p. 4. (AEC/31/Rev. 1. June 27, 1948.) 86 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "First Report of the Atomic Energy Com- mission to the Security Council, 31 December 1946," p 16. 87 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 88 Ibid., p. 44. 92 Authority or by national or private management licensed bv the Au- thority. Suspected clandestine activities seemed to present" the most difficulties in the findings and recommendations of the UNAEC and in the negotiations themselves. Committee Two's report seemed to rec- ognize that inspection for clandestine activities represented one of the more troublesome political problems to be dealt with in the ne- gotiations. Moreover, it reflected a recognition of how certain inherent technological demands of atomic energy control were in conflict with traditional political requirements of states: Like all problems in atomic energy, the detection of clan- destine operations is greatly simplified by the technical facts of the field. Nevertheless, general and political considerations play a larger part in the effectiveness and acceptability of any system for the detection of clandestine operations than in most other parts of the problem. They will need most careful con- sideration when the functions, powers, and organization of the agency are defined. It will be here that the conflicts be- tween the requirements of the international control agency on the one hand and considerations of national sovereignty and present practice on the other will have to be resolved. 89 The second report of the UNAEC attempted to deal with the politi- cal problems associated with inspection in a section entitled "Rights of and Limitations on the International Agency in Relation to In- spections, Surveys, and Explorations." It offered 21 specific proposals on such subjects as procedural details of inspections, ground or aerial surveys, and the like. Six of these were devoted to proposals dealing with investigation of clandestine activities. 90 Many of these procedural proposals were made with the understanding that they should be in- corporated in the treaty or convention establishing the Authority. The following concluding statement may serve as a general comment on the character of the inspection envisioned by the UNAEC in its sec- ond report: In summary, the proposals contained in this chapter pro- vide very extensive powers of inspection and search which enable the agency to visit any accessible place and provide appropriate procedures applicable in certain specified circum- stances. It has to be recognized that, in addition to these pro- posed procedural requirements and limitations, the good sense. as well as the budget, of the agency will themselves be limita- tions on the exercise of powers given to the agency and that, by virtue of the prospective functions of the agency which have been proposed in previous chapters, the amount or inspec- tion required and t he attendant interferences will be much less than would be necessary under a control system which sought to depend on inspection alone. 1 ' 1 With regard to declared facilities, the Soviets woidd agree only to "periodic inspections." or to inspections "carried out at definite inter- » Ibid., p. 56. ■ The main categories of these proposals were the following: (1) requirement of war rants or special consenl ; cj i granting of special consent : (3) resorl to domestic or inter national court, body, or official; (i> domestic •■,,urts. bodies, or officials required to issue warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause; (5) International court, body, or official required to issue warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause: and (6) scope of warrants. Complete details of these proposals <;m be found in United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, "The International Control of Atomic Energy, The Second Report to the Security Council", pp. 54—55. « Ibid., p. 50. 93 vals," but opposed permanent stationing of inspectors in countries. Soviet proposals on this subject, though more detailed than others, were considered by the majority of the Commission as failing to pro- vide an adequate basis for the development * * * of specific proposals for an effective system of international control of atomic energy. 92 The U.S. interpretation of the Soviet proposals on inspection was that it was "concerned chiefly with bookkeeping and reports." 93 As far as investigation of clandestine activities was concerned, the Commission reported that in the "minority" (Soviet) position, "inspection as to clandestine or unreported facilities is virtually ignored." 94 As was the case with international ownership, the extent of agreement on details achieved by a considerable number of UNAEC members was nullified by Soviet opposition to the basic principles behind the proposals on inspection. In commenting on the impasse in the negotiations, the third report of the UNA EC seemed to focus on how the inspection issue, and the agreed technological requirements of control, challenged national at- titudes toward security, secrecy, and sovereignty. It said : * * * Secrecy in the field of atomic energy is not compat- ible with lasting international security. Cooperative develop- ment and complete dissemination of information alone prom- ise to remove fears and suspicion that nations are conducting secret activities * * *. The majority of the Commission is fully aware of the im- pact of its plan on traditional prerogatives of national sov- ereignty. But in the face of the realities of the problem it sees no alternative to the voluntary sharing by nations of their sovereignty in this field to the extent required by its proposals. It finds no other solution which will meet the facts, prevent national rivalries in this most dangerous field, and fulfill the Commission's terms of reference. 95 Moreover, the third report placed the issue in a larger perspective when it expressed, if perhaps too f acilely, the hope that : The new pattern of international co-operation and the new standards of openness in the dealings of one country with an- other that are indispensable in the field of atomic energy might, in practice, pave the way for international co-operation in broader fields, for the control of other weapons of mass de- struction, and even for the elimination of war itself as an instrument of national policy. 96 The Issue of Stages of Transition to International Control A second major problem for U.S. policy and for the negotiations in- volved the manner in which an international control Authority would assume its responsibilities, or the stages by which there would be a 82 Proposals and Recommendations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, Sec. 2, "Report and Recommendations of the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, adopted May 17, 194S." pp. 77-78, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Post- war Negotiations, p. 66. 93 State Department, Polici) at the Crossroads, p. 137. 91 U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report 1047, p. 103, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Postwar Xeriotiations, p. 66. 95 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, "Third Report to the Security Council," pp. 4-5. 98 Ibid., p. 5. 94 transition from the existing U.S. control of atomic energy to a system of international control. The issue of these transitional stages involved partly the practical steps by which the international Authority would arrive at its position of complete control over atomic energy, but it also concerned the underlying assumption that this transition would have to proceed in such a way that the control system would be made reliable before it could assume responsibility for the information and facilities associated with the dangerous uses of atomic energy. Without jeopardizing its own military security or that of the other nations of the world, thereby fulfilling its responsibility as keeper of the "sacred trust'' over atomic energy, the United States had to deter- mine its policy regarding the sequence and timing of the transfer of information and facilities to an international Authority. For other countries, the issue of the transitional stages raised questions regard- ing whether and when the United States would relinquish its monopoly over atomic energy 7 and thus give up what appeared to be a command- ing military advantage. Thus, U.S. policy had to be framed to satisfy multiple and conflicting purposes. Important related questions for policymakers of the United States and other countries were, when would the United States stop its production of atomic bombs, and what would become of its stockpiles ? THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR PROCEEDING BY STAGES The concept of stages for the release of information and transfer of facilities had its foundations in early U.S. policy on international con- trol of atomic energy and in those international agreements which com- mitted the United States to seek such control. Initial Administration pronouncements regarding atomic energy included assurances that the "secret" of weapons manufacture would not be released in the ab- sence of international control. In his October 1945 message to Congress, which concentrated primarily on national control. President Truman, in speaking on the problem of international control, pledged that international discussions would "not be concerned with disclosures re- lating to the manufacturing processes leading to the production of the atomic bomb itself," and that they would "constitute an effort to work out arrangements covering the terms under which international collaboration and exchange of information might safely proceed." Although the President did not specifically mention transitional stages, his comments indicate an effort to avoid any implication that the im- pending discussions might lead to dissemination of information on atomic energy, before control of its destructive uses had been achieved. As later developed in U.S. policy, this goal became one of the primary purposes for devising transitional stages. The Three Nation Agreed I >eclaration of November 1945 offered an "exchange of fundamental scientific information * * * for peaceful ends with any nation that will fully reciprocate," bul added that much of the information on practical applications of atomic energy would become available "just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards "Harry s Truman, "Special Message to the Conpn>ss on Atomic Energy, October 3, I'M.". / ublic Papers of th( President of tin United States, 1945 (Washington, D.C. : u.b. Gove'rnmenl Printing Office, 1961 >, i>. 366. 95 against its use for destructive purposes can be devised." 98 Moreover, the statement recommended that the proposed U.N. Commission pro- ceed "by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken." " The same phrase was incorporated in the Moscow Declaration and in the resolution which established the UNAEC. At the Moscow Conference, the provision that the work of the Commission should proceed by stages had been strongly supported by the United States; Russian agreement was obtained primarily in exchange for Western agreement to Soviet insistence on the close relationship of the Commission with the U.N. Security Council. 100 The idea that the. proposed Commission should proceed by stages may have made it appear to the United States that its participation in the proposed organization would involve the release of information on atomic weapons either for the purposes of negotiation or to set up the system of international control. Thus, even before taking part in the negotiations on the substantive issues of control the United States felt it necessary to seek assurance that atomic weapons information would be protected in the absence of international control, and this concern was carried over into the negotiations themselves, as it applied to the transition from U.S. to international control. INSISTENCE BY ACHESON COMMITTEE ON STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH Origins of the discussion: The idea of transitional stages in the Aeheson-Lilienthal report originated in the attitude among the mem- bers of Acheson's committee that the security of the United States had to be protected before and during the transition to effective inter- national control. Some committee members expressed concern lest in- formation and facilities associated with manufacturing the atomic bomb be released by the United States before a reliable system of in- ternational control had been established. The Board of Consultants did not set out initially to devise such stages. They viewed their basic task as to conceive a "workable system of international control," and tended to disregard devising the steps to achieve it. It was only at the insistence of the Acheson committee that the Board resigned itself to modifying its report to include a general discussion of stages. The finished form of the Aeheson-Lilienthal report, however, avoided going into considerable detail, on the grounds that specific schedules would have to be negotiated in the UNAEC, and that decisions on the. timing of the release of information and facilities by the United States should be left to the highest policymakers in the Government. Although the political basis for the concept of stages had been es- tablished in the policy approved by the President, the Board of Con- sultants apparently preferred to omit explicit discussion of this sub- ject, even though Conant had earlier mentioned to the Board the need for transitional stages. 101 In the Board's original report to Acheson's committee, the Consultants did not deal with the issue of transitional 98 state Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 25. m Ibid. 100 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 216. 101 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, p. 534. 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-8 96 stages beyond the assertion that a necessary first step would be a raw materials survey. This consideration was primarily an operational requisite of the international Authority. When the plan was submitted to the committee, Conant, Bush, and Groves were the principal ex- ponents of the political and military arguments for determining the transitional stages for the release of information and transfer of material. Bush based his position on the recognition that rapid demobiliza- tion of U.S. military manpower had resulted in a U.S. dependence on the atomic bomb as its primary source of military power, while the Soviet Union had retained its large armies. If the international con- trol system should be established in one step, and the United States relinquished its monopoly, Bush argued, the Soviets would be left in a superior military position. Acheson's comments on the stages centered on two considerations. First, while he granted that the plan should go into effect as quickly as possible, he appeared to envision the transitional period as one which would reveal whether other nations would adhere to a system of international control. Acheson's remarks have been described as fol- lows : "As soon as the organization had completed the first transitional phase and everyone was 'playing pool,' it would turn to the next. If the first phase revealed bad faith, further progress was out of the question." 102 Acheson's second point was that the United States should be prepared for crises with the Soviet Union and that a variety of issues, whether connected with the plan or not, could sabotage the whole effort. Therefore, U.S. preeminence in the field of atomic energy should not be forfeited immediately, in the event that steps to set up the international Authority failed. Moreover, support for the idea of stages was based on the commit- tee's general view of the complete plan for international control. Both Acheson and Conant described the plan primarily as a "warning de- vice" whereby the United States and other nations of the world would become aware when a country embarked on its own program to de- velop nuclear weapons, and could take preventive or punitive action. Given this attitude toward the fully operational control system, it is understandable that the committee should have sought to retain for the United States the highest degree of military preparedness in the event of a breakdown as the system was being established, while at the same time preventing other nations from developing their own nuclear weapons. Committee members differed as to the extent to which a detailed schedule of transition could be specified. Bush suggested that the stages would have to be defined clearly enough to insure acceptability of the plan, perhaps on the grounds that such definition would serve to strengthen the confidence of other nations in U.S. intentions to re- linquish its monopoly. lie recognized, however, that the fine details could not be determined at that point, a task which rightly belonged to the American negotiator. This position was supported by Acheson. Throughout the deliberations between the Board and the committee, General Groves supported the idea of setting forth the most explicit stages possible, to show "where the American people would come out «» Ibid., p. 548. 97 if someone suddenly doublecrossed them." 103 It was finally agreed that the Board would add a section to its report to deal with stages, but only in a "speculative way."' The purpose of the new section was "to give the report the ring of reasonableness." 104 During the discussions with the committee, Lilienthal had ques- tioned the group's competence to set down the transitional stages. In a meeting following the presentation of their first report to the com- mittee, the Board members were apprehensive about the idea, appar- ently because of its political implications. One source has described the meeting as.follows : All had serious misgivings about adding a section on stages. It was not that they had any illusions about Russia. They recognized that the shift to international control must come in orderly steps. But they considered it bad tactics to write in an implied distrust of other nations. Their report assumed the good faith of Russia. It permitted the concept of stages to evolve during the negotiations. It avoided giving the plan a made-in- America stamp that would prejudice others against it. Yet what could the consultants do ? If they refused to write the fourth section, someone else would. Perhaps they ought to stick with the task and see it done well. Distinctly unhappy, fearing they were blighting the spirit of the work, they de- cided to undertake the revision. 105 Final version — some technological considerations : In keeping with the concern expressed by Acheson's committee, the main thrust of the discussion in the Acheson-Lilienthal report on transition to interna- tional control was the effect which the transition process would have on U.S. facilities and information, and thus on the status of U.S. military security. The report stated that two different kinds of sched- ules needed to be considered. One would include "indispensable re- quirements for the adoption and the success of the plan itself" and these steps were "fixed by the plan itself." 106 The second kind of sched- ules consisted of a number of options which were considered "compat- ible with the operability of the plan and affecting primarily its accept- ability to the several nations." 107 The task of choosing from these op- tions involved the acceptance of the parties concerned. Therefore, it should be left to the international negotiations. In dealing with these two kinds of schedules, the report divided the nature of the releases by the United States into two categories: material and information.. The discussion of the release of fissionable materials cited the two kinds of schedules mentioned above. In discussing those material ac- quisitions by the Authority which were viewed as "fixed by the plan it- self," the report treated only the initial operations of the Authority. The first step, regarded as "an essential prerequisite for all further progress," was for the Authority to obtain "cognizance and control over the raw materials situation." Various other steps were listed re- garding initial operations of the Authority, but none would affect U.S. weapons production facilities. The report left the determination 103 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 257. lf ' 4 Hewlett and Anderson. History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, p. 549. m Ibid., p. 547. 106 State Department, "Acheson-Lilienthal report," p. 45. 10T Ibid. 98 of the schedules for the transfer of these facilities for later negotiation. The same treatment was given to disclosures of information. Nego- tiators would need some kinds of information to gain an adequate understanding of atomic energy, and thus contribute to effective nego- tiation of control. In making a case for these disclosures, the report cited an earlier study of classified information, prepared by a group in the Manhattan project, which delineated various groups of infor- mation which could be released or which had to be retained. The Acheson-Lilienthal report noted that this earlier report had been able to identify certain categories of information which could be released in the absence of international control without jeopardizing national se- curity. In appealing for the release of certain kinds of information, the Acheson-Lilienthal report pointed out that all of this information fell into releasable categories. 108 The Acheson-Lilienthal report suggested that the timing and se- quence of the release of more sensitive information would depend on the negotiated stages whereby the international Authority would as- sume its operations. Some of this information would be required to enable the international Authority to undertake its initial operations. Another portion, particularly that on atomic weapons, would not have to be released until such time as the Authority was allowed to pursue research in this field, presumably during some later stage of transition. The report did emphasize that when the Authority was prepared to take over an operation, the United States and other countries would be obliged to release to the Authority all information, practical and theoretical, pertinent to that activity. The report also added that in order to take over some activities, the Authority would have to carry on planning in advance, and that for these purposes, information might have to be released prior to actual operations by the Authority. In discussing the need to negotiate many of the schedules for the as- sumption of control by the international Authority, the consultants commented on the demands this practical requirement for informa- tion release placed on U.S. policy : The extent to which special precautions need to be taken to preserve present American advantages must be importantly influenced by the character of the negotiation and by the earnestness which is manifested by the several nations in an attempt to solve the common problems of international con- trol. These questions lie in the domain of highest national policy in international relations. 109 The release of both fissionable material and atomic information was discussed in the report in relation to U.S. security; in both areas, the report declared that the position of the United States would continue »°*The Acheson-Lilienthal report described the product of the Declassification Committee as follows: "It recommended against declassification at the present time oi a very con- sidernble body Of technical, technological, industrial, and ordnance information, that is information bearing directly on the manufacture of weapons and the design and operation of production plants. Bit* it recommended the. prompt declassification of a large Dortyot .' ..^ S_ -. ' j -n J.--T.-I i i—e „t:„„ «* ,,..,, ,.,-H I. >iil nntllro find W (IP n III) lea 111 1 IV. furtherlngTffoSn lo^I-tera muT.rnaT^cirrit^in the absence of International measures. Ibid., pp. 53 54. we Ibid., p. 49. 99 to be a favorable one during the stages of transition. As far as facil- ities were concerned during the transition, all operating facilities would be located in the United States; and if a breakdown in the con- trol system occurred, this country would have the advantage. Sim- ilar assurances were given with regard to the release of information. As noted above, information necessary for release during the nego- tiations met- the security requirements set down in the earlier study by the Manhattan District Group. Moreover, the report explained, the items of information it advocated were "of a theoretical and descrip- tive nature and have in large part to do with the constructive applica- tions of atomic energy [and] involve almost nothing of know-how." 110 The report contended that a major source of U.S. superiority in atomic energy rested in the actual experience of working with the facilities. Thus, the Acheson-Lilienthal report relied in part on certain tech- nological considerations to meet some of the political demands associ- ated with the transfer of U.S. information or facilities. (One example is the assertion that selective release of technical information would not jeopardize U.S. security.) At the same time, however, the Consult- ants pointed out that many political decisions would have to be made in order to determine U.S. policy on the arrangements for the transi- tion to international control. These decisions would be governed partly by the general trend of the negotiations, but would have to define the circumstances under which the United States was willing to relin- quish those atomic energy facilities associated with its destructive ap- plications and which were then viewed as temporarily the exclusive property of the United States. It is interesting to note that on this latter point, the letter of transmittal of the report to Secretary Byrnes, written by Acheson, discusses the stages at length, and calls for fur- ther study and decisions to support U.S. policy on transitional stages. Indeed, the letter even comments on the question of U.S. production of bombs, but does not take a position : The development of detailed proposals for such scheduling will require further study and much technical competence and staff. It will be guided, of course, by basic decisions of high policy. One of these decisions will be for w T hat period of time the United States will continue the manufacture of bombs. The plan does not require that the United States shall dis- continue such manufacture either upon the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency. At some stage in the development of the plan this is required. But neither the plan nor our transmittal of it should be con- strued as meaning that this should or should not be done at the outset or at any specific time. That decision, whenever made, will involve considerations of the highest policy affect- ing our security, and must be made by our Government under its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of the world situation. 111 INCONCLUSIVE TREATMENT OF THE TRANSITION ISSUE BY UNAEC The U.S. policy on stages, as enunciated in Baruch's speech and in the memoranda which elaborated the U.S. position, did not develop u °Ibid., p. 52. v* Ibid., p. vi. 100 the concept beyond the level of detail contained in the Acheson- Lilienthal report. Indeed, very little was said regarding: the relation- ship between the need for stages and U.S. security. In his remarks to the opening session of the UNAEC, Baruch mentioned stages only in regard to what would seem to be a procedural matter. He merely asserted that full control of atomic energy would ''have to come into effect in successive stages," and that the transition should be set forth in the charter creating the Authority. Baruch recalled the language of the resolution creating the UNAEC as the basis for this provision. Baruch did mention the U.S. role during the transitional stages, with regard to the release of both information and facilities, in terms which obviously offered few. if any, immediate concessions on the part of the United States. As far as information was concerned. Baruch outlined basically the procedure recommended in the Aeheson- Lilienthal report, stating that only the information necessary to an understanding of atomic energy in the negotiations would be revealed by the United States until a successful conclusion was reached. Further disclosures would depend "in the interests of all. upon the effective ratification of the treaty," and would be carried out when the inter- national Authority Avas prepared to assume certain functions. In his comments on U.S. facilities, he said that, "The United States was prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the Authority." 112 The first U.S. memorandum expanded somewhat on Baruch's state- ment that the charter establishing the international Authority would specify the sequence and timing of the transition from the existing conditions to international control. Besides citing this requirement, the memo stated that the charter also should specify "the time when and the conditions under which the national and private possession, manufacture, and use of atomic weapons shall be outlawed." 113 Nevertheless, U.S. policy on the specific question of the timing for the disposal of existing weapons, a major question dining the negoti- ations, was not mentioned. The second U.S. memorandum treated the question of transit ional stages in a similar manner and did not provide any additional elaboration of the U.S. position, particularly concern- ing its own contributions during the transitional process. Soviet policy on the question of stages was concerned primarily with the timing of the destruction of existing atomic weapons. It called for the establishment of international control following an agreement on the prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons. This sequence was never accepted by the majority during the negotiations: While it is generally agreed that atomic weapons must be eliminated from national armaments, the majority have con- cluded that such elimination should come at that stage in the development of the international control system which would clearly signify to the world that the safeguards then in op- eration provided security for all participating states. 114 Indeed, the Soviet Union itself recognized that there could be no guar- antee that a second agreement establishing a control system would be u* State Department, drouth of a Policy, p. 146. '"Thirl p 14!) u* U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report 1047. p. 103, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Post- war Negotiations, \>. I 101 concluded following conclusion of an agreement to prohibit and de- stroy atomic weapons. 115 Apparently, Soviet skepticism regarding the sincerity of U.S. pledges to destroy its bombs after the institution of international control contributed to the persistence of the Soviets in standing by their own proposals. Probably they saw advantage also in delay. It seems a strong probability, moreover, that the progress of their own development of atomic energy may have reinforced the de- termination of the Soviets to maintain their position. (The Soviet negotiators may not have been aware of that progress, but those from whom they received their policy directives presumably were fully informed.) In regard to negotiation of the transitional stages, the issue was probably reduced to the question of when the United States would relinquish its monopoly over atomic energy, or more specificially, its bombs and the facilities for producing them. The Soviets asked what assurance there was that destruction actually would be carried out. During the negotiations, U.S. policy on this particular question was not defined beyond the pledge that destruction of existing stockpiles would take place when effective safeguards had been established. Ef- forts by the UNAEC to settle this question in more precise terms were unable to reach an* agreement satisfactory to the Soviets. The question of U.S. cessation of bomb production in relation to in- ternational control had been raised during the deliberations which resulted in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Despite Acheson's assertion in the letter of transmittal that the report had not taken a position on the timing for a halt of U.S. weapons manufacture, the treatment of the issue in the report has been interpreted as follows : * * * the report took no definite position, implying there- fore, that atomic weapons would continue to be built. Bomb- making would have to stop sometime, but that was a ques- tion for the President to determine consistent with consti- tutional processes and in the light of the world situation. 116 In a speech before Freedom House in October 1946, Baruch pledged the intention of the United States to destroy its bombs "if the world would join in a pact to insure the world's security from atomic war- fare." His comments on destroying U.S. weapons prior to establish- ment of the system posed the question : Why should America alone be asked to make sacrifices by way of unilateral disarmament in the cause of good will? If equality of sacrifice be needed then each should participate. 117 Truman himself had written to Baruch the previous July : We should not under any circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us. 1 In discussing the negotiations, Bechhoefer describes this question as "perhaps the most fundamental divergence between the Soviet posi- tion and that of the West." To Soviet questions on when bombs would be eliminated, the U.S. response was that the majority had concluded 115 Ibid. . p. 71. ua Laeberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 258. 117 State Department, Groirth of a Policy, p. 90. 118 Hnrrv S. Truman. Memoirs, vol. 2. Years of Trial and Hope. (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday, 1956), p. 11. 102 that weapons should be eliminated "at that stage in the development of the international control system which would clearly signify to the world that the safeguards then in operation provided security for all participating States." 119 Bechhoefer cites one discussion during the second year of the negoti- ations which illustrates the "indecisive nature" of the negotiations on the question of stages. The Soviet Union had proposed an amendment to the first report which simply called for destruction of manufactured and unfinished weapons. The first UNAEC report had proposed dis- posal of bombs, an expression which meant the elimination of the bomb mechanism and the peaceful use of the nuclear fuel from the dis- mantled weapons. The Soviet amendment had omitted any provision for use of the nuclear fuel, which posed the real danger following de- struction of the bomb mechanism, although they agreed that the fuel should not be destroyed. During discussion of the amendment, the U.S. representative raised the point that the real issue was not destruc- tion of the weapons but control of the nuclear fuel from dismantled weapons. In response, the Soviet representative insisted that the issue of control could not be discussed apart from destruction of weap- ons. Attempts to settle this question in the form of a resolution were fruitless, when the group could not even agree on a definition of the term "'destruction." References to the term could not be separated from the issue of stages, which comprised the basic source of disagreement between the positions expressed by the United States and the Soviet Union. 120 In the face of this impasse, a section on the majority plan for control in the third report of the UNAEC included the following statement regarding stages, which had been retained verbatim from the recom- mendations in the first report : The treaty should embrace the entire programme for put- ting the international system of control into effect and should provide a schedule for the completion of the transitional proc- ess over a period of time, step by step, in an orderly and agreed sequence leading to the full and effective establish- ment of international control of atomic energy. In order that the transition may be accomplished as rapidly as possible, and with safety and equity to all, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission should supervise the transitional proc- ess, as prescribed in the treaty, and should be empowered to determine when a particular stage or stages have been com- pleted and subsequent ones are to commence. 1 '-' 1 The final report recognized that more details would be desirable, but stated that it would serve no useful purpose to attempt to elaborate on this and other questions "until agreement on the basic principles of control has been reached." 122 Thus, it would appear that efforts to determine the sequence and t imingof the assumption of control by the international Authority may have originated in the negotiations simply as a question of tin 1 pro- 1W I* S Participation in the U.N., report 1947, p. 10.1 as quoted in Beehhoofer, Postwar \ egotiations, p. 74, <-*' For ;i il.'iailod discussion of this particular point, see ibid., i>i». 72-74. 121 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission^ "Third Report to the Security Council", p. 17 is 122 Ibid., p. 3. 103 cedural steps necessary for setting up the control system. However, the negotiations soon became preoccupied with the political implications of stages, which were important to the security interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union ; that is, the question of when the United States would no longer be the sole power in possession of atomic weapons. The Issue of Enforcement : Sanctions and the Veto The third important issue in the effort to establish international control of atomic energy was that of imposition of sanctions on viola- tors. The question of whether violators of international control should be punished grew out of Baruch's advocacy of the idea. He succeeded in having it adopted as part of the U.S. proposal. During the negotia- tions, the question of the procedural arrangements to deal with sanc- tions — specifically, whether the veto power in the U.N. Security Coun- cil could be exercised over decisions on them — represented a major obstacle to agreement. DETERMINING U.S. POLICY ON SANCTIONS Conant had cautioned the Board of Consultants at the outset that the issue of sanctions was a matter for the Security Council to con- sider ; and during later discussions, one member of the Board pointed out that it would have been presumptuous for a group of technical consultants to comment or make recommendations on such a political subject. During its deliberations, the Board foresaw war as the prob- able outcome in case of a violation, but needless to say it did not enter into the subject of the organizational mechanism that would be em- ployed to initiate, conduct, and coordinate the war. This was a political problem, in the opinion of the Board, and there was no discussion of it in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Baruch's idea of establishing sanctions to enforce the control system was discussed at the time the U.S. proposal was being developed. At a meeting between Baruch's group and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups, opposition by the latter to the idea of sanctions was unanimous, ap- parently on the grounds that they did not consider the concept work- able under existing political circumstances. In turn, the members of Baruch's delegation to the UNAEC viewed the Acheson-Lilienthal plan as offering merely a warning device and less than a secure system to guarantee control of the destructive uses of atomic energy. Although Lilienthal granted that the plan was only a warning device, he, Acheson, and other members of their groups argued that absolute security was unattainable, 123 Nonetheless, Baruch felt strongly that the plan did not provide an adequate measure of security and continued to press Secretary Byrnes for a policy which included penalties. Baruch's position on penalties has been described as follows : It was important to * * * show the necessity of enforcing the engagements of the nations. Baruch considered penalties the sine qua non. He was quite aware this might bring the 123 Later, Baruch called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the plan for atomic energy control. Both General Dwisrht Eisenhower and Admiral Chester Nimitz voiced doubts on the effectiveness and acceptability of sanctions, while General Carl Spaatz supported the idea. Although Baruch sought the advice of the military, their views did not enter into the discussions which determined policy. Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, pp. 575— 576. 104 United States ""athwart of the veto power." for war, the ulti- mate penalty, might be necessary. * * * Penalties means im- mediate punishment and elimination of any veto of it. * * * As for the warning elements in the plan, the American people should know how little it amounted to. 124 Eventually, Baruch obtained approval from President Truman of both the idea of sanctions and the provision that the veto power of the Security Council would not apply to the decision to administer them. Two days before the opening of the UNAEC, Baruch briefed the Sen- ate Special Committee on Atomic Energy on the U.S. proposals, and the members appeared to welcome the plan approved by the President. 1 -"' U.S. POLICY ON THE VETO : ITS RELATION TO ENFORCEMENT Because U.S. policy on the veto over sanctions was a principal target of Soviet opposition, and a major hindrance in the negotiations, a discussion of this question might be useful to an understanding of the principal issues of this study. It should be noted that the principle of unanimity — that is, the veto power — among the permanent mem- bers of the Security Council on security matters had been a contro- versial issue during negotiation of the U.N. Charter. Strong U.S. sup- port for the veto power has been explained as follows : * * * The Western powers * * * realized that the veto privi- lege placed a premium on inaction at precisely the most criti- cal point of great-power disagreement. Long and fruitless ef- forts were therefore made by American experts * * * to de- vise some method of decisionmaking on security issues that would allow the Council to override the negative vote of at least one permanent member. All such formulae, however, collapsed before the dominating political fact that the ad- ministration was not prepared to allow American armed forces to be ordered into some unknown future military action without U.S. consent. Even had Executive officials felt less strongly on the question, they would never have assumed that Congress could be persuaded to relinquish so much authority to an untried international organization. 1 -" Thus, the policy of the United States on the veto, as it applied to the question of enforcement of atomic energy control, represented a significant departure from its earlier policy on the veto within the general framework of the United Nations. Although the question of sanctions and its relationship with the veto power was primarily a political matter, a number of technological factors associated with atomic energy control may have influenced the United States in its policy decisions on these subjects. This change in US. policy was probably attributable to the nature of atomic weapons and the destructive force which they represented to policymakers, a perception epitomized in Baruch's opening address to the [TNAEC: Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its poten- tialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet 121 Ibid., pp. .-,7.", 574. '=■'• [bid., pp. 565 574 120 Emphasis added, itnth B. Russell, The United Nations . 51. 105 terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. The terror created by weapons has never stopped men from em- ploying them. For each new weapon a defense has been pro- duced, in time. But now we face a condition in which adequate defense does not exist. * * * The search of science for the absolute weapon has reached fruition in this country. 127 In light of the fact that the atomic bomb inspired such awe, it is not difficult to understand how an important U.S. political stance could experience such a drastic modification in the form of the proposal that the veto power should not be exercised over sanctions for viola- tions of atomic energy control. 128 Another technological consideration which may have had a bearing on U.S. policy toward the veto question concerned the "warning de- vice" aspect of the plan in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Policy dis- cussions revealed that the Board had not envisioned any international stockpile of bombs. Thus, if a nation decided to embark on an atomic weapons development program by seizing production facilities of the international Authority, the sequence of technological processes of producing atomic weapons would take considerable time. The Board estimated that it would be approximately 1 year before enough atomic weapons could be produced to constitute a significant threat. During the drafting of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, one member of the group envisioned the following situation in the event of a violation of the international control system : Supposing denatured material had been allocated to a plant which is located in Ruritania, and the Ruritanian Pooh-Bah decides to w T elsK on the Atomic Development Authority by removing the denaturants. The •Authority's representatives, made up of people of many nationalities, try to check on the plant, on the watch for just such a move. So the Pooh-Bah sends soldiers to get the ADA people out of the way and seize the factory. Assuming that the Pooh-Bah has the scientists working for him, it will still take him in the neighborhood of a year to turn out a bomb. While he's at it, the member coun- tries of the Authority, having received no satisfactory answer to what's become of their inspectors, go to war with Ruritania * * * the war would have to be along conventional lines. Naturally, the atomic plant would be the first target for the attacking planes. 129 Presumably, the Board considered that the warning device aspect of the plan satisfied the technological requirements of security. How- ever, this conception was not shared by all of those involved in U.S. policy deliberations. One source states that Baruch's position on this question was that the Board's plan provided "no more of a warning than S3 months to a year,' " although the origin of his estimate is not clear. Moreover, Baruch added that technological developments could shorten even that amount of time. 130 These estimates may account for 127 State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 138-139. 12R Nonetheless, it should be recalled that this was not the first occasion when this line of thinking on the destructive potential of atomic energy affected policy, for it had played an important role in inflnpncinc nations, including the United States, to take the initial steps ; for example, the Three Nation Agreed Declaration, et cetera, toward seeking agree- ment on international control of atomic energy. 1=0 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 247. n~ m ~.i<,oi n *, 130 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, p. 573. 106 the sense of urgency with which Baruch treated the veto question in his opening speech to the UNAEC : * * * There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed. 131 It is unlikely, however, that these factors alone can account for Baruch's adamant position on penalties and the veto question. Early in the policy deliberations following Baruch's appointment, the elder statesman had raised the possibility to Secretary Byrnes and others that the negotiations of the UNAEC might provide a forum for the attainment of world disarmament, encompassing all weapons. One writer labelled Baruclrs notion as "an expression of his idealism and expansive self-image." 132 although his position was supported by Eber- stadt and Hancock. When Hancock learned that the Secretary of State was not enthusiastic about Baruch's idea, one source describes his reac- tion : "As Hanock sized up the situation, Byrnes was trying to simplify the job by limiting it to atomic energy." 133 The exchange on the subject between Baruch and Byrnes has been described as follows: * * * Byrnes would have none of this vision. It would be "a serious mistake," he said, to attempt to cover these other weapons as part of Baruch's present assignment. Baruch was equally strong in response : "The problem of atomic energy is a problem of the hearts of men — no plan so far proposed gives any guarantee of assurance." Only total disarmament offered such a guarantee. Byrnes was unmoved. 134 News of Baruch's proposal for total disarmament prompted one member of the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy to admon- ish him to "stick to his knitting." l35 Thus, since Baruch's idea of a com- prehensive disarmament proposal had been thwarted, it is understand- able, perhaps, that if his efforts had to be confined to atomic energy, he might seek a control system which would be as secure as possible. by providing "immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations." 130 In addition. Baruch's insistence on removal of the veto as a vital component of the proposed system of punishments may have l>cen prompted by the -rowing U.S. attitude of mistrust of the Soviet Union. The belief was strong that violations most likely would origi- nate with the Soviet Union or one of its allies. Moreover, the Soviet Union's performance during the first months of the United Nations, which was characterized by frequent use of the veto in the Security Council, fortified the impression that Moscow would have recourse to the veto to avoid the consequences of its violations. 137 *» State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 142-143. "3 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 277. Hewlett and Anderson, History of the Atomic Energy Commission, p. 569. ■ Lieberman, The Scorpion mni the Tarantula, p. 290. Hewlett and Anderson, History o) the Atomic Energy Commission, p. o7G. i« State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 138. «i During ii..- meetings of the iNAI'c itself, a resolution was Introduced In tbe General Assembly, calling for an investigation of Soviet abuse of the veto. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 57. 107 Thus, by proposing sanctions to achieve "an international law with teeth in it," Baruch may have compensated for losing the personal op- portunity to propose and negotiate a comprehensive disarmament plan. He may also have sought to satisfy the requirements of a control system which he believed the emerging political relationships of the atomic age demanded. POLITICAL UNACCEPTABILITY OF VETO-FREE CONTROL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS At issue during the negotiations, sanctions and the veto became in- volved with the political arguments associated with the general issue of the veto power in the United Nations. In order to understand how this issue contributed to the failure of the negotiations, it might be helpful to examine briefly the course of the issue and U.S. policy during the international discussions of international control of atomic energy. During the negotiations, the third U.S. memorandum provided a vehicle to answer the various legal questions arising from the rela- tionship between the proposed international Authority and the United Nations, and an important part of this issue was sanctions. The memo- randum listed those activities which if pursued by an individual na- tion would constitute a serious threat to the peace. These included virtually every possible breach of the control arrangement. 138 The memorandum proposed that the Security Council would deter- mine the response to these violations. In defending the provision to exclude these matters from the veto, the U.S. position was that it did not impair the principle of unanimity in the United Nations, because nations would enter into this particular arrangement freely. It also emphasized that the proposal to exclude the veto applied only to the question of atomic energy. An additional point raised by the memo- randum was that the question of sanctions could not be discussed without considering the provisions of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which recognized the "inherent right of individual or collective self- defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." Besides noting that an attack with atomic weapons would justify a response under Article 51, the memorandum suggested that a broader definition of "armed attack" might be included in the treaty for the Authority, to include certain preliminary steps to such action. Baruch was unyielding on the veto question during the negotiations, and his perseverance was matched by the adamant opposition of the Soviet Union. One example of the Soviet position on this question is in a speech by Gromyko in July 1946 : We believe that it would be wrong, and perhaps fatal, to undermine, in practice to abandon, the principle of unanimity i3s in e gal possession or use of an atomic bomb ; illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb ; seizure of any plant or other property belonging to, or licensed by, the Authority ; willful interference with the activities of the Authority ; creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the Authority. The U.S. proposal also granted that admin- istrative decisions would be made and carried out only by the international Authority, and that the Authority could make decisions on other matters, which were not serious threats to the peace. The" latter could be enforced by the Security Council as procedural matters, a process which did not involve the veto. State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 161-163. 108 of the permanent members of the Security Council * * * We cannot accept any proposal which would undermine in any degree the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council on all questions relating to the main- tenance of peace and security. 139 Bechhoefer notes that Baruch attempted "to soften the impact of his position" by recalling that the proposal to eliminate the veto would apply only to the control of atomic energy. He also points out that in terms of the legality of the provision, it would not affect the veto power as established by the U.N. Charter. But, in Bechhoefer's view, because the proposal "ran counter to the basic concept of the continued unity of the great powers as embodied in the Charter," it indicated to the Soviet Union "a U.S. decision to attack the underlying basis of postwar settlements." 14 ° Baruch was so firmly convinced of the correctness of his stance on the veto that he may have missed an opportunity to bargain with the Soviets on the issue, or at least to place them in a position where they would be called upon to reveal further details of their proposals. Bechhoefer cites an instance in 1947, when the Soviet Union proposed an amendment that the Authority "should carry out their control and inspection functions, acting on the basis of their own rules, which should provide for the adoption of decisions, in appropriate cases, by the majority vote". 141 The Soviet Union was willing to grant the majority vote of the Authority "in appropriate cases," a term which could have been explored. Nonetheless, discussion of this amendment would have "shifted the question from the problem of a veto to the issue of the authority of the control commission, which was politically far less sensitive." However, Baruch would accept nothing less than his original proposal. 142 While U.S. policy on the veto had its foundations in both techno- logical and political factors, it would appear that the underlying po- litical relations of the great powers in the United Nations provided a major source of the difficulty in the negotiations. Indeed. Bechhoefer concludes that Baruch's position on the veto gave the Soviets the op- portunity to oppose the U.S. proposals "'for the wrong reason." The basis for this assertion is that disagreement over the veto involved basic political differences between the two countries rather than the substan- tive, technical aspects of control. 143 Recap'/tiihiflon of the Three Issues of Atomic Control Thus, the United States brought before the United Nations three issues making up a program of international control of atomic energy. The first involved the control institution itself. This called for a scheme of international ownership and regulation, with considerable intimate interaction with national programs of atomic energy develop- ment. Possibly the newly-formed United Nations would have been un- equal to the large task of managing such a program. But the tech- "■ [bid. p. B2. 'hhoefer, Postwai Negotiations, pp. .~>7 58. 1,1 State Department, Policy >ii the Crossroads, p. ~f>. "■' Emphasis added. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 59. '" [bid., pp. 59 '''<> 109 nical orientation of the design of the proposed institution left un- answered many political questions, and after long debate in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the scheme was tabled. The issue of the transition from U.S. monopoly to international con- trol met the same fate. Lacking agreement on the what, it was hard to design the hoir of a plan. After much deliberation, the UNAEC came reluctantly to this conclusion. The question of what should be done to preserve world security in the event of a violation of an international atomic control agreement likewise went unresolved. This question went to the heart of the issue of collective security versus national sovereignty. But even though it came at a time when only one nation possessed atomic weapons cap- ability, the quest for agreement went unsatisfied. V. Some Distinctive Features of the Negotiations It appears as though the negotiations came to nothing because the control plans advanced by the Soviet Union and the United States were each based upon their perceptions of a desirable world order and the defense of their respective national interests. In the cir- cumstances of that period, these views and the plans based on them were not reconcilable. The reasoning and perceptions underlying Soviet policy decisions at that juncture are not known with certainty 25 years later, and clearly were less well perceived at that time. The fact that many of the following observations relate mainly to U.S. policy is not intended to be solely a comment on this country's approach to atomic energy control. That such observations are useful arises from the fact that basically it was the U.S. plan which was accepted by the majority in the international negotiations. Therefore, an important part of an inquiry into the outcome of the negotiations lies in the origins of U.S. policy and inputs of U.S. scientists and diplomats. 144 Excessive U.S. Reliance on Technical Control Plan One characteristic of the efforts to achieve control of atomic energy which may have contributed to their failure was the tendency on the part of U.S. policymakers and of the majority of the negotiators in the UNAEC to accept the constraints developed out of technological considerations as the basis for their proposals for a control arrange- ment. The foundations for the concrete proposals by the United States were the technological studies of the Board of Consultants, and when the first signs of impasse appeared in the UNA EC, in 1946, the negotia- tors chose to await a report from the Scientific and Technical Commit- tee before proceeding with the negotiations. However, each scientific group, Lilienthal's and the UNAEC committee, divorced itself from any responsibility for considering the political factors involved in a control arrangement. And the diplomats and politicians, in addressing themselves to the basic political problems which were preventing agree- ment, chose to seek a firm basis for their proposals in what were con- sidered to be the undeniable technological facts of the situation. When it was evident that there was little hope for agreement, the basic assertion from the UNAEC was that a minority had failed to recognize the compelling technical factors needed to shape 1 an ade- quate control system. 145 But there appears to have been a larger failure of the i \ can only be .'i matter for speculation (110) Ill of the participants on both sides to appreciate that even as powerful a scientific and technological event as the discovery and decisive mili- tary use of atomic energy could not of itself prompt so radical a re- ordering of diplomacy as to reconcile the overwhelming political stakes at issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. Spe- cifically, this was a failure to reconcile (a) the basic technological fact that any effective international control system would have to cope with the difficulty of separating peaceful from military activities, and (b) the fundamental diplomatic reality that any such system would have to accommodate both the Soviet Union's traditional fear of for- eign intrusion and the U.S. fear of becoming an inferior military power. In retrospect, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the con- cessions necessary on all sides to establish a workable arrangement for international nuclear control were beyond the scope of traditional international behavior. A profound change in concepts of sovereignty and security would have been required to insure the success of the negotiations. Possibly this principle remains as unappreciated today as it was at the time the Baruch plan was being considered. LACK OF U.S. ATTENTION TO SOVIET REQUIREMENTS Based upon U.S. perceptions of Soviet motives and of Soviet capa- bility for nuclear development, acceptability of the U.S. plan for atomic energy control was secondary to requirements for an effective control system. As early as the U.S. preparations for the Truman- Attlee-King meetings, before the Soviet Union had had an oppor- tunity to participate in any forum on the atomic energy question, the intent of U.S. policy was to devise a workable system of control with- out special regard for acceptability of the plan to any other parties. 14 * Similarly, throughout the deliberations between Achesoivs committee and Lilienthal's group, very little was said regarding the possibility of or the requirements for Soviet acceptance of the plan, although there was some recognition of the prevalent political facts of life, largely mutual suspicion, which would characterize United States- Soviet relations during the early postwar period. But an awareness of these factors did not prompt active consideration of whether the Soviet Union would accept the plan. Rather, it became the goal of U.S. policy to devise the necessary arrangements to prevent violation of a control system, and eventually, with Baruclvs policy on punish- ments and the veto, a guaranteed course of action in the event of viola- tion. To the United States, the most likely target of its policy toward thwarting or punishing violators was the Soviet Union. The suspicious and negative attitude in the "West toward the Soviet penchant for secrecy was undoubtedly reinforced by the ex- pansionist actions of the Soviet Union in the East European countries following the war. Yet Soviet expansionism has been explained as an effort to buffer that country from foreign incursions, a traditional fear which had been exacerbated by the devastating Soviet experience 148 Indeed, Secretary Byrnes approached the negotiations for international control of atomic energy with a negative attitude, which was carried over into a policy paper which Bush prepared for the meeting. In characterizing a conversation with Ryrnes on the issue. Bush commented to Conant that "we were discussing carefully ways and means toward an effective accord [i.e.. one which was without risk to the United States] rather than merely struggling with the question of whether any accord is possible." Bush to Conant. Xov. 8, 1945, in the Bush Papers, as quoted in Liebernian, The Scorpion and the Taran- tula, p. 167. 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-9 112 during World War II. 147 The question of how this particular ex- planation of Soviet actions at that time might have justified Soviet foreign policy in general is a political problem beyond the scope of this study. Still, it may be worth noting that this observation, as a pos- sible explanation of Soviet expansionism, has been offered to account for Soviet rejection of certain elements of the Baruch plan. 148 In the Soviet view, these proposed arrangements would have made the Soviet Union vulnerable by admitting foreig] rs to the Soviet Union in posi- tions of authority. Apart from the ideological trauma of this foreign penetration, their presence might enable potential enemies of the Soviets to detect sources of strength to attack and evidences of weak- ness to exploit. On the other hand, if the United States had recog- nized Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence, the same argument continues, this gesture may have represented enough of a concession by the West to contribute to obtaining a Soviet concession : modification of its stand on the presence of foreign inspectors. To some extent, a certain amount of outside inspection probably would have been necessary for effective control, and obviously a change in the Soviet position was essential to reaching agreement. 149 SOVIET CALCULATION' OF U.S. POSITION The Soviet Union's calculation of the motives of the United States probably encountered uncertainty with regard to the place which atomic weapons held in the overall defense posture of the United States. While the Soviets had retained their large forces of manpower following the war, the United States had undergone rapid demobili- zation of its armies. The extent of U.S. dependence on the atomic bomb, and thus any demonstration of its willingness to relinquish it. were governed by basic U.S. security considerations. In turn, the fact that the atomic weapon had become such an integral part of the U.S. de- fense posture only complicated its own efforts to devise an equitable policy on a system of international control without jeopardizing U.S. or world security. Indeed, Bechhoefer points out that "By January 1947 * * * it had been ascertained that * * * United States de- mobilization had reached the stage where Soviet acceptance | of the U.S. plan] would leave the United States naked." Bechhoefer be- lieves this might account for l.S. failure to explain t ransitional stages in detail, including the stage for elimination of the bomb, although he does not explicitly question the sincerity of U.S. motives. 1 ™ The principle behind the declarations by the United States that it would hold atomic energy in a "sacred trust" in the absence of inter- national control raises an additional point which might explain Soviet skepticism toward the U.S. plan. This point concerns the moral force which US. officials attached to their pronouncements bearing on the U.S. position in the negotiations. It would seem that merely by stat- ing its aims and responsibilities in atomic energy, these officials may have expected other count lies to accept the U.S. pledges without ques- tion. For example, during a policy discussion of stages, Acheson's re- 147 Lieberman. The Scorpion and tin- Tarantula, j> 402. " s [bid., p. 404. "" iMii , p mi Lieberman'a Interpretation Is, however, o hypothesis which it is impos- Bible id prove or disprove nl tin- present time. uo Bechhoefer, Postwar Vegotiationa, p. 11. 113 marks are described in one source as follows: "When the United States presented its plan, it would have to explain the process of tran- sition. Then the nations would establish an international authority. * * * The United States would not give everything away the day it agreed to institute the plan ; rather, it would promise to do so." 151 Cer- tain actions — e.g., the atomic test at Bikini in July 1946, less than one month following the opening of the UNAEC, or the U.S. failure in the UNAEC negotiations to define the specific control conditions which would determine when it would relinquish its atomic weapons — might well have cast doubt on those pledges, particularly in the eyes of the Soviet Union. Thus, both the United States and the Soviet Union acted in the negotiations primarily to meet their individual needs of security, based on their own particular perceptions of the existing threat. Some of these perceptions may have been less than accurate. Nevertheless, as a result, a basic element in each country's policy toward atomic energy control, which could not be ignored or superseded by technological requirements, was to avoid an arrangement which would have sub- jected one party to the suspected goal of domination by the other. For the most part, there is little evidence that a substantial effort was made to combine or reach a compromise between those technological and diplomatic elements which were necessary to reach agreement on international control. By and large, representatives from each field retained their parochial interests, especially in light of the attitudes of representatives of one field toward the other, and approached the problem of atomic energy control accordingly. In short, once the diplo- mats had grasped the import of the possibility of a facile solution offered by the technical experts, they began to mistrust it. For their part, the technical experts had probably underestimated the political difficulties in implementing the solution. And finally, the tasks of both groups were made difficult by the many previous commitments to allies and other countries and to the American people. One Attempt at Technical-Diplomatic Coordination One example of an attempt to combine technological and political factors of atomic energy control may be evident in the proposal of the groups led by Acheson and Lilienthal to assign a research and develop- ment function to the international Authority. Recognizing the nega- tive human response to police methods of inspection, they hoped that the purposes of security could be served in two ways through research in atomic energy. First, because some national activity would be re- tained in this area, the potential for national rivalries would be chan- neled into constructive purposes. Second, this function of the interna- tional Authority would keep the supranational body technically ad- vanced in terms of detecting activities which were illegal under the 151 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, p. 548. 114 terms of the agreement. The research carried on by the international Authority would serve as a beneficial source of consultation for the na- tional efforts; periodic inspections would not be solely investigative, in the sense of arousing suspicions, which would only threaten the entire system of control. Rather, as envisioned by the Board, inspec- tions would provide an opportunity for individual nations to receive guidance in their efforts through the knowledge of the inspectors, and inspections would be less intrusive because of the generally beneficial expertise developed in the inspectors by the Authority. Thus, the pur- poses of security would be served through methods which met the needs of the technology and the less tangible human factors inherent in international control. However, obstacles to agreement were so weighty in relation to the total effort to agree on a system of interna- tional control that this element of the U.S. plan exercised no positive influence on the outcome of the negotiations. Underlying Misconceptions in U.S. Policy A number of misconceptions and miscalculations during the U.S. policymaking process on matters pertaining to both the technology and the politics of atomic energy control may have influenced the out- come of the negotiations. U.S. policy in the negotiations may possibly have been conditioned by an attitude that possession of the bomb pro- vided great leverage for the United States to press for acceptance of its proposals. This attitude rested on a number of technological assumptions, which eventually proved incorrect. First, U.S. estimates regarding the Soviet Union's ability to develop its own atomic weapons ranged any- where from 5 to 25 years, whereas the first Soviet atomic explosion occurred in IUV.), just 3 years following the opening of the UNAEC. This development changed the entire character of the atomic energy control problem. Although negotiations on the Baruch plan continued until the early 1950's. Soviet possession of atomic weapons — some sources reason — necessitated a different approach to arms control, and perhaps even made the Baruch proposals obsolete. The length of time during which the United St#es could expect to maintain its supremacy in the field of atomic energy posed a dilemma for U.S. policy. On the one hand, there was the assumption, based on historically valid technological considerations, that the loss of the U.S. monopoly was inevitable. This recognition contributed greatly to the U.S. commitment to seek international control of atomic energy. On the other hand, erroneous technological intelligence estimates which favored the U.S. position appear to have prompted a further — and as it proved, unwarranted — U.S. assumption that it could attain interna- tional control on its own terms, and that it could afford to insist on certain points in its proposals. This attitude was interpreted as "atomic diplomacy" by critics of U.S. proposals, and was justified by propo- nents of U.S. policy as fulfillment of the U.S. responsibility for the "sacred trust" over atomic energy. An additional technological misconception which may have played at least a minor role in the outcome of the negotiations concerned the extent to which peaceful uses of atomic energy would be made readily available to benefit a large number of countries. Much of the scientific and technological information which would have contributed sub- 115 stantially to development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy could not be released in the absence of international controls, as such peace- ful development was so closely connected with the information neces- sary for development of an atomic weapon. Thus, the hope of sharing; the knowledge for beneficial uses of atomic energy became an incentive for the Lilienthal Board to devise an effective control system. Such hopes apparently influenced both U.S. policymakers and the other negotiators in the UNAEC to believe that the control plan offered something more than a rein on the destructive forces of atomic energy. Although present-day development of atomic energy for peaceful uses — a quarter-century later — is advancing at a substantial pace, the predictions of 1945 regarding the imminent development of peaceful uses seem overly optimistic. Notwithstanding the optimism, however, security factors so overshadowed all other issues in the negotiations that the drive by individual countries for active international coopera- tion in peaceful development failed to develop real momentum at that time. These technological factors tended to limit the ontions of the non- nuclear countries participating in the negotiations. Essentially, for any such country there were only two options : development of its own atomic bomb, at considerable industrial effort and economic cost, or controlled access to the technology through acceptance of a plan for in- ternational control, defined by the only country which possessed the ultimate weapon. To supporters of the U.S. proposals, perhaps suffici- ent confidence existed between them and the United States that its pledges and its control plan seemed reasonable. Moreover, many coun- tries, recovering from their massive war efforts, lacked the reserves of resources to develop their own atomic weapons. The promise of the potential benefits of atomic energy for national purposes, however limited, which the control plan offered may have provided additional incentive for approval of the U.S. proposals. It is doubtful that the Soviets experienced a similar reaction. In commenting on the plan proposed by the Board of Consultants, one source speculates on the Soviet reaction as follows : * * * The members of the Lilienthal Board were con- vinced that adoption of their plan by the Soviet Union would cause no less than another revolution in Russian society — a revolution which was to be accomplished apparently in re- turn for Russian involvement in atomic development. This could not have seemed a very desirable quid pro quo to the Russians, who knew that they were capable of building atomic weapons themselves in three or four years. 152 A political miscalculation by the United States affecting the negotia- tions can be identified in light of U.S. experience in its relations with the Soviet Union. One source has expressed the possible Soviet percep- tion of the Baruch plan as follows: "The clear advantage offered the U.S.S.R. was relief from an 'out of the blue' American atomic air attack, but at a price of forgoing any early moves toward nuclear equality." 153 An almost axiomatic reflex of the Soviet approach to arms control negotiation has been the notion that the Soviet Union will not negotiate from an inferior military position. One explanation 152 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 409. 163 George H. Quester. Nuclear Diplomacy: the First 25 Tears (New York : Dunellen Co., 1970), p. 20. 116 for the delay in the opening of recent negotiations on strategic arms limitation has been Soviet reluctance to bargain until it had attained "parity" with the United States in strategic weapons. 154 A fuller appreciation of this Soviet attitude during the UNAEC negotiations might have broadened the perspective of U.S. policy. Moreover, if U.S. policymakers had been aware of the fact that the Soviet Union had been working assiduously on its own atomic weapons during the negotiations, a different approach might have been used. Two cabinet members, Secretary Stimson, and the Secretary of Com- merce, Henry Wallace, suggested that the Soviet Union be treated in a more open manner on atomic energy questions. Stimson, who left the Administration in September 1945, suggested including the Soviets in atomic energy development as soon as possible after the war. Such a move, he believed, would avert Soviet suspicions regarding U.S. inten- tions and would mark a first step toward the necessary internationali- zation of atomic energy, without giving rise to an arms race. During the UNAEC negotiations, Wallace publicly encouraged more active cooperation with the Soviet Union, to the point where his remarks be- came a source of embarrassment to the Administration; to Baruch the vigorous expression of the Wallace position was undermining the U.S. position at the UNAEC. As a result, Truman asked Wallace to leave his cabinet. Obviously, the suggestions of both Stimson and Wallace fell on deaf ears of those in power, who felt it necessary to adopt a defensive position toward the Soviet Union. 155 One source declares that a major weakness of the U.S. policy on atomic energy was its diplomatic timing. Details of U.S. policy on in- ternational control remained unclear for a few months after the first atomic weapon was used. And the approach to the Soviet Union at the Moscow conference was made only after consultations with the British and the Canadians, a move which one source sees as an indica- tion to the Soviets of a conspiracy against them. 156 Another issue in the negotiations which may have represented a po- litical miscalculation by the United States concerned its policy on eliminating the veto over sanctions. Bechhoefer concludes that U.S. insistence on this provision gave the Soviets the wrong reason for opposing the U.S. control plan, since it presented an issue which was unrelated to the substantive problems of control. 157 In light of the way U.S. policy on the veto developed just two years after the opening of the UNAEC, the political impact of Baruch's attitude toward the veto in atomic energy matters does not seem to have been noticed by other policymakers at the time of the UNAEC meetings. Indeed, U.S. policy toward the veto soon developed in such a way as to be inconsistent with the position which Baruch was striving to maintain. The Vandenberg resolution, passed by the U.S. Senate in July 1948, 158 recommended ,M For example. Dr. Mnrshnll Shulman. Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, recently testified to a Senate committee that "Perhaps one reason for the delay in the Soviet response was the desire to wait until deployments then planned had made their appearance, so thai negotiations could lie conducted on the hasis of equality." U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Arms Control, Inter- national Law and Organization. Arms Control Implications of Current Defense Budget. Hearings, June and July, 1971, 92d Cong., first scss. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. l!»71 1. n 246. 163 For detailed accounts of the positions taken by Stimson and Wallace, see Lleberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, pp. 138-155 and pp. 334-358, respectively. >'■" Ibid., p. in:, inT Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, pp. 59-60. «»For a complete texl o1 tin Vandenberg resolution, see U.S. Congress. Senate. Sub- committee on the t " n i t <f tin United Nations Charter, t Col- lection of Documents. 83d Cong., Second scss., January 7, 1954. (Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 140-141. 117 that the United States supports "voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members." (These were areas most hindered by Soviet use of the veto in the Se- curity Council.) However, consideration of the resolution may have reinforced the U.S. position of maintaining its veto power over mat- ters of enforcement, particularly those involving the use of armed force. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report stated : Some advocates of Charter revision contend that the veto should be stripped from decisions involving enforcement ac- tion and the use of armed forces by the Security Council. It should be pointed out, however, that such a proposal would be vigorously opposed by all the great powers, who remain unwilling to permit their troops to be thrown into action without their consent, and by many other members of the United Nations as well. Moreover, it is significant that it is not enforcement action in a single instance which has been blocked by the veto. 159 Through this resolution, the Senate helped to clarify U.S. policy on enforcement in the United Nations, but these principles represented a divergence from Baruch's position on atomic energy questions. The Vandenberg resolution also paved the way for the United States to take an active part in engineering collective defense arrangements such as NATO, under the terms of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The fact that the United States sought this kind of vehicle to ensure its security and that of its allies marked a recognition by the United States of a need for alternatives to the Security Council in this regard. As expressed in the UNAEC negotiations, the U.S. position on the security arrangements of atomic energy control placed a great deal of emphasis on the Security Council as the' principal organ to deal with questions of this nature. However, this position toward the machinery for security matters seemed to undergo a transition, as indicated by subsequent U.S. participation in collective -defense arrangements. The development of collective security arrangements may or may not rep- resent a possible alternative which was neglected in the effort to set up machinery for security under atomic energy control. But it may in- dicate a general trend which was casting the Security Council in a dif- ferent role from that which seemed to govern the atomic energy proposals. And as involvement of the Security Council demanded, resolution of the question of how the veto would be used, the emphasis on that body may have contributed to the failure of the negotiations. Given the existing political conditions at the time, it would be diffi- cult in retrospect to determine whether a change of one or several fac- tors or developments might have altered the results of the negotiations. The complexity of the relationships among science, technology, and diplomacy is abundantly illustrated through an examination of these first efforts to control atomic energy. It is clear, from the perspective of this study, that elements of both the diplomatic and technological aspects of atomic energy contributed to the failure of the initial inter- national efforts to control it. 159 Ibid., p. 135. VI. Concluding Observations The discovery of nuclear fission and its subsequent military appli- cation by the United States altered the balance of power among the major nations of the world and gave to the United States a few brief years of exclusive possession of a military weapon of truly revolution- ary potency. During this transitional period and until the present era of nuclear stalemate, American diplomacy was able to function from a position of great military strength with little need to make conces- sions. One of the first impacts of the discovery upon American diplomacy was the task accepted by U.S. diplomats of doing what they could to bring the nations of the world into sufficient agreement to establish the international control of nuclear energy. Examination of their un- successful attempt to do so suggests several observations about the im- pact of science and technology upon American diplomacy and inter- national relations. In this examination, it is necessary to be aware of a distinction be- tween two questions associated with international control of atomic energy and the issue of the interplay among science, technology, and diplomacy. First one can examine the events surrounding the Baruch plan as they exemplify the impact on diplomacy of an unprecedented technological achievement, the atom bomb. The second consideration arises from the fact that there were certain technological principles of atomic energy which determined the necessary technological character- istics of the control system. One might call this area the "technology of control.'* Thus, the second question to consider is the interaction between the technology of control and the conduct of the diplomatic negotiations to establish a control system. A recognition of this distinc- tion in terms of the scope of this study is important to an understand- ing of the following discussion. I in pact of New Technologies on I nt, motional Relations In light of the way the discoveries associated with atomic energy gal- vanized U.S. diplomacy and stimulated an extended and global diplo- matic effort, this case suggests that the creation and application of new technologies arising from scientific discoveries may so change re- lations among nations that a system of international control of that technology becomes desirable to one or more parties. Nuclear en- ergy is neither the first nor the last example of a technological innova- tion suggesting the desirability of international machinery and proce- dures for controlling it. Hut it is probably the most dramatic example to date."" On the other hand, the fact that the diplomatic effort arose out of the discovery of fission, a radical development in itself, did not change the basic function of diplomacy or the behavior of diplomats. The U.S. ""Other examples would include aviation, warships, supertankers, ami communications satellites. ( us) 119 experience suggests the venerable aphorism : "Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose." The idealism of science and its traditions for in- ternational cooperation were not strong enough to overcome interna- tional political differences. Not even an awareness of the awesome de- structive force of the atomic bomb provided sufficient incentive to nations to agree on a secure form of control over atomic energy. In the face of a new weapon which drastically altered traditional concepts of war, intense rivalries among different national interests prevented a movement toward common ground on international control of atomic energy. While exclusive possession of a new technology stemming from a scientific discovery may give a nation an advantage in international affairs, that advantage is likely to shrink quickly. In the case of nuclear energy, the principal disadvantaged country was able to duplicate the discovery of fission and to create a rudimentary initial technology sufficient to permit detonation of a nuclear device while the negotia- tions were still in progress. Yet during this time U.S. negotiators ap- parently assumed that secrecy could preserve their advantage for a comfortably long period of diplomatic accommodation. Thus, another lesson from this study is that it is unrealistic to rely on secrecy, once the application of a new technology has been forcefully demonstrated before the world as in the case of the atomic bombs, to prevent other nations from acquiring or recreating this technology. In approaching the problem which the new atomic energy technology imposed on U.S. diplomacy, there was recognition of the need to com- bine elements of both areas to achieve a solution to the problem. While this principle was easily accepted by diplomats and scientists alike, members of each profession were not successful in putting the principle into practice. To a considerable extent, the differences between men like Lilienthal and Baruch were founded on a certain lack of apprecia- tion on each side for the manner in which the members of the other side approached the problem of the international control of atomic energy. Perhaps this case indicates that for science and diplomacy to work together efficiently, the members of each field must express their respective points of view fully and in terms which can be understood and applied by members of the other field. At the same time, there must be a special receptivity by members of each field and a special willingness to accommodate to the outlook of the other, in order to attain the ultimate goal. Not only were mistakes made in the course of the interaction of science and diplomacy, but there were also a number of miscalcula- tions by the experts in their respective fields, as described in the previ- ous section. Whether or to what extent these particular elements, contributed to the failure of the negotiations would be difficult to deter- mine. Total accuracy on the part of either scientists or diplomats may be too much to expect, but certainly in areas basic to the solution of critical problems, a high degree of accuracy would seem to be a reason- able and necessary goal. The Diplomatic Task : Combining Effectiveness and Acceptability The second major portion of this conclusion deals with the tech- nology of control and the diplomatic efforts to cope with it. This ques- tion breaks down further into two features of a control system in which science, technology, and diplomacy became involved: effectiveness and 120 acceptability. The first concerns those characteristics required of an effective system, that is, one which merely fulfilled the function of con- trol. For the most part, these could be found primarily in the area of science and technology of atomic energy, although certain political factors were thought to be essential to a workable plan. The second has to do with the acceptability of the plan, those technological and polit- ical characteristics of the plan which would lead to agreement among nations. In turn, those aspects of the plan which promoted its capacity for effectiveness or acceptability interacted in ways which may have contributed to the failure of the negotiations. During negotiation of the Baruch plan, one can detect two absolute factors which were peculiar to the efforts to attain an effective system of international control over atomic energy: a technological reality and a political reality created by the discovery and use of atomic energy. In turn, both of these realities created substantial problems for the negotiations, and thus for the acceptability of the plan. The predominant political characteristic of atomic energy was the fact that the keeper of the military use of the atom represented an absolute power for a finite period of time. Thus, the control system had to be effective in such a way as to exercise adequate control over this tremendous military force. The primary problem this presented for the United States was the fact that international control affected the very heart of its military security. To the Soviet Union, the political impact of the United States as sole owner of the bomb strengthened the impression of a very real threat to Soviet military security. More assurance of an end to that threat would have been necessary in ex- change for Soviet renunciation of its own efforts to develop a bomb and accept international control. The technological reality of atomic energy which was important to the negotiations was the fact that the processes associated with the peaceful and military uses of atomic energy were approximately the same. And it appeared from the outset that the security of a control system would have to be maintained through inspections of an exceed- ingly intrusive character. The Soviet Union was faced with this pe- culiar attribute of the technology of atomic energy which weighed heavily on the choices of a control system and which seriously chal- lenged the closely guarded society of that country. To the United States, a major consideration influenced by this technological fact of life was how to penetrate the rigid secrecy of the Soviet Union in order to prevent or detect its expected violation of the control system. Perhaps also, to some indeterminate degree, this penetration of Soviet society was regarded in the United States as an intrinsically desirable goal, apart from considerations of atomic control. Thus, during the negotiations to devise a control system, both the United States and the Soviet I'liion were faced with certain political and technological absolutes which were directly opposite to certain fundamental features of their respective countries. These features were integral to meeting what each country considered the require- ments for maintenance of its national security. The negotiations ne- glected to reconcile these requirements with these dominating techno- logical and political factors of atomic energy in order to attain adequate and acceptable international control. 121 On the whole, the technology of atomic energy seems to have deter- mined the parameters of the proposals and therefore set the tone of the negotiations. When obstacles arose in the policymaking process and in the negotiations, the consensus was that there had been a failure to recognize the technological factors which supported the proposal for the international control system. Yet little effort was made by the diplomats to come to terms with some of the political problems which contributed significantly to the impasse. At the same time, scientists who were in a position to influence policymakers in the United States and in the UNA EC refused to accept any responsibility for comment- ing on the political feasibility of control or the political elements of a possible control system. Perhaps a guiding assumption among policymakers and negotiators alike was that the technological necessities of effective control would force acceptance of that control. But in reality, the drive to devise effectiveness in the control system seems to have ignored, if not to have defied, the need for special diplomatic efforts to achieve acceptability. The area of acceptability received little if any consideration in U.S. policy discussions. The basis for the U.S. approach may be found in several considerations: a moralistic attitude which characterized the U.S. negotiating technique, arrogance generated by the notion of U.S. leverage, or prejudice toward Soviet science and technology which led to overly hopeful estimates of the life expectancy of the U.S. monopoly over atomic weapons. It is clear that while science and technology alone could devise a control system which would be efficient in its task, and diplomacy could provide the fundamentals for an acceptable system to protect national security, only a combination of the elements from science, technology, and diplomacy could be expected to devise a workable system for control which would be acceptable to the leading nations of the world. Underlying many of the conclusions on acceptability is an assump- tion that all parties entered the UNAEC negotiations in good faith, and were prepared to bargain diligently for a goal which represented the promise of assured security for all. It would be virtually impossible, of course, to determine accurately what were in fact the motives of each country as it entered the negotiations. But it is reasonably certain that the tone of the initial proposals could have helped shape the sub- sequent behavior of the countries in the negotiations. As it was, the initial proposals may have lessened the force of the drive which was necessary to sustain the bargaining process successfully. In light of the fact that the Soviets were not far from developing their own atomic weapon, one might infer alternatively that the So- viets entered the negotiations simply for propaganda value and were not genuinely interested in achieving a system of international con- trol of atomic energy. Whether or not this was the case, not everything possible was done by the West to create an atmosphere of trust or a spirit of compromise which would seem to be basic ingredients to meaningful negotiation. This fact could cast doubts on the intentions of the West. On the whole, one cannot discount entirely the possibility of some measure of reluctance on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union to accept the idea of international control of atomic energy, a sentiment which would inevitably have influenced their behavior in the negotiations. 122 U.S. Attitudes in the Conduct of the Negotiations Diplomats were clearly the focus of action, with scientists in an advisory capacity. No radically new participation of scientists was observed in these international negotiations. The interplay between science and technology and diplomacy was not so continuous or extensive as to require direct participation by scientists in the negotiations. Rather, the advice and analysis from science advisers served mainly to set the stage for the diplomats and their negotiations. At a time when scientists enjoyed the peak of postwar public esteem for their contribution to the victory in World War II, their normal role in the Baruch plan negotiations did not extend beyond technical advice. Apparently, the scientific approach with its emphasis upon objective, experimentally demonstrable fact did not provide a useful paradigm for the international negotiators. The characteristics of the proposed control plan, as enunciated by the scientists of the Lilienthal Board and those of the UNAEC Scien- tific and Technical Committee, suggest that the authors were thinking in terms of an ideal situation. Many of the features of this plan, while considered necessary to an effective control system, presented notions which were totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. A possible al- ternative in the U.S. policymaking process might have been to deter- mine the basic technological and political requirements for an effective control system which each side would accept, and then to try to estab- lish some common ground between the two positions. With this process as a starting point for the negotiations, perhaps the discussions could have proceeded to elaborate on the control system in such a way as to explore a variety of proposals and arrive at the proper combination of technological and political characteristics which would provide both an effective system, and one reasonably acceptable to all concerned. A willingness to proceed on this basis might at least, in the Baruch plan negotiations, have emphasized good faith and signalled an understand- ing that each side had its special political problems to resolve. Chapter 4 — Commercial Nuclear Power In Europe: The Interaction of American Diplomacy With a New Technology CONTENTS Page I. Reasons, Purpose, and Scope 131 Some Reasons for the Study 131 Scope and Limitations of the Study 131 Sources of Information 133 II. Some Facts About Nuclear Power 134 Fission and Fusion: Two Sources of Nuclear Energy 134 Breeding or the Conversion of Useless Atoms Into Useful Nuclear Fuel 134 Natural and Enriched Uranium as Nuclear Fuel 134 Plutonium: A Manmade Nuclear Fuel 135 Commercial Nuclear Power 136 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 137 Fusion Power: An Expectation Yet To Be Fulfilled 138 Safeguards : Ways To Assure Discovery of Unauthorized Diver- sion of Fissionable Materials 139 Some Limitations of Safeguards 140 III. From Hiroshima to Atoms for Peace: Postwar Trends in Regional Multinational Cooperation in Europe 141 An Initial Prohibition of International Cooperation 141 Initial Pessimism Toward Nuclear Power 142 Changing Technology and Diplomacy 143 Interest in International Collaboration 143 The Evolving Scene: 1945-1953 144 The Postwar Struggle 144 The Marshall Plan 145 The Truman Doctrine 145 Unification in Europe 146 The European Coal and Steel Community 146 The European Economic Community 146 Common Organs of the European Communities 147 The Commission of the European Communities 147 The Council of Ministers 147 The European Parliament 147 The Economic and Social Committee 147 The Court of Justice 148 Financing the Communities 148 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 148 U.S. Attitude Toward European Unity 148 IV. Atoms for Peace: A Presidential Initiative 150 Origins of Atoms for Peace 150 President Eisenhower's U.N. Address : 150 Implications for Nuclear Power in Europe 152 Legislation for Atoms for Peace 152 The Eisenhower Proposal to Congress 153 The Congressional Response 153 International Cooperation and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954_ 154 Some Questions From the Scientific Community 156 Accomplishments of Atoms for Peace 156 V. Bilateral Agreements for U.S. Technical Assistance to Commercial Nuclear Energy in Europe 158 Legislation for Technical Cooperation in Nuclear Energy 158 AEC Organization: The Division of International Programs — 160 The First Bilateral Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation 161 Pressures To Promote Nuclear Power Abroad 161 (125) 126 V. Bilateral Agreements, etc. — Continued Pase Providing Working Experience With Nuclear Energy 164 The Research Reactor Program 164 Some Doubts and Insights 164 Fuel for Research Reactors 165 The Power Reactor Program 165 The Bilateral Agreement Situation in 1971 167 Additional Measures To Stimulate Foreign Interest in Nuclear Power 168 Allocation of Nuclear Fuel Materials 168 Establishing Prices for Nuclear Fuel Materials 169 Financial Assistance for Foreign Nuclear Powerplants 170 Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Disposal 171 Authority for the U.S. Nuclear Industry To Provide Nu- clear Products and Assistance 172 A Reluctance To Export Technology 172 Safeguarding Nuclear Materials Supplied Through Bilateral Agreements 173 Conclusions and Current Issues 174 VI. Creating an International Organization: The International Atomic Energy Agency 176 The IAEA: A Brief Description 176 Changing Goals and Situations 177 The Fruits of Negotiation 178 The Role of Scientists in the Negotiations 179 Some Insights From Congressional Review 179 Limitations Upon the U.S. Commitment 181 Warnings of Consequences of Failure To Ratify 182 The International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957 182 Bilateral Agreements and the IAEA 183 A Bilateral Agreement With the IAEA and Three Policy Questions 184 U.S. Participation in the IAEA 185 Initial U.S. Support 185 Trends in U.S. Support 186 A Hardheaded Approach to IAEA Functions 187 A Stronger Role for the IAEA: The Smyth Report of 1962 188 A State Department Commentary 189 An AEC Reaction 190 A Pessimistic Postscript The Decline of the Supply Function 191 International Standards for Nuclear Safety 192 International Safeguards for Nuclear Materials 194 Congressional Interest in IAEA Safeguards 195 Bilateral Versus IAEA Safeguards 197 Evolution of IAEA Safeguards: A Brief Chronology 198 Conclusions and Current Issues 201 VII. Creating a Regional Nuclear Organization: The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 203 Origins of Euratom 203 Advice for the Decisionmakers 204 A Target for Euratom 204 U.S. Support for European Nuclear Integration 205 Soviet Opposition to Euratom 206 Three Policy Issues of Euratom 207 Whether Euratom Should Manufacture Enriched Uranium. 207 Whether To Include Military Activities in Euratom 208 Whether Euratom Should Have a Monopoly of Nuclear Materials 208 A Treaty for Euratom 208 127 Page VII. Creating a Regional Nuclear Organization — Continued Establishing the Infrastructure for European Nuclear Power... 209 Financing and Operating Commercial Nuclear Power- plants 210 Creating a Nuclear Common Market 210 Joint Enterprises: An Innovation in International Organi- zation 210 Early Changes in Euratom Objectives 211 Research for Nuclear Power 211 Funding of Euratom Research 212 In-House Research and Development for Euratom 212 Dissension, Crisis, and Delay in Euratom's Programs 213 The First 5- Year Plan (1958-1962) 214 The Second 5- Year Plan (1963-1967) 214 Failure To Adopt a Third 5- Year Plan 215 Plutonium for Fast Breeder Research 216 The Supply and Control of Nuclear Materials 216 Supranational Ownership of Nuclear Fuel Materials 217 Supplying Nuclear Materials 217 Euratom Manufacture of Enriched Uranium 217 Some Difficulties of the Supply Agency 218 Safeguarding Nuclear Fuel Materials 218 Euratom Safeguards and U.S. Policy 220 Euratom and Nuclear Safety 220 Euratom and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Power. . 221 Duplication and Dilution of Effort 221 Proposals for New Research Functions for Euratom 222 The McKinney Report Recommendations of 1959 222 Views of the EEC 223 Conclusions and Current Issues 223 VIII. Joint United States-Euratom Research and Development 226 U.S. Interest in Euratom Demonstration of Nuclear Power 227 Initiation of the Joint Programs 228 The United States-Euratom Agreement of 1958 229 The Joint Boards: An Organizational Innovation 230 A Note on the Environment of the Negotiations 230 The Euratom Cooperation Act of 1958 231 A Bilateral Agreement With Euratom 232 The Joint Power Program 233 The First Invitation To Participate 233 The Second Round of Invitations 235 Financing the Demonstration Plants 235 The Fuel Guarantee Authority 235 The Joint Research Program 236 The First 5- Year Plan (1959-1964) 236 The Second 5- Year Plan (1965-1969) 237 Conclusions and Current Issues 237 IX. The Nuclear Energy Agency: Another Regional Approach to International Organization for Nuclear Energy 239 Origins of the Nuclear Energy Agency 239 NEA Functions 239 Some NEA Innovations in Organization of International Projects 240 The Halden Project in Norway 240 The Dragon Project in the United Kingdom 241 The Eurochemic Project in Belgium 242 Building the Infrastructure for Nuclear Power 242 NEA and Safeguards for Nuclear Materials 243 U.S. Participation in NEA Activities 243 Conclusions and Current Issues 244 X. U.S. Fuel for European Nuclear Power 246 The Enriched Uranium Business 246 Requirements for Enriched Uranium and Enrichment Services. 247 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 128 X. U.S. Fuel for European Nuclear Power — Continued Page U.S. Supply Policy 248 Advantages to the United States 248 Disadvantages to the United States 249 Evolution of U.S. Supply Policy 249 Special Conditions for Euratom 250 Toll Enrichment 251 Financing Nuclear Fuel Inventories 252 The Deferred Payment Plan 252 Pricing Uranium Enrichment Service 253 European Opposition to U.S. Enrichment Monopoly 253 The U.S.S.R. as an Alternative Source of Supply 254 Supply Policy Alternatives 255 Maintaining the Competitive Position of the United States in the World Enrichment Market 255 Enrichment Requirements 256 The Prospects for Expanding U.S. Enrichment Capacity. _ 257 Sharing the U.S. Monopoly 258 Some Views of the Joint Committee 261 The Gas Centrifuge: A Technical Perturbation for U.S. Policy?. 261 The Centrifuge and Proliferation 262 Breaking the Secrecy Barrier 263 The French Drive for a European Diffusion Plant 263 Conclusions and Current Issues 264 XI. The Nonproliferation Treat y and Safeguards 266 New Urgency for Safeguards 266 The Four Functions of the Nonproliferation Treaty 267 U.S. Ratification and Support of the Treaty.. 268 U.S. Support for Safeguards 269 Safeguards Provisions of the Treaty 270 Elements of the IAEA Safeguards System 271 Negotiation of IAEA Safeguards Agreements: The IAEA Safeguards Committee 272 Some Facets of the Negotiations 272 Protection of Commercial Interests 273 Inspections and Their Scheduling 273 "Strategic Points" 274 Enforcement of Safeguards 274 U.S. Support of the Safeguards Committee 275 The Soviet View 275 Criticisms of IAEA Safeguards 275 Some Congressional Doubts 276 Costs of Safeguards 277 Financing Safeguards Under the Treaty 278 A Joint Committee Reservation 279 Physical Security of Nuclear Materials 279 Nonproliferation and Euratom 280 Euratom Concern 281 A Recent Development 282 Conclusions and Current Issues 282 XII. Some Issues Recapitulated 285 Nuclear Power for U.S. Foreign Policy 286 Sustaining U.S. Technological Leadership in the 1970s 286 Reducing European Dependence Upon Imported Energy. 286 Controlling the Possibilities for Proliferation 287 Demonstrating the Practicability of Inspection for Arms Control 287 Improving the U.S. Position in World Trade 287 A Potential Limitation Upon Nuclear Power for Foreign Policy 288 129 Page XII. Some Issues Recapitulated — Continued Foreign Policy for Nuclear Power 288 Maintaining the Competitive Position of the U.S. Nuclear Industry in the World Market 288 Further Development and Demonstration of U.S. Nuclear Technology Abroad 288 Expediting the Solution of Environmental Effects of Nuclear Power 289 Establishment of International Standards for Nuclear Power 289 Protecting the U.S. Position in Uranium Enrichment 289 Glossary 290 TABLES I. Status of Agreements for Cooperation as of April 1, 1958 163 II. International Agreements in 1970 168 III. U.S. Contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Calendar Years 1960-73 187 IV. Appropriations for Euratom Research and Training Programs From 1958 to 1971 213 V. AEC Contracts for Toll Enrichment With Foreign Customers, November 1970 252 VI. Total Manpower and Cost Estimates for IAEA Safeguards 278 VII. Summary of Nuclear Facilities in Non weapons States 278 FIGURES I. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 138 i t i * 4 >H VjV Garigliano Nuclear Power Plant (SENN), Scauri, Italy. This 160,000 KW. station began commercial operation in November 1964. CHAPTER 4— COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER IN EU- ROPE: THE INTERACTION OF AMERICAN DIPLO- MACY WITH A NEW TECHNOLOGY I. Reasons, Purpose, and Scope The interaction between American diplomacy and the new tech- nology of unclear power during the past three decades illustrates how the development of nuclear power has been a resource for U.S. diplo- macy and. conversely, how diplomacy has helped the domestic devel- opment of nuclear power in the United States. The purpose of this re- port is to describe this interaction and to identify issues that may need attention during- the 1970s. Some Reasons for the Study One of the most dramatic scientific discoveries of our time is that of atomic energy. During the brief span of 30 years from the first demonstration of a nuclear chain reaction in 1942 to date, a whole new technology has been developed, demonstrated, and brought into practi- cal use in such widely divergent applications as enormously destruc- tive military weapons, naval propulsion, generation of commercial electricity, and, most recently, the possible civil use of nuclear ex- plosives in engineering, mining, ancl recovery of natural gas. There exist today 38 working nuclear power stations in Europe in comparison with 28 operable nuclear power stations in the United States. 1 The applications of this new science and technology by public and private bodies have inevitably interacted with American diplomacy. On the one hand, American preeminence in military and civil use of nuclear power has provided certain advantages ancl leverages for U.S. diplomatic action. On the other hand, U.S. foreign policy deci- sions have been made to further the progress of domestic use of nu- clear power in the United States. These decisions have led to the creation of not only one but three international organizations and to the establishment of a complex network of bilateral agreements for technical assistance by the United States to its allies and friends to promote use of nuclear energy. As the United States and the industrial nations of the world stand on the threshold of an anticipated massive deployment of civil nuclear power during the coming years, further issues for diplomacy merit attention before the pace of events so accelerates that there will be no time for unhurried decisions. Scope and Limitations of the Study The immediate impact of nuclear energy upon American diplomacy following World War II is to be found in the fruitless efforts of the United States and the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to bring about the international control of this new science and tech- nology. Although the UXAEC was to continue in existence until Janu- ary 1952, it had for all practical purposes ceased to function in 1949 1 These nuclear power stations are distributed among the nations of Europe as follows: Federal Republic of Germany .">, France S, Italy 3, Netherlands 1, Spain 2, Sweden 2, Switzerland 3. and the United Kincdom 14 Note : This chapter was prepared in 1972 by Warren H. Donnelly. (131), 132 and with its demise died the hope that atomic energy could be put under international ownership and control. An analysis of this inter- action of atomic energy and American diplomacy is to be found in a companion study of the Congressional Research Service : Tht Baruch Phi n : U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age. 2 The subsequent interaction between U.S. diplomacy and nuclear power is the subject of the present study. Since the first use of nuclear weapons terminated the war with Japan in 1945, U.S. diplomacy and nuclear energy have been closely and continually intertwined. The re- lationships have changed over the years from the early postwar period when the United States possessed the great military advantage of the atom bomb to back its foreign policy and diplomacy to the situation today when the possession of enormously destructive nuclear arma- ments by the superpowers of the world has brought a period of nu- clear stalemate. While large-scale armed conflict between major nations has not occurred since 1945, the many smaller wars and conflicts have prevented the postwar years from being an era of peace. The starting point for this examination of American diplomacy and commercial nuclear power for Europe is President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Plan of 1953. This initiative, together with the sub- sequent rewriting of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, opened the way to accelerated development of commercial nuclear power in the United States, and to greater technical assistance to, and cooperation with, other countries and with international organizations in nuclear power. Against this background, the bilateral technical assistance arrange- ments of the United States are described and also the U.S. relations with the three international organizations set up to foster use of nu- clear power in the free world: the International Atomic Energy Agency, Euratom, and the Nuclear Energy Agency. Next follows in- formation on U.S. policy and programs for supplying nuclear fuel to Europe. The next-to-last section deals with the Xonprolifcration Treaty, and the safeguards which it would impose on civil use of nuclear fuel materials in Europe. The study concludes with a reca- pitulation of the issues and a look to the future. Commercial nuclear power in Europe presents an instructive case of major interaction between technology and foreign policy for two rea- sons. First, the strengthening of Europe during and since the era of the cold war has been a keystone of U.S. foreign policy; Second. Europe is the only area other than North America where commercial development of nuclear power has attained any prominence. Further- more, during the late L950's the economics oi the European energy market were more attractive for the early demonstration and appli cation of commercial nuclear power than were those of the United States with its then abundant and cheap energy supplies of coal, oil, and natural gas. No attention is given in this report to commercial nuclear power in the developing nations of the world because the technology for nuclear power has not evolved in this direction. Nuclear power tech- nology so far has been characterized by high capital costs, rcquire- * Lenelce N. Wu. The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Xuclcar Age, A report prepared fur the Subcommittee mi National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of tiir House Committee mi Foreign Affairs in the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 67 p. 133 ments for a sophisticated infrastructure of supporting technical and industrial products and services, a need for highly trained personnel, and dependence upon the United States for nuclear fuel supplies. The combination of these factors has made nuclear power less attractive to developing countries than had been hoped for by early proponents of nuclear power. Thus the commercial use of nuclear power is con- centrated largely in the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union. During the period covered by this study, Europe has been a principal theater of interaction between American diplo- macy and nuclear technology — both civil and military. For this reason, and for the sake of manageability, this examination is limited to commercial or civil use of nuclear power in Western Europe. This analysis is not intended to be a definitive account of the domes- tic nuclear power program of the United States, nor of the nuclear programs of the several international organizations that were created to further the peaceful use of this new technology. Rather it is intended to illustrate typical interactions between a rapidly evolving, science- based technology and diplomacy, and to suggest some issues for Amer- ican diplomacy that may be anticipated as the evolution of nuclear power continues. Sources of Information The principal sources of information used in this study include the hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the annual reports of the Atomic Energy Commission, and hearings before the foreign relations committees of the House and the Senate. Additionally it draws upon publications of the U.S. nuclear industry, notably Nuclear Industry, which is the monthly magazine of the Atomic Industrial Forum, and Nucleonics Week, a commercial weekly newsletter; also used were Nuclear Science and Engineering, which is a commercial British journal, and the monthly bulletins of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom. Several books on nuclear energy which have been useful for this analysis include those of Nieburg, Polach, Kramish,. Scheinman, and Willrich. 3 The report does not attempt an exhaustive examination of all of the literature, but rather seeks to select materials that illustrate interaction of U.S. foreign policy and domestic policy with commercial nuclear power in Europe. ■ 3 Harold L. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C. : Public Affairs Press, 1964), 255 pp. Jaroslave G. Polach, Euratom: Its Background, Issues and Economic Implications (Dobbs Ferry, New York : Oceana Publications. Inc., 1964), 232 pp. Arnold Kramish, The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row. Publishers. 1963). 276 pp. Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press. 1965), 259 pp. Mason Willrich, ed.. Civil Xuclear Power and International Security (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1971). 124 pp. Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control (Charlottesville, Va. : The Mlchie Company, 1969), 341 pp. II. Some Facts About Nuclear Power The discovery that useful energy could be obtained from uranium atoms initially attracted more academic than commercial interest, and the first Government interest in its use was for naval propulsion rather than commercial application. 4 This discovery, together with earlier speculations that the enormous energy of the sun also originated in a different nuclear reaction, laid the foundation for the peaceful, com- mercial use of nuclear power, and for employment of this new tech- nology as an element of U.S. foreign policy. Fission and Fusion : Two Sources of Nuclear Energy The two basic processes for the release of nuclear energy are fission and fusion. Fission is a demonstrated and practical, although poten- tially dangerous, source of energy. Fusion remains to be demonstrated as a controlled source of useful energy, although its proponents expect that this capacity will be achieved before the end of this century. 5 Fission refers to the splitting apart, or fissioning, of atoms of ura- nium and plutonium accompanied by the release of energy and the pro- duction of intensely radioactive wastes. For present nuclear tech- nology, the nuclear fuel in general use is atoms of uranium of atomic weight 235, or the U-235 isotope. In nature, for each 1,000 atoms of uranium, 7 are U-235 and the other 993 are the uranium isotope of weight 238 (U-238) which is not directly useful for nuclear fuel. Breeding, or the Conversion of Useless Atoms into Useful Nuelear Fuel In the fission process in a working nuclear power reactor, some atoms of U-238 or thorium can be transformed into useful nuclear fuel, namely, atoms of plutonium and U-233 respectively. If more of these '"fertile" materials are transformed into nuelear fuel than are consumed by the reactor, the process is known as "breeding. " Through breeding it is possible, in principle, to use all of the U-23S and thorium in nature as a nuclear fuel. As a practical matter, it is estimated that successful demonstration of breeder technology would multiply the energy re- coverable from uranium resources at least fifty-fold, would virtually make nuclear power independent of the costs of mining uranium ores, and would add the nuclear energy of world thorium deposits to world energy reserves. Natural and Enriched Uranium as Nucleai Fuel In some types of nuclear power reactors, the uranium obtained from nature can be used as a fuel. This was tin 1 approach favored by the I nited Kingdom and France during the l!>50's and well into the L960'& 'The lirst U.S. Government Interest was at the Naval Research Laboratory of the Department of the Navy where research was proposed to explore the potential use of nuclear energy fur naval propulsion, 8 Details about tli«' scientific anil technological aspects of nuclear power are available in such sources as Samuel Glasstone's two definitive imoks : Sourcebook on Atomic Energy (New York: I) Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967); and .\miinr Reactor Engineering (New York : I >. Van Nostrand Company, inc., 1963) (134) 135 The natural uranium reactors offered the advantage that a country possessing uranium deposits could have nuclear power without having to build its own enrichment facilities or obtain enrichment from abroad. On the other hand, for technical reasons, this type of reactor is larger and more expensive than reactors of other types. To get the same power out of smaller, less expensive reactors it is necessary to process the uranium fuel to increase the relative proportion of U-235 atoms from the 0.7 percent in nature to perhaps 3 percent. This de- sired "enrichment" can be obtained by several processes. The process in general use is the gaseous diffusion process in which a gaseous form of uranium — uranium hexaHuoride — is diffused through a porous ceramic barrier. Each time the gas passes through such a barrier, there is a slight separation of the lighter U-235 atoms from the heavier U-238 atoms. Many hundreds of diffusion stages, even a thousand or more for a large plant, are needed to manufacture material sufficiently enriched in U-235 for use in weapons. Another enrichment process that has strong proponents today is the gas centrifuge process. Here the uranium hexaHuoride is whirled rapidly about with the heavier atoms being forced outward by centrifugal force. As with gaseous dif- fusion, a series or cascade of centrifuges is required, for the separa- tion at each stage is slight. Of the two processes, the gaseous diffusion process requires a large industrial facility and a large supply of elec- tricity. In principle, centrifugal separation, if it is demonstrated to be economically feasible, should permit building of smaller plants at less capital investment and with less demand for electricity. Because enriched uranium has been available in the United States from the three plants that were built to make materials for weapons and for naval propulsion, and because of advantages of enriched uranium as fuel, it was natural for the infant nuclear industry to apply its military experience with enriched uranium to commercial nuclear power plants. As a result, the principal path of evolution for U.S. nuclear power technology has been the use of slightly enriched fuels. Now, at the outset of the 1970's, this technology has become dominant for much of commercial nuclear power in the United States, in the Soviet bloc nations, and in Europe. Even in the United Kingdom and France it appeal's that many future nuclear power plants are likely to use enriched fuels. Plutonium : a Manmade Nuclear Fuel Nuclear power reactors fueled with natural or slightly enriched uranium also produce plutonium as a byproduct. 6 While some of the plutonium atoms are fissioned, enough remain in the used fuel when it is removed from a reactor to make recovery of this byproduct nuclear fuel economically feasible. The recovered plutonium can be used for weapons or as fuel for other nuclear reactors. This dual utility of plu- tonium is troublesome for world peace : As nuclear power grows, so will the stocks of plutonium, which some observers fear may increase the risk of theft or undetected diversion of this material to clandestine manufacture of nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the operation of a nu- clear reactor for power produces a mixture of plutonium isotopes, plutonium-239 and plutonium-240. The longer uranium fuel is ex- U-238 atoms capture neutrons emitted by the fissioning U-235 atoms and are trans- formed into plutonium. 136 posed to the fission reaction, the higher the proportion of plutonium- 240 (Pu-240). The more Pu-240 is present, the less usetul the ma- terial is for weapons because it makes the behavior of the material less controllable. On the other hand, limiting the exposure of uranium fuel in a power reactor limits the amount of plutonium-240 and makes the recovered material more suitable for weapons. When nuclear power reactors are operated to produce the cheapest electricity, the plutonium they produce as a by-product is not suitable for very efficient nuclear weapons because of the Pu-240 present. "Weapon grade" plutonium should contain no more than 10 percent of these non-fissionable isotopes and preferably less. 7 One way in which nuclear power reactors could be used to produce weapons grade plutonium would be to limit the time the fuel spends in the reactor to a few weeks, which is about a tenth of the normal exposure time for economic nuclear power. However, even though con- taminated with up to 30 percent of plutonium-240, the by-product plutonium normally produced in present nuclear power reactors would still be usable as the explosive material for primitive but still effective nuclear weapons. 8 When the breeder reactors favored by the United States are commer- cially deployed during the 1980's, they will produce more plutonium than the nuclear fuel they consume. Use of this technology will allow many more nations to become self-sufficient in the production of nu- clear fuel. Any nation with sufficient deposits of natural uranium can then achieve a nuclear fuel cycle independent of other nations provided it has enough enriched uranium or plutonium to start the cycle. From the point of view of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, it should be noted that the preferable fuel for fast-breeders will be the same as that for efficient nuclear weapons, namely, plutonium con- taining little of the isotope plutonium-240. The problem of preventing the diversion of fissionable material seems likely to become more dif- ficult as fast-breeder reactors come into widespread commercial use. 9 Commercial Nuclear Power The large-scale generation of electricity from steam-electric power plants requires access to an industrial base that can supply the furnaces, boilers, turbines, generators, switchgear, and other electrical apparatus. Additionally, it requires access to transportation facilities to move huge amounts of fossil fuels — coal, oil, and natural gas. To introduce commercial nuclear power requires access to industries that can design, manufacture, install, and service the components of nuclear power reactors, fabricate and reprocess uranium fuels, and indefinitely store the residual radioactive wastes. Of these industrial capabilities, prob- ably the most unusual are those for enriching uranium and for reproc- essing used nuclear fuels. The other facilities are not greatly different from those to be found in an industrialized country. The enrichment plants that have been built to date by the United States and the Soviet Union are verv large industrial installations i Stockho'm International Pence Research Institute. World Armaments and Disarma- ment: 8IPR1 Yearbook t:>: l (New fork: Humanities Press, 1972), p. 366. - Loc, -it. ll.i.l . p. 290. 137 representing capital investment thought to be beyond the resources of most countries. The United Kingdom and France have small enrich- ment plants which were built to make highly enriched uranium-235 for weapons, but these are not large enough to supply fuel for commercial nuclear power. Enrichment plants now in operation use a process known as ''gaseous diffusion" and sometimes are referred to as gaseous diffusion plants. Recently there has been revived European interest in the gas centrifuge, and work is in progress to demonstrate the feasibility of this process as an alternative to gaseous diffusion for the manufacture of enriched uranium. Fuel reprocessing plants are unusual industrial facilities. They must be designed, built, and operated to process intensely radioactive mate- rials. Because the required equipment, processes, and personnel are not readily available from other industries, the construction and operation of a fuel reprocessing plant is costly and does not offer possibilities of conversion to other uses if the markets for fuel reprocessing should not meet expectations. On the other hand, the scale of financial and indus- trial effort should be within the capability of most industrial countries. An undesired and troublesome waste from fuel reprocessing is the radioactive materials produced when uranium or plutonium atoms are fissioned. The radioactivity of these wastes decreases slowly, and the wastes remain dangerous for centuries. While proponents of nuclear power assert that these wastes can be made inert and be safely stored for many years, some critics fear their ultimate release to the environ- ment with disastrous results. After some 25 years of research and development for nuclear power, the United States has yet to demon- strate on a working scale the technology for the indefinite storage of these wastes. At present, only a few industrialized countries now have the indus- trial capabilities to supply all the special materials, products, and services for commercial nuclear power. But many countries are plan- ning to build their own fuel fabricating and fuel reprocessing plants to service their nuclear power plants. The International Atomic En- ergy Agency expects that by the late 1970 's several additional countries will possess the industrial base necessary for nuclear power. At pres- ent these countries are limited to Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany, and the Soviet Union. But of these only the United States and the Soviet Union have a large-scale capability to produce enriched uranium for nuclear fuel. The Japanese are exploring with the United States and France the possibilities of some form of joint international enrichment project, while the French also have been seeking partners to build an inter- national enrichment facility in Europe. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle From the preceding notes on vital aspects of nuclear energy, it is apparent that the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, in contrast to conventional hydro or steam electric power plants that burn oil, coal, or natural gas, is only one step in a long and complex sequence of technological activities that are necessary for the genera- 138 THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE URANIUM MINES 1 MILLS CONVERSION TO UF 6 RECOVERED URANIUM ENRICHING CONVERSION TO FUEL REP10CESSIN6 WASTE STORAGE - BY-PROMCTS J Figure 1 tion of nuclear power. The entire sequence is called the nuclear fuel cycle and is illustrated in Figure I. In summary, the major parts of the nuclear fuel cycle are as follows : (1) Mining and milling of uranium ; (2) Refining of uranium and conversion to uranium hexafluo- ride; (3) Enrichment of uranium ; (4) Conversion of enriched uranium into fuel material ; (5) Fabrication of fuel elements for the nuclear power re- actors ; (6) Use of the fuel elements in working nuclear power plants; (7) Reprocessing of spent fuel to recover useful nuclear fuel materials; and (8) Perpetual storage of intensely radioactive waste's from the fission process. Fusion Power: an Expectation Yet to be Fulfilled In the fusion process, atoms of light elements, primarily hydrogen, are fused together with a resultant release of energy. The uncon- trolled fusion process is the basis for the hydrogen bomb which has so revolutionized foreign relations and national security in the 20th century. If a controlled fusion process could be achieved and demon- strated to be technologically and economically feasible for generation of elect licit v. the world would have a literally inexhaustible supply of energy. It is for this reason that the United States, the Soviet Union, and many other countries are engaged in fusion, or "controlled ther- monuclear," research. As ;in environmental benefit, fusion would not produce the enormous amounts of radioactive wastes characteristic of lission, and could offer 139 the prospect of more efficient conversion of energy into electricity ; a fusion powerplant would discharge less waste heat to the environ- ment than its fission counterpart, thus easing problems of thermal pollution. At least three major technical obstacles stand in the way of a demon- stration of a workable controlled fusion reaction. Optimists expect these can be overcome within the next few decades. On the other hand, until a demonstration is actually achieved, national energy policies cannot assume that fusion will in fact be available to supply energy needs of the 21st century. Safeguards : Ways to Assure Discovery of Unauthorized Diversion of Fissionable Materials The nuclear age brought a new meaning to the word "safeguards" in international relations. Safeguards are measures to guard against the diversion of nuclear fuel material from uses permitted by law or international agreement and to give timely indication of possible diver- sion or assurance that diversion has not occurred. 10 Safeguards are a means of detecting but not preventing diversion. Diversion of plutonium produced in nuclear power plants is con- sidered to be the chief danger to national security from commercial nuclear power. A fundamental goal of U.S. foreign policy is to dis- courage nations which now lack nuclear weapons from building fa- cilities to produce nuclear materials to make weapons. The expected installation of nuclear power plants in many of these countries will make available large amounts of plutonium with an attendant risk of diversion. The Internationa] Atomic Energy Agency estimates that by 1980 the daily accretion to the world's stock of nuclear fuel mate- rials will be sufficient to manufacture 10 nuclear weapons a day. 11 Some observers expect that from 300,000 to 450,000 kilograms of plutonium will be accumulated by 1980 in civil nuclear power pro- grams throughout the world. 12 As for slightly enriched uranium, while it cannot be used directly in weapons, it could be further processed to increase its enrichment to weapons grade. Fortunately for international security, the plutonium produced in commercial operation of nuclear power plants is not ideal for use in weapons. Nonetheless, it would be possible in principle to operate some nuclear power plants to produce plutonium better suited for weapons materials. "With present nuclear technology, this action would require the plants involved to be shut down frequently, which would be a conspicuous signal of suspicious behavior. All safeguards systems depend upon two elements: (1) the main- tenance and review of records showing the receipt, production, con- sumption, transfer, and storage of nuclear materials: and (2) the undertaking of on-site inspections to determine the validity of these records. Physical inspection is necessary- to verify the amount of safe- guarded materials actually on hand. An inspector must have access to the materials to take measurements and, in some cases, take samples for analvsis. 10 The Department of State used this definition in : U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Xonprolifcratinn Treat;/. 90th Cong. 2d Sess., 196S, p. 50. 11 International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards, (circa 1968) p. 7. 12 Mason Willrich. "The Nature of the Problem," in Mason Willrieh. ed., Civil Nuclear Power and International Security (New York : Praeger Publishers, 19T1), p. 3. 140 Some Lim itations of Safeguards Control of nuclear materials, both because of their monetary value and for their utility to make nuclear weapons, would seem to require a combination of accounting and physical controls and protection. This double control is not now in practice. Safeguards systems do not extend to physical protection against theft or diversion, but are designed only to detect such theft or diversion. The hope for safe- guards is that their detection capability will deter a would-be diverter by his risk of early detection and unmasking in the world community. This limitation of safeguards has important consequences. It means that assuring the physical security of nuclear materials is a separate responsibility of the possessing nation. A second limitation of safeguards is technical and statistical. Ex- perience indicates that large users and producers of nuclear materials can never know precisely how much materials they have ; there can be no assurance of the detection of every slight diversion. Unavoidable process losses and statistical errors in sampling and measurement set limits on accuracy. These limitations do not mean that safeguards cannot achieve a high level of effectiveness. They do mean that some margin of error is inescapable which might mask some small diver- sions. The diversion of substantial amounts of plutonium or highly en- riched uranium-235 would probably be detected, but there remains the nagging possibility that enough materials might be diverted without detection to make a few nuclear weapons. The possession of a few illicit weapons by a smaller nation, or possibly a non-national organization which might obtain the nuclear materials on a nuclear black market, is a real disadvantage of nuclear power to be weighed when considering the balance of cost and benefit from a policy of promoting its world use. Moreover, the higher the rate at which atomic fuel is used, re- processed, and increased by breeding, the larger will be the margin of uncertainty attributable to statistical error and the greater the chance of undetected diversion. III. From Hiroshima to Atoms for Peace: Postwar Trends in Regional Multinational Cooperation in Europe Nuclear power is capable of both military and peaceful applica- tions. While the first research aimed at application of nuclear power was for ship propulsion, the first actual application was a bomb. It was the latter use that colored the impact of the atom upon U.S. diplomacy for the later 1940's and well into the 1950's. The first postwar impact of nuclear power upon American diplomacy was evident in the unsuccessful struggle of diplomats to achieve international control of atomic energy through the United Nations and the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. As the effort failed, the diplomats had to grapple with the implications of possession of atomic bombs by the Soviet Union. And even as diplomacy was learn- ing to accommodate to the military implications of atomic energy, scientists and engineers were adding a new factor as their research and development led to the expectation of early commercial use of nuclear power. By the early 1950's this optimism began to affect the foreign policy of the United States, as its diplomats and scientists undertook initiatives that ultimately led to the creation of two regional, multinational organizations to coordinate peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a military alliance for its military use, a worldwide interna- tional atomic energy organization, a network of bilateral agreements by the United States with other countries for technical assistance with nuclear energy, and a treaty to prevent proliferation of new national capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons. These develop- ments evidence the impact of the discovery of fission upon American diplomacy. In addressing the interaction between American diplomacy and programs to foster commercial nuclear power in Europe, this study gives limited attention to the role of the United Kingdom. While the British were a principal partner of the United States in the wartime development of the atomic bomb, this special relationship was dis- solved by the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There- after the United Kingdom's government moved vigorously to estab- lish a civil nuclear power program both to supply energy for domestic use and in hopes of increasing future export trade. This they did independently of the United States and also of the nations that were later to form the European Common Market. The British tradition of separation from and independence of Europe has persisted until recently. Clearly the separation efforts of the British caused diplo- matic interactions between the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. However, an analysis of these interactions is not within the scope of this study. An Initial Prohibition of International Cooperation To maintain nuclear secrecy, Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 13 terminated nuclear collaboration with the wartime allies 13 Public Law 79-585, 60 Stat. 755. (141) 142 of the United States. The Act stipulated that until Congress should declare by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been established, there could be no exchange of information with other nations for the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes. Xo such joint resolution has ever been introduced. As the cold war intensified, the United States began to favor the sharing of some nuclear information to strengthen its NATO allies. To this end, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was amended in 1951 14 to authorize the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) under cer- tain conditions to enter into arrangements with allies of the United States to give them certain nuclear information. 15 In congressional debate on this amendment many Members indi- cated their belief that such nuclear cooperation should be entered into only for reasons so compelling as to overbalance the preference for secrecy of the original legislation. Clearly, the 1951 amendment was intended to strengthen military alliances rather than to foster commer- cial use of nuclear energy in Europe. The restrictions of the 194G atomic energy legislation upon U.S. technical cooperation with other nations are notable for attitudes they represent. During the war years, close collaboration of scientists and engineers of the allies had produced the atom bomb within the short span of six years from the initial observation of fission in uranium. Once atomic energy had entered the arena of international relations the attitude changed from cooperation to secrecy. One early task of U.S. diplomacy was to reconcile the nuclear interests of U.S. allies with this legislative constraint upon international cooperation and communication of information for nuclear energy. Initial Pessim ism To travel Nuclear Power Early postwar preoccupation with military use of nuclear energy and initial pessimism as to the commercial utility of nuclear power concentrated the impact of atomic energy upon American diplomacy. With the rapid expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, particularly after perfection of the hydrogen bomb, U.S. diplomats for many years operated from a unique position of strength that offset the rapid post- war reduction of the Nation's armed forces. That commercial nuclear power would soon be feasible seemed un- likely in the late 1940's. A leading theoretician of nuclear power, Dr. Walter Zinn, in draft ing the firsl program for nuclear power in 1947. called attention to the shortage of nuclear fuel. Existing stocks of uranium ores were judged scarcely large enough to sustain produc- tion of a modes! number of weapons, but inadequate to supply fuel for future nuclear power plants. Zinn concluded that the only hope for nuclear power lay in successful perfection of the breeder. Trans- " Public Law 82 235, 05 Stat. 692. u The Act amended Section 10. (a) (3) it required unanimous action by the five ('mn- ioners on such an agreement and provided further that certain Information about weapons nut be communicated ; thai no such arrangement be entered into with any nation "threatening the sccuritj of the United States"; thai the data involved ". . . shall he limited ami circumscribed i" the maximum degree consistent with the common defense ami Miu ri t y . . ." ; thai the Presidenl gel written recommendations of the National Security Council ami incorporate these in a determination that the arrangement would ". . . substantial]} promote ami would not endanger tin' common defense ami security of the United States . . ami that before tin' arrangement was consummated, the Joint Committi i' "a Atomic Energj should be Informed ami thirtj days pass. 143 luting the breeder concept into practice appeared to be extremely difficult and in 1947 the chances for successful breeding were said to be marginal at best. 10 The General Advisory Committee 17 shared Zinn's pessimism. On November 23, 11)47, the committee expressed doubt that it would be possible under the most favorable circumstances for any considerable portion of the power supply of the world to be replaced by nuclear fuel within 20 years. 18 Subsequent history confirmed their observation. Even by the early 1970s, nuclear power accounts for only a small percentage of electrical power generation in the United States and of the world. However, by the 1990s it is expected to supply half of the electricity needs of the United States and a quarter of U.S. total energy needs. Changing Technology mid Diplomacy During the late 1940's and early 1950's diplomats struggled toward international control of atomic energy. Efforts of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission resulted in diplomatic frustration. Mean- while, scientists and engineers were progressing toward commercial nuclear power, and the initial pessimism about commercial nuclear power shifted to optimism, an optimism that was soon to affect Amer- ican diplomacy. For example, in June 1952 a Canadian leader in nuclear energy, J. Lome Gray of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., said : 19 We are convinced, even with our present incomplete knowledge of this tech- nology, that fission of natural uranium will produce energy that can and will compete economically with coal or oil. We are thinking at this stage of quite large control power stations. A few months later, AEC Commissioner Eugene M. Zuckert wrote : 20 Study of the development of atomic energy from 1942 leads me to feel that the strides the engineers and scientists are making are so great that "power only" reactors may be nearer than we dare hope for, even though we are still in the early phases of research and development. By December 1952, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had concluded that atomic power for industrial purposes was technically feasible, and that the only problem was its cost. 21 Interest in International Collaboration If this optimism was to be justified, prototype nuclear power plants had to be designed, built, and put into operation to provide engineering and operating experience for the nuclear industries and the electric utilities. The AEC wished to get on with this demonstration, but its nuclear power program became caught up in the controversy of public versus private generation of electricity. One pragmatic solution was to build demonstration plants overseas. Arranging such demon- 16 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan. Atomic Shield, 1947/1952 (University Park, Pa. : The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1969). p. 29. 17 The General Advisory Committee to the USAEC was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and for almost a decade had a powerful influence within the Commission. 18 Hewlett and Duncan, op. cit.. p. 116. 19 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on .Atomic Energy. Atomic Poirer anil Private Enter- prise, 82nd Cong.. 2d Hess.. December 1952 (Joint Committee print), p. 3. 20 Loc. cit. Reference to "power only'' reactors is important, for previously many observers hwl argued that at best nuclear power could be economically competitive only as a byproduct from manufacture of plutonium for bombs. = l Loc. cit. 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 11 144 strations became the task of the diplomats. The AEC supported the idea of building demonstration plants abroad. In 1952, AEC Com- missioner T. Keith Glennan forecast an increasing demand abroad for nuclear power: "This demand naturally will arise first where present costs of electrical energy are high and this suggests that such a program may have an important place in a future Point Four pro- gram," J2 Europe was a likely location because it needed electricity and costs of European electricity were higher than in the United States. thus setting an easier economic goal for the designers and engineers. AEC Commissioner Henry D. Smyth endorsed the idea that the nuclear power stations might be built abroad with U.S. financial help through Point Four funds. He too pointed out that since power pro- duction in the United States was much cheaper than in other countries, the economic incentive for nuclear power would be greater abroad. By the early 1950's nuclear power had begun to attract the interest of the makers and executors of foreign policy. Still it remained of limited import as the governments and diplomatic services of the United States and its allies struggled to assure the survival of a free Western Europe. The experience then with a massive outpouring of U.S. fi- nancial and technical aid through multinational organizations was to point the way for later multinational ventures in nuclear power. The Evolving Scene: 191^5-1953 Eight years elapsed between the end of fighting in Europe and President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan of 195)1 The events and trends of these years generated pressures upon the United States to take new diplomatic initiatives. One initiative was the President's plan to foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the world by means which included construction and operation of demonstration nuclear power plants in Europe. These 8 years saw the initial recovery of Europe, the start of the cold war. the onset of economic stagnation in Europe, the mount- ing of the Marshall plan and the related establishment of the Or- ganisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), creation of the .North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Korean "War. U.S. pronouncement of the doctrine of massive retaliation, and the formation of two multinational European organizations for eco- nomic cooperation. 23 I UK POSTWAR STRUGGLE Fighting ended in Europe on May 5, L945. The enormous devasta- tion on the continent and in the British Isles made survival and restoral ion of commerce and industry the imperatives of the day. Yet despite this devastation, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe estimated that Western Europe had by 1946 regained its prewar levels of industrial production. Unfortunately, the extremely harsh winter of 1946 17 impeded this initial recovery, which came to a halt altofrtherin L947. -Ihi.l . p. 25 M While an examination <>r r.s Soviet relations In Europe lies outside the scop.' of this paper, there were i" be interactions between these power blocs with respeel ii> nuclear power, for background on the general relations, the reader may wish to consult Thomas \Volfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1915 t970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, L970). 145 With the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the elimination of the Nazi threat, the Soviet Union gave priority to its historical strug- gle with the capitalist world, the leading member of which was the United States. By 1047. Eastern Europe was under full Soviet domi- nation : the Soviet Union's subsequent refusal to accept Marshall plan aid for herself and her satellites decisively ended the wartime alliance and there began the period known as the cold war. The subsequent struggle short of war pervaded all sectors of society in both the United States and the Soviet Union, including the scientific and technical communities, as the two opponents attempted to prove the superiority of their respective systems. The Soviet threat to Western Europe, together with the threat of economic breakdown and resulting political instability, led to Presi- dent Truman's initiatives of the Marshall plan and the Truman doctrine. These moves were deemed necessary because conditions in Western Europe presented a power vacuum between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States feared that Soviet forces would enter Western Europe, especially through Germany, where they already had a foothold. Consequently, U.S. diplomatic objectives were aimed at strengthening Western Europe politically and eco- nomically until this power vacuum could be filled. THE MARSHALL PLAN The concepts of the Marshall plan were announced by Secretary of State George C. Marshall on June 5, 1947. The basic principle of American foreign policy was to foster closer collaboration among European nations. Further help from the United States therefore should be given only after these nations had agreed together upon their basic needs and had organized to make effective use of aid from the United States. Such aid was in the U.S. national interest, said Secretary Marshall, because the modern system of industrial division of labor in Europe was in danger of breaking down with a consequent demoralizing effect on the world, the generation of disturbances, and undesirable consequences for the U.S. economy. The Marshal] plan continued in operation until 1951. In addition to the financial support it provided, the plan also stimulated European nations to organize for economic development through the Organisa- tion for European Economic Co-operation. By the end of this remark- able venture in international aid. the industrial outputs of the United Kingdom. West Germany. France, and other nations of Western Europe had increased substantially over the levels of 1947, ranging from an increase of 35 percent for the United Kingdom to 334 per- cent for West Germany. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE On November 17. 1947, President Truman announced to a joint ses- sion of Congress that he would propose a long-range European re- covery program to support the freedom-loving countries of West- ern Europe in their endeavors to remain free. A few weeks later in his foreign aid message of December 19. 1947. the President proposed major U.S. aid to Europe, coupling this with the Marshal plan con- 146 cept of European joint action and also to the national interests of the United States. Unification in Europe Alter the crisis of initial survival had passed, the remaining problems facing the governments of Western Europe were three- fold : (1) To develop an effective system of collective security; (2) To sustain economic stability ; and ( :; ) To foster further industrial development, U.S. foreign policy toward European recovery received another, largely unanticipated, technological shock in 1949 when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic explosive. Four years later the U.S.S.R. tested its first hydrogen bomb. 24 As the Soviet Union began to acquire a nuclear arsenal, the nations of Western Europe, saw rea- son to seek unity in their future dealings with the Soviet bloc. A uni- fied or federated Western Europe also might hope to emerge as an independent global power, capable of exercising substantia] influ- ence in world affairs independently of the United States or the Soviet Union. The European approach to unity featured the creation of three international communities: a coal and steel community, a common market, and a nuclear power community. The European Coal mid Steel Com in mi ity A major step toward the goal of European unity was taken when West Germany, France. Italy, and the Benelux countries ( Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) ratified the Treaty of Paris on July 25, L952, and brought the European Coal and Steel Community ( EUSC) into force as an independent multinational organization. The treaty required that the six members remove all tariff and other bar- riers to the free movement of coal, iron ore, and steel within two years, and abolish all discrimination against imports from other members. Max Beloff of the Brookings Institution sees the importance of this multinational organization in the impetus it gave to Western Euro- pean cooperation and integration in political and defense matters. 25 Tin- Euro/" mi Economic Community Within a few years the example of the Coal and Steel Community led to the formation of two additional communities: a European com- mon market . and an atomic energx community. The starting point for these ventures was a conference of the for- eign ministers of the ECSC nations at Messina in June 1955, shortly before the opening of the United Nation's first international confer- ence on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Two years later the Treaty of Rome was signed, on March 25, L957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), commonly known as the Common Market. The treaty came into force on January 1. l!>f>8. The aims of the Common Market are to promote a harmonious development of economic activity and cooperation among its members through gradual elimination of financial and physical restrictions on the free movement of goods, capital, and workers among member countries: the harmonization of economic policies; and the consolida « December R, 1953 !»M:i\ Beloff, 77" United States Elsenhower, Mandate for Change: 1953 1956 (Garden City, N.Y. : Double day, 1963 I, p. 252 (150) 151 Minister Churchill at the Bermuda conferences of 1953, and receiving British encouragement, President Eisenhower offered his Atoms for Peace proposal in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 8, 1953. 33 Speaking first of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the President emphasized two atomic realities of the day : (1) knowledge of atomic power which some nations then possessed would eventually be shared by others; and (2) even a vast superiority in numbers of nuclear weapons would not prevent the damage and toll of human lives that could be inflicted by surprise aggression. Even against the most powerful defense, he said, an aggressor having enough atomic bombs for a surprise attack could probably inflict hideous damage on chosen targets. What, then, should be done? The consequences of in- action were too forbidding to accept. He said : 3i To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed — the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us from generation to generation — and the condemnation of man- kind to begin all over again the age old struggle upward from savagery toward decency, and right, and justice. The President proposed to promote peaceful uses of nuclear power as a way to reverse the trend of atomic military buildup. Nuclear ma- terials committed to peaceful purposes would not be available for weapons. To this end, he proposed that the nuclear nations of the world, primarily the United States and U.S.S.K., contribute fissionable materials to an international pool that would be administered by an International Atomic Energy Agency. This pool would provide fuel for abundant electrical energy to the power-starved areas of the world. The initial contributions to the pool would be small. However, the pro- posal had the great virtue, said the President, that it could be under- taken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a system of worldwide inspection and control. Elabo- rating on his proposal, the President said : 35 The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure. The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to supply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power- starved areas of the world. The President specifically invited participation of the Soviet Union and committed himself to seek the legislation necessary for the United States to carry out its part of the proposals. Within the United Nations, the response to the Atoms for Peace proposal was instantaneous and favorable. The speech was scored as a victory for the United States in international affairs by undercut- m "Address bv the President before the United Nations General Assembly," Congressional Record, vol. 100. January 7, 1954, pp. 61-63. 34 Ibid., p. 62. 35 Loc. cit. 152 ting a persuasive Communist propaganda offensive that represented the United States as motivated by "atomic imperialism'" and aimed at monopolizing the benefits of nuclear technology through its policy of atomic secrecy. James J. Wadsworth, later to become U.S. am- bassador to the conference that was to create the international agency, wrote that the United States had gained a diplomatic advantage over the Soviet Union by making the first overture to the world commu- nity for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 36 Implications for Nuclear Power in Europe From the point of view of Western Europe, the main implications of the Atoms for Peace message were threefold : (1) In principle it would be possible to obtain from the United States enriched uranium and scarce materials such as heavy water, for development of nuclear power, subject to agreements for ex- change of technical information and control of the materials supplied ; (2) The United Nations would be entrusted with supply and safeguards functions via the proposed international agency : (3) A great amount of scientific and technical information and data on nuclear energy would be released to the world. This latter was significant for until then much of the technology for nuclear power was kept secret in the United States. The first tangible result of the message was an international confer- ence on atomic energy sponsored by the United Nations in Geneva in 1955. In retrospect, the conference was a unique event. None of the three subsequent U.N. conferences released at one time so much scien- tific and technical information in such an exhilarating atmosphere. But the United States, which was the principal participant in the confer- ence, tended to oversell atomic energy, which many, if not all, countries looked to as a symbol of modernity and greatness. The year 1955 marked the launching of all-out nuclear programs in many countries, with attendant overestimating of promised benefits and underestimat- ing of the technical and economic problems of nuclear power. 37 Legislation for Atoms for Peace A complete redrafting of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 legislation quickly followed President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposals to clear the way for private development of civil nuclear power in the United State- and to open opportunities for nuclear cooperation with other nations and with international bodies. The modifications em- bodied in the 1954 legislation, 88 while permitting expanded interna- tional cooperation, also included provisions to insure that this coopera- t ion would promote, not compromise, national security. m James .1 Wadsworth. "Atoms for Peace " hi J, Stoessinger and A. Westin, eds., Power and Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Inc., 1964), p. 35. This aspeel of "over ell" is emphasized by Jules Queron, former general director of research ; i ml development for Euratom, In liis essay. "Atomic Energy In Continental Western Europe," in Richard L. Lewis and Jane Wilson, eds.. Mamooonin Pins Twenty- Yeara (New York : The Viking Press, t.iti I p. 146 ••Public Law 83 703, 68 Stat. 919, approved August 30, 1!»r>4. The vote In the House was 231 for. 154 against, 'i present, and 4.". not voting; in the Senate it was r.7 for, 28 against, nnd 11 not vrot inc. 153 THE EISENHOWER PROPOSAL TO CONGRESS Scarcely two months after his Atoms for Peace message, President Eisenhower on February 17, 1954 proposed revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 39 He called for expanded international cooperation in atomic energy, but was silent as to the proposed international atomic energy agency. The changes he recommended were to : Widen cooperation with U.S. allies in certain atomic energy matters ; Improve procedures for the control and dissemination of atomic energy information ; and Encourage broadened participation in the development of peace- time uses of atomic energy in the United States. 40 These recommendations, the President observed, were separate from his proposal to seek a new basis for international cooperation in atomic energy as outlined in his Atoms for Peace address. Consideration of additional legislation which might be needed for that proposal should await, he said, the outcome of discussions with other nations. 41 But no subsequent message ever came. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in May and June 1954 held extensive hearings on the proposed revisions of the Atomic Energy Act. Administration witnesses supported international cooperation for its benefits to the United States. AEC Commissioner Smyth testified that the requested amendments would contribute substantially to world peace, strengthen the national defense and the defense and economy of the free world, and assure the continued leadership of the United States in atomic energy. 42 Commissioner Thomas Murray further de- veloped the case : Industrially underdeveloped countries, whose future economic growth is being hampered by inadequate or high-cost fuels and electric energy, might benefit significantly if the technical and financial problems can be overcome. For the industrially advanced nations, encountering difficulty in continuing to secure adequate supplies of cheap fuel and electric energy in the face of diminished reserves and mounting costs for local or imported fuel, nuclear-power develop- ment may prove to be a key element in future industrial growth. 43 39 Atomic Energy Art of 1946 — Message from the President. (H. Doc. No. 32S) Con- gressional Record, Vol. 100. February 17, 1954, pp. 1921-1924. 40 Elaborating tbe reasons for international cooperation, the President spoke of the need for authority to provide certain information and also nuclear materials to foreign countries : In the development of peaceful uses for atomic energy, additional amendments are required for effective United States cooperation with friendly nations. Such coopera- tion requires the exchange of certain "restricted data" on the industrial applications of atomic energy and also the release of fissionable materials in amounts adequate for industrial and research use. I therefore recommend that the Atomic Energy Act be amended to authorize such cooperation. Such amendments should prescribe that before the conclusion of any arrangement for the transfer of fissionable material to a foreign nation, assurances must be provided against its use by the recipient nation for military purposes. Ibid., p. 1922. 41 Loc. cit. 42 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energv, Hearings, 8. SS2S and H.R. 8862, to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 191,6, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, part II, p. 562. 43 Ibid., p. 574. This point was made by EEC Commissioner Murray, an industrialist. 154 Secretary of State Dulles, after underscoring Soviet military nuclear progress, concluded that the strict secrecy requirements of the 1946 Act no longer represented the wisest international policy for the United States. He identified three circumstances that had combined to create the need to relax the original limits on international cooperation: (1) the developing Soviet nuclear program, (2) U.S. dependence on foreign uranium to manufacture nuclear weapons, and (3) legitimate hopes for nuclear power abroad. Arguing the benefits to U.S. self-in- terest, 44 Secretary Dulles supported the legislation, in part, so that the United States could stay ahead of the Soviet Union in providing knowledge of peaceful applications of atomic energy. 45 Replying to a question as to international implications of failure to enact the proposed amendments. Secretary Dulles claimed that it would be quite disastrous for the United States. 46 Some members of the Joint Committee expressed concern lest the proposed amendments be regarded as an international "giveaway" of U.S. secrets, technology, and materials. These fears were countered by Representative TV. Sterling Cole, then chairman of the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic Energy. He minimized the significance of the pro- posed relaxation of controls over exchange of scientific information with other countries. He observed that in comparison with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the new proposals made only one addition to information that could already be exchanged. This was dissemination of information on industrial and other applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This, he said, was no giveaway. So when you hear talk that this bill proposes to give vital information away to the peoples of the world, to foreigners, to enemies as well as friends, just tell those people who talk that way to look at the record. The bill does no such thing. It scarcely enlarges the field of the exchange of information beyond what is presently authorized by law. . . ." Interna fi oh ill Coopcrat'ton and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 The overhauling of the Nation's basic atomic energy legislation in l!>r>4 greatly expanded the scope of possible international relations to encourage commercial use of nuclear energy abroad. In doing so it placed new demands upon U.S. diplomacy. For this reason it is pertinent to identify provisions of the new law that affected move- ment of scientific information, technology, and materials of nuclear energy from the United States to other nations. 41 For example, be sa id : In extending abroad, under proper security safeguards, the evolving technology of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, we shall tighten the lion, is thai tie our- friends abroad to us, we Bhall assure materials resources that we need, and we shall maintain world leadership In atomic energy — leadership which today is such a large clement of our national prestige. Ibid., p. 685. *» He said : Other countries an- making progress In atomic-power technology. There Is n crowing tendency for certain raw materials supplying nations which are not industrially well advanced, to turn to such other countries for nuclear power information because they have l n disappointed by our Inability to give them significant help. It is clear to me that if this trend continues, ihe interests of the United states will be seriously and det- rimentally affected There is no need lure to emphasize how Important It Is for us in ■tay ahead of the U.S.S.R. In providing knowledge of how to put atomic energy to peaceful uses. ibid., p. <;85. M lie said : I would lie sorry if (lie international aspect of this hill failed . . . because I do want to emphasize with the greatest earnestness of which I am capable that I believe it would be quite a disastrous thing fi.r the United States If these foreign policy aspects of the hill were 1 1 ■ . i adopted. It would gravely Interfere in my opinion with our ability to get indispensable quantities of source material which we have to get from foreign markets and which I do not think we can continue to get except on a basis of exchange of Information, piTlng of information, which is more liberal than that which Is permitted by the present I. or. eil. ♦7 Congressional Records vol lno, July 23, 1954, p. 11656. 155 The Congress declared that development, use, and control of atomic energy should be so directed as to "promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition in private enterprise." To attain this goal, the Act speci- fied a program to : . . . promote the common defense and security and to make available to co- operating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common defense and security will permit. In support of this program, the Act authorized the AEC to cooperate with any nation by distributing nuclear fuel and source materials, and certain artificial radioisotopes. 48 International nuclear cooperation would be effected through bilateral agreements for cooperation with individual nations or with a regional defense organization. These agreements departed from conventional practice. Instead of being treaties, they were agreements negotiated by the AEC which were simpler to negotiate and did not require the advice and consent of the Senate for their ratification. This arrangement was judged appropriate because of the many foreign nations that were expected to wish to benefit from U.S. nuclear science and technology. Congress did place some limitations upon the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the State Department in negotiating such agreements. Section 123 of the Act required that each such agreement include: (1) The terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the cooperation; (2) A guaranty by the cooperating party that security safe- guards and standards agreed upon would be maintained ; (3) A guaranty by the cooperating party that any material to be transferred pursuant to an agreement would not be used for atomic weapons, or for research or development for weapons, or for any other military purposes ; and (4) A guaranty by the cooperating party that any material and any restricted data to be transferred would not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the cooperat- ing party except as specified in the agreement. Section 123 further required the President to approve each agree- ment for cooperation and to make a written determination that the proposed agreement would promote rather than constitute an unrea- sonable risk of the common defense and security. Finally, Congress preserved for itself the option to intervene by requiring that a pro- posed agreement for cooperation together with the Presidential ap- proval and determination must lie before the Joint Committee for 30 days while Congress is in session. The expanded legislative charter for AEC to foster use of nuclear power abroad prohibited transfer of information on design and fabri- cation of atomic weapons and limited the exchange of restricted data for peaceful uses to six categories. 40 Since 1954. this framework of legislative policy, program, and au- thorization has been the basis for U.S. cooperation with European Ji B, Lapp, Atoms and People (Now York: Harper k Brothers, Publishers, 1950), p. 182. Statement of Myron B. Kratzer, Director, Division of International Affairs, T T .S. Atomic Energy Commission, In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astro- nautics, Rubcommltl i International Cooperation in Science and Space, Hearings, A General Review of International Cooperation m Science ami space, 02d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, p, :::::: 157 Atoms for Peace has been unique as a form of international coopera- tion. While cooperation across national boundaries has occurred in many scientific fields, international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy came about as the result of deliberate decisions and spe- cific actions of governments, rather than of scientific communities, to share the benefits of an important new science and technology. The basic concept of Atoms for Peace was to draw on two major U.S. assets: (1) the knowledge of peaceful applications of nuclear energy; and (2) the industrial capacity of the United States to pro- duce in large quantities, and at reasonable cost, the essential materials of the nuclear age, especially enriched uranium. The costs to the United States of undertaking Atoms for Peace were to be minimal, inasmuch as the technology to be made available was under development for domestic use, while the plants and equipment al- read}* existed to supply the essential materials. Most of the capital in- vestment in special factories, laboratories, and test sites had already been made; thus, the U.S. contribution of nuclear resources to Atoms for Peace was limited largeh T to costs of materials and labor. In retrospect over 15 years, Atoms for Peace has involved only mod- est financial aid by the United States. U.S. cooperation has been flexi- ble, designed to meet the needs and capabilities of countries at various stages of technological and economic development. With the develop- ing countries, Atoms for Peace cooperation has tended to center on non- power uses of nuclear energy, particularly use of radioisotopes in medi- cine and agriculture. With the advanced countries, particularly in Europe, nuclear power has been the dominant theme of cooperation. 52 Not everyone has been sanguine about Atoms for Peace. W. Sterling Cole, after his experience as the first Director-General of the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency, was pessimistic. In the early 1960's he judged that the Atoms for Peace program no longer existed; that the United States gave only lip service.to the concepts of Atoms for Peace; that it was not a distinct entity ; and that it had become submerged in foreign aid along with other types of U.S. foreign assistance. He hoped that the President would revive and rejuvenate Atoms for Peace by setting it apart as a special type of assistance. 53 Whether Atoms for Peace has fared as poorly as this is a subjective question. As Cole has said, no separate agency was ever given the clearcut responsibility for carrying out the Atoms for Peace program. The AEC may have in- herited the responsibility, but it did not receive a specific legislative charter to take a strong promotional position. 62 II. id., p. 334. M Testimony of W. Sterling Cole. In U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Fnertrv, Hearing*, United States Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Aaencu S7th Cong , 2.1. Sess., 1962, p. :;:;. V. Bii-ateral Agreements for U.S. Technical Assistance to Commercial Nuclear Energy in Europe Realization of the ambitious goals for Atoms for Peace by other nations, particularly in Europe, required U.S. technical assistance in nuclear energy. Two well established methods for pursuing this policy were available. The United States could provide technical assistance directly to individual countries or it could also support and work through regional or international organizations. Each method had its advantages. Direct assistance was quicker, credit for successes would go to the donor nation, and there were the prospects of influence or lover- age for the donor in dealing with the recipients. International bodies, on the other hand, had a traditional function of setting standards and providing a neutral ground for exchange of information and coop- eration between nations of divergent policies and interests. In the case of atomic energy, both methods were employed. The United States through the Atomic Energy Commission has entered into many coun- try-to-country agreements — more commonly known as bilateral agree- ments. It also has cooperated with the European Atomic Energy Com- munity (Euratom) and with the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to open American nuclear technology to Europe, and is a principal member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which also has technical assistance functions. This section examines direct technical assistance from the United States through the mechanism of bilateral agreements with individual countries. It relies heavily upon two reports of the Atomic Energy Commission which were submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1960 during that committee's review of the international atomic policies and programs of the United States. 54 Legislation for Technical Cooperation in Nuclear Energy At the time of the Atoms for Peace message, the authority of the Government to provide technical assistance to foreign nations to encourage their use of nuclear power was severely limited. While the Atomic Energy Act of 194C> 55 provided for a program to share with other countries, on a reciprocal basis, information concerning the prac- t ical indusl rial applications of atomic energy, this could not be imple- mented before ". . . effective and enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes [could] be devised." 56 With the failure of the U.S. proposal for the international control of atomic energy, this con- dition was never fulfilled and the restriction ended the notable col- 423 I'M. P L. 585, 79th Cong., 60 Stat. 7. r ,r, 7:.. id . section I. (b)(2). (158) 159 laboration of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Bel- gium which had characterized the wartime atom bomb project. The only cooperation remaining after 1946 was in exploration for and pro- curement of uranium ores needed for the continuing nuclear weapons program of the United States. The restrictions on technical assistance were relaxed slightly in 1951 by an amendment to the Act 57 which authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to exchange certain infor- mation with other countries about the "refining, purification and sub- sequent treatment of source materials, reactor development, production of fissionable material, and research and development related to the foregoing." Canada was a primary beneficiary of this amendment. The Canadians had continued to transmit information on nuclear energy to the United States despite U.S. restrictions upon information in exchange. After this amendment, the United States was able to provide information to friendly nations that were beginning to show an interest in civil nuclear energy. Notable among these countries was Belgium, which still controlled large uranium deposits in the Belgian Congo. In this amendment, the Congress laid down four principles for U.S. technical assistance in nuclear energy, principles that were to be in- fluential when the Atomic Energy Act was rewritten in 1954. These were : (1) A prohibition against communications of weapons design and fabrication data ; (2) A requirement for adequate security standards in countries receiving classified information ; (3) A determination by the President that the arrangements would promote and would not endanger the common defense and security; and (4) A requirement that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy be informed of the arrangement 30 days prior to its consum- mation. The specification of these principles indicates ways the United States can control its technical assistance to and cooperation with other countries, ways which would not be possible were such assist- ance to be channeled exclusively through an international organization. The last principle also is of interest for it asserts congressional interest in arrangements for furnishing technical assistance to nuclear indus- tries abroad. During the early years of the technical assistance pro- gram, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy closely examined the individual agreements and their administration. The Joint Commit-, tee on Atomic Energy held hearings on international agreements in 1964, 1965, and 1966. Congress gave fresh recognition to international cooperation in nuclear energy when it revised the Atomic Energy Act in 1954. 5S One of six statutory programs and objectives specified in the Act was a "program of international cooperation to promote the common de- fense and security and to make available to cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely as expand- ing technology and considerations of the common defense and secu- rity will permit." 59 57 Public Law 82-235, 65 Stat. 692. 68 Public Law 83-703. 68 Stat. 919. 68 Sec. 3e. of P.L. 83-703. 96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 12 160 Additionally, the 1954 revision defined limits and procedures for technical cooperation with other nations and provided for certain forms of cooperation to be conducted under executive agreements, or "Agreements for Cooperation," commonly known as '"bilateral agree- ments." Under the revised act, the United States could encourage foreign use of atomic energy and nuclear power through various in- centives, which included : 1. Supplying nuclear fuel materials for research and power reactors ; 2. Providing assistance in the design and construction of these reactors ; 3. Exchange of certain scientific and technical information after mutually agreeable controls for sensitive materials and secret in- formation had been agreed upon. The. Congress specified detailed conditions and limitations on nego- tiation of the agreements. Section 123 of the Act states that no co- operation with any national or regional defense organization shall be undertaken until : a. the Commission, has submitted to the President the proposed agreement for cooperation, together with its recommendation thereon, which proposed agree- ment shall include (1) the terms, conditions, durations, nature, and scope of the cooperation: (2) a guaranty by the cooperating party that security safe- guards and standards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be main- tained ; (3) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material to be trans- ferred pursuant to such agreement will not be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development, of atomic weapons, or for any other military pur- poses: and (4) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any Restricted Data to lie transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will not be transferred to an unauthorized person or beyond the jurisdiction of the cooperating party, except as specified in the agreement for cooperation: b. The President has approved and authorized the execution of the proposed agreement for cooperation, and has made a determination in writing that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security : and c. The proposed agreement for cooj>eration. together with the approval and the determination of the President, has been submitted to the Joint Committee and a period of thirty days has elapsed while Congress is in session (in com- puting such thirty days, there shall he excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than .". days) . The. Act further specified that the communication of Restricted Data. 00 the export of facilities to produce of use nuclear fuel materials, and the distribution of nuclear fuel materials to another country could occur only pursuant to an Agreement for Cooperation. U.S. citizens and companies were prohibited from directly ot- indirectly engaging in the production of any nuclear fuel materials outside of the United States, except under an Agreement for Cooperation or an AEC au- thorization. Tn this way. the Act out control of cooperation between the domestic nuclear industry and private industries of other coun- tries firmly into the hands of ( he A EC. AEC Organization: the Division of International Programs In response lo the new positive outlook for international technologi- cal collaboration authorized by the Atomic Enersrv Act of 1054, the AEC established a Division of [international Affairs in November ••Tlif term "Restricted Data" Is defined to menu "nil dnta concerning (1) design, mnnu- f.-K-ii"-,. ,,r utilization of ntomle weapons : ('Ji the production of special nuclear material or i •"■ i the use of special nuclear material In the production of energy, bul shall not include data declassified or removed from 1 1 n- Restrict**'! Data category. . . ." 161 1955. Its function was to develop and direct a program of international cooperation for peaceful applications of atomic energy. The division's responsibilities included coordination of AEC activities relating to various types of agreements for international cooperation; assistance with negotiations for an International Atomic Energy Agency; and liaison with the State Department, including direct participation with the State Department in preparing proposals to be presented to the United Nations. 61 In a subsequent AEC reorganization, the division was renamed the Division of International Programs. The First Bilateral Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation The AEC moved quickly to use its new authority by opening nego- tiations with 27 countries for bilateral agreements. By the end of 1955, agreements with 22 countries had been comj^leted. The first agreements negotiated were those with the three wartime nuclear collaborators of the United States. Each agreement reflected the special and close relationship that had developed between the United States on one hand and the United Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium on the other. The differences among these agreements also re- flected the stages of development of the nuclear science and technology of the countries involved. PRESSURES TO PROMOTE XTJCLEAR POWER ABROAD The mid-1950s witnessed increased pressure to promote demonstra- tion of U.S. nuclear power technology abroad. One example of this pressure was a report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which was appointed by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1955 62 63 and was chaired by newspaper pub- lisher Robert M. McKinney. It urged vigorous measures to encourage the use of atomic energy abroad. The measures included convening a series of regional conferences with bilateral partners of the United States to establish realistic goals for nuclear power; U.S. supplying of nuclear fuels and technological assistance for installation of at least 1000 megawatts of nuclear power capacity outside the United States by I960 64 ; furnishing financial assistance through normal govern- mental and private channels; and applying of safeguards to such powerplants. 65 The anticipated returns from encouraging foreign nuclear power were seen as substantial for U.S. world leadership and also for the domestic nuclear industry. According to the McKinney panel : 66 61 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, July-December 1955 ( Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 85. w U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, S4th Cong., 2d Sess., January 1956. (Joint Com- mittee print i . 155 p. 84 One of the four principal instructions to the Panel was to "consider also the effects of the application of atomic energy upon economies and industries abroad." The Joint Committee instructed the panel to take into account the interlocking effects that such development and application abroad might have on the United States economy and industries. Ibid., p. v. 81 More specifically, the Panel recommended that the United States, In issuing invita- tions to such conferences, "announce that it Is prepared to furnish nnclear fuels, provide necessary technological assistance and permit contracts for the installation of at least 1 million kilowatts of atomic generating capacity outside the United States as soon as possible — we hope by 1960. The attention of the world should be called to the fact that such a program would parallel and possibly exceed the capacity installed during the same period at home." Ibid., p. 8. 65 Loc. cit. 66 Ibid., p. 95. 162 ... In the uncommitted areas of the world, American leadership in making atomic power available could be a strong influence in guiding these areas toward a course of freedom. In this sense, atomic power acquires great importance in international relations. This consideration should strongly influence our national policy as to the rate at which the development of atomic power suitable for such purposes is pressed. There is urgency for the development in the United States of atomic powerplants suited to the needs of the other nations of the free- world. . . This urgency which exists for foreign atomic power has domestic benefits as well. The growth of an atomic power program will probably not become signifi- cant before 1965. A gap may occur for the power equipment manufacturing industry between present domestic interest in atomic power reactors and actual sales in substantial volume. If the equipment manufacturers . . . are to be expected to carry forward research and development directed toward making atomic power competitive in the United States, the foreign market for power reactors with its high near term growth potential may offer a solution to bridg- ing this gap. The potential demand may represent a $30 billion market. But this sense of urgency was not strong enough to warrant U.S. incentives to the European electricity industry that went beyond those offered by the AEC to the domestic nuclear power industry. The McKinney Panel avoided proposals to supply nuclear fuel without charge, or to pay repurchase prices for byproduct plutonium from European power plants higher than those paid to domestic nuclear power producers. Also, no special financial arrangements were pro- posed. Instead, the panel preferred the normal channels of U.S. foreign financial assistance. "Any other course will complicate to the point of un workability what should be a straightforward comprehensive policy covering international activities of the United States." r,r In reference to the domestic concerns that byproduct plutonium from nuclear power might lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons, the McKinney Panel opted for a two-pronged approach to safeguards. It called for inspection rights under the bilateral agreements plus reprocessing of the used European fuel in the United States. 88 By April 1, 1958, the AEC had in effect 30 agreements for coopera- tion in nuclear research and 11 for nuclear power with 39 countries. Four more research agreements and three power agreements with an additional four countries were signed and being ratified. 09 Table I lists these agreements. •"Ibid., p. 06. «T1ic panel said: "We believe the United States should pet on with making atomic power available now to these nations. We believe that this can and should be done on an Interim basis with bilateral agreements permitting appropriate Inspection, providing for earmarking Of plutonium and uranium 233 thus recovered exclusively for further peaceful uses. Other control mechanisms for a broader nature can be devised and agreed upon later." Ibid., p. 96. "•U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearings, Development, Grotrth and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong.. '2d Sees., 1958, p. 79. 163 TABLE I— STATUS OF AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION AS OF APRIL 1, 1958 Cumulative number of countries Country Scope of exchange Effective date 1 Argentina 2 Australia 3 Austria 4 Belgium... 5 Brazil 6 Canada 7 Chile 8 China, Republic of 9 Colombia - 10 Cuba 11 Denmark 12 Dominican Republic 13 Ecuador 14 France 15 Germany, Federal Republic of. Germany: City of West Berlin. 16 Greece. 17 Guatemala 18 Israel 19 Italy.... 20 Japan 21 Korea, Republic of 22 Lebanon 23 Netherlands 24 New Zealand 25 Nicaragua 26 Norway 27 Pakistan 28 Peru 29 Philippines 30 Portugal 31 South Africa 32 Spain 33 Sweden.. 34 Switzerland... Switzerland 35 Thailand 36 Turkey 37 United Kingdom 38 Uruguay.. 39 Venezuela Research Research and Research Research and Research Research and Research do power, power, power. .do. .do. .do. do do Research and do power. Research. do... do... .do. .do. .do. .do do... Research and Research .do power. Research and Research do power. do do Research and do power. Research do. Power Research do Research and Research do power. July 29. May 28 July 13. July 21, Aug. 3 July 21 Aug. 8 July 18 July 19 Oct. 10 July 25 Dec. 21 Feb. 6 Nov. 20 Aug. 7 Aug. 1 Aug. 4 Apr. 22 July 12 July 2H Dec. 2/ Feb. 3 July 18 Aug. 8 Aug. 29 Mar. /' June 10 Aug. 11 Jan. 2b July 27 July 21. Aug. 22. Keb. 12, Jan. 18. July 18. Jan. 29. Mar. 13. June 10, July 21, Jan. 13 July 21 ,1955 ,1957 ,1956 ,1955 ,1955 ,1955 ,1955 ,1955 1955 ,1957 ,1955 ,1956 ,1958 ,1956 ,1957 ,1957 ,1955 .1957 ,1955 ,1955 ,1955 ,1956 ,1955 ,1957 ,1956 ,1958 ,1957 .1955 ,1956 ,1955 .1955 ,1957 ,1958 ,1956 ,1955 ,1957 ,1956 ,1955 ,1955 ,1956 ,1955 SIGNED AND IN RATIFICATION PROCESS AS OF APR. 1, 1958 Brazil.. Power 40 Costa Rica... ._ Research 41 Iran _ ._ do 42 Iraq do 43 Ireland do Italy Research and power. Peru do July 21,1957 May 18,1956 Mar. 5,1957 June 7,1957 Mar. 16,1956 July 3, 1957 July 19,1957 Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, hearings, "Development, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy Industry," 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, p. 79. 164 Providing Working Experience with Nuclear Energy For the United States to share the benefits of nuclear energy with other countries, particularly those of Europe, required a growing cadre of trained scientists and engineers in those countries. One way to ex- pose these technologists to U.S. nuclear technology was for them to be trained at and work in the laboratories of the AEC. Arrangements to this end were included in the bilateral agreements for cooperation. Another way was to encourage the installation and use of nuclear re- actors abroad which would provide still more experience for local scientists and engineers. Arrangements to this end were negotiated by the AEC and the Department of State with many countries. Some agreements provided for help in obtaining research reactors, others extended to demonstration nuclear power plants. The latter were to be of particular importance for fostering commercial nuclear energy in Europe. THE RESEARCH REACTOR PROGRAM U.S. efforts to get research reactors into the hands of scientists and engineers abroad began November 5, 1054. At that time Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge announced to the U.N. General Assembly that the United States was prepared to negotiate bilateral agreements with other nations. These agreements would commit the United States to supply technical assistance and nuclear fuel materials for the construc- tion and operation of research reactors. By the end of 1955, the AEC reported that agreements for the exchange of information on design, const ruction, and operation of research reactor- included the couut ries Japan, Lebanon, Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of China, Spain. Switzerland. Turkey, and Venezuela/ On June 11. 1955, President Eisenhower at Pennsylvania State Uni- versity outlined new programs to enlarge the scope of U.S. assistance to other nations in development of research and power reactor projects under agreements with other nations or through the International Atomic Energy Agency. For research reactors the President proposed that the United States* would contribute half the cost and furnish the nuclear fuel needed. lie said : 71 We propose to offer research reactors to the people of free nations who can use them effectively for die acquisition of the skills and understanding essential to peaceful atomic progress. The United states, in the spirit of partnership that moves as. will contrihute half the cost. We will also furnish the acquiring na- tion the unclear material needed to fuel the reactor. To keep the commitment within bounds, the arrangements for fi- nancing set a limit of $350,000 upon the U.S. contribution, which was to he paid in dollars to the cooperating nation after it had completed the project and certified the completion. By the end of 1!K>7. six re- search reactors of US. manufacture were in operation abroad and 10 others were under construction or on order. The total US. commitment at thai time was $2.4 million for the research reactor projects. Some doubts and insights: Several years later, in 1964, the Joint ( Jommittee \ oiced some reserval ions as to the accomplishments of the 7 " r s. Atomic Energv Commission, Major ictirities in the Itomic Energy Programs, .lulu December 1955 (Washington, D.C. : U.'S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 85. 71 r.S atomic Energy Commission, Eighteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission (Washington, D.C. : r.s. Government Printing Office, 1055), p. 13. 165 research reactor program. By then a total of 26 grants had been made to 12 countries which had established atomic energy programs. While the initial purpose of this program had been to provide scientists with working experience with nuclear reactors, some nations sought posses- sion of a research reactor as a symbol of national prestige although they lacked the trained scientists to operate them. The AEC was faced with a touchy international issue. Rather than offend some na- tions by refusing them research reactors, the AEC often installed them in countries that could not use them effectively. 72 Today there is little mention of these research reactors. For the in- dustrial countries, they have served their initial purpose and have been bypassed by more modern reactors for experimentation and the training of nuclear scientists and engineers: for the developing coun- tries the reactors, while perhaps a mark of prestige, did not appre- ciably accelerate the use of atomic energy. In retrospect, the research reactor program raises the question of how far a highly industrialized, technological nation should go in providing sophisticated equipment to countries lacking the personnel or the industrial base to use it effec- tively. There is also the question of the extent to which scientific and technical manpower assigned to these research reactors in the develop- ing nations could have been more profitably assigned to other work of greater short term benefits. Fuel for research reactors : Initially the United States limited its offer to supply nuclear fuel for research and test reactors to material of 20 percent enrichment or less, which could not be readily used for clandestine manufacture of nuclear weapons. By 1956, the desire of the industrial nations for improved research and test reactors had caused the United States to announce a major revision in policy which permitted the export of uranium enriched up to 90 percent for use in special testing reactors. This raised the safeguards issue. The United States required the recipient nations to accept comprehensive controls and safeguards. Two years later, in 1958, this policy was liberalized when the AEC announced that highly enriched fuel could be supplied for research as well as test reactors. The following year, in 1959, the AEC announced its intention to lease such materials to foreign countries either through the International Agency or through bilat- eral agreements. THE POWER REACTOR PROGRAM If the United States wished to demonstrate the use of U.S. nuclear power technology in Europe, it had to attract the interest of European utilities. The "power agreements" were the means to this end. In his June 11, 1955 announcement, President Eisenhower said : 73 72 The USAEC commented on this as follows : During the recent hearings on our agreements for cooperation, we discussed the matter of follow-up on the research reactor grants which had been made to developing countries. Information on these grant reactors is received from a variety of sources such as reports by our AEC scientific representatives, reports by IAEA technical teams and consultants, and reports by United States scientists. From these reports we are able to obtain an idea of the extent to which these reactors arc being utilized. In general, we have con- cluded that these reactors are making a contribution to the scientific program of the country but they are also capable of being used to a greater degree. Cf. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agreements for Cooperation, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.. 1964, p. 127. 73 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Eighteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January-June 1955, op. cit., p. 13. 166 Within prudent security considerations, we propose to make available to the peoples of such friendly nations as are prepared to invest their own funds in power reactors, access to and training in the technological processes of construc- tion and operation for peaceful purposes. By the end of 1955, several countries had initiated negotiations in response to this invitation. Early in 1956, negotiations were concluded with the governments of Australia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland for the iirst bilateral agreements for power reactor projects. The agree- ments provided for the transfer of Restricted Data 74 and special nu- clear materials. They also provided for sale of nuclear fuel materials to each country, with the United States retaining an option to the plu- tonium produced and the right to approve the transfer of such pluto- nium to any other nation or to an international organization if the United States decided not to exercise its option. Additionally, subject to limitations of available space, facilities, and personnel, the United States and its bilateral partners agreed to open their specialized nu- clear research facilities to each other. The first bilateral agreement for nuclear power development also opened the way for direct relations between representatives of the U.S. nuclear industry and private individuals and organizations in the cooperating nations, thus removing the AEC as a direct participant in commercial dealings. Other provisions of the bilateral arrangements provided for: 75 (1) Patent arrangements covering inventions or discoveries resulting from the exchange of Restricted Data; (2) Security and safeguards arrangements to protect classified information and equipment and nuclear materials; (3) Future consultation about transfer of rights or responsibil- ities of the agreement, particularly those relating to safeguards to the International Atomic Energy as might be mutually agreed upon, and (4) Disclaiming of any warranty by the communicating Party on the accuracy and completeness of information, material, equip- ment or devices transferred under the agreement and of its suit- ability for any particular use or application. 74 At that time exchange of Restricted Data was significant, for much of nuclear power technology was still classified ami unavailable In open literature. The Restricted Data to lie exchanged Included: (1) general Information on research reactors, experimental and demonstration power reactors; (2) technical Information as mighl lie agreed upon for specific research ami demonstration power reactors; and (3) the exchange of classified information on reactor materials, specifications, physics and engineering, and also of environmental safety information. Restricted Data of military Significance were not to be exch.i aged. " It should he noted that this disclaimer was also used by the UISAEC for information, materials, devices, services, etc., that It supplied to the domestic nuclear Industry and so was not unique to the bilateral agreements. 167 The term of each of the first bilateral agreements was 10 years. By l ( .>r>7. advancing technology of nuclear power led several Euro- pean countries to the initiation of negotiations with the United States for the transfer of large quantities of nuclear fuel for specific power projects. Such arrangements were requested by the governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Union of South Africa. Subsequent bilateral agreements with the European nations were considered as interim measures pending the establish- ment of the Euratom Supply Agency. A decade later, nuclear power was so far advanced in Europe that availability of nuclear fuel to cover long-term requirements for nu- clear power programs became a subject for negotiation. New bilateral power agreements were negotiated which committed the United States to supply nuclear fuel over a term of 30 years to Switzerland and Sweden, and for 10 years to the United Kingdom. These agreements also reflected an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act in 1064 76 which permitted private ownership of nuclear fuel materials, opening the way for wholly commercial transactions between companies in the U.S. nuclear industry and customers abroad in countries having bi- lateral agreements with the United States. These new agreements also specified that the IAEA would promptly be requested to assume re- sponsibility for applying safeguards to the material transferred under agreements. In addition, the agreements committed the United States to supply nuclear fuel materials to these governments, or to enrich uranium supplied by them. 7? The Bilateral Agreement Situation in 1971 At the end of 1971, the AEC had in effect 34 Agreements for Coop- eration in Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States and other nations or groups of nations. These agreements c